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
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
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## SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC

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# Security in the Pacific

*A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of  
the Institute of Pacific Relations*

*Hot Springs, Virginia*

*January 6-17, 1945*

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT  
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

*1 East 54th Street, New York 22  
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## PREFACE

The purpose of this volume is to report the discussions which took place at the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held at Hot Springs, Virginia, from January 6 to January 17, 1945. It is not intended as a comprehensive, detailed report of the Conference but aims at making available as soon as possible the main opinions which emerged from the round tables and plenary sessions. In this it follows the precedent established in *War and Peace in the Pacific*, the report of the Eighth Conference held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec in December 1942.

The Conference discussions were based on an agenda distributed some time in advance. Attention was directed to six main questions:

(1) What were the most significant developments in 1944, in their bearing on relations between the United Nations and the prospects of establishing foundations for a durable peace and economic, social and political progress among the peoples of the Pacific?

(2) What will be the effects of defeat on Japan, what principles should determine policy in relation to Japan and how should these principles be given concrete expression?

(3) What economic problems will exist in the Pacific area after the war and how should these problems be attacked so as to promote economic recovery and ensure continuing progress?

(4) In what way has the war affected cultural and race relations in the Pacific area, and by what means may these relations be improved?

(5) What problems are involved and what policies and methods should be adopted to promote the welfare of dependent peoples and assist them towards self-government?

(6) How should the organization of collective security be designed in the Pacific area in order to ensure a durable peace?

The significant developments in 1944 were covered by statements made in plenary session. These provided the starting point for round table discussions. The future of Japan and collective security in the Pacific were discussed in four parallel round tables; economic problems, race and cultural relations and problems of dependent areas were each discussed in two parallel round tables.

*The present report is based on the rapporteurs' summaries of these discussions and on addresses and statements made in plenary sessions. The rapporteurs' statements were accepted by the round tables (in some cases after being amended) before being presented to plenary sessions. This must not be taken to mean that every member of a round table*

## Security in the Pacific

*approved of every opinion in a report, but simply that the round tables accepted the rapporteurs' statements as satisfactory summaries of the main points in the discussions. The reports in this volume aim at a synthesis of the rapporteurs' statements. This method has been adopted to avoid cumbersome overlapping, duplication and repetition; but care has been taken to record as far as possible differences in viewpoint and to preserve the balance of argument. The use of such words as "agreement" and "consensus" does not indicate that questions were put to the vote or that they were formally "accepted" or "adopted." It is difficult to avoid using such expressions, but they must be understood to denote only each rapporteur's personal estimate of the prevailing trends of opinion in his round table, supported however by the acceptance of the rapporteur's statement by his round table as a reasonably correct judgment on such trends of opinion.*

The membership of the Conference included men and women from the following countries: Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Korea, the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. As will be seen from the Conference membership list (page 149) observers came from the International Labour Office, the League of Nations Secretariat, the Rockefeller Foundation and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The French group included three members from Indo-China. The United Kingdom group included a member from Burma.

Although there is a National Council of the IPR in the Soviet Union, that Council did not send any of its members to Hot Springs. The Chairman of the IPR in Moscow had cabled in December 1944 expressing regret that his Council could not participate. Full participation of the U.S.S.R. Council in the international work of the Institute has been prevented principally by the fact that the Soviet Union is not at war with Japan. Moreover as in other countries the almost complete mobilization of scientific personnel would have in any case imposed serious difficulties. Because members of the Institute in all other member countries have been publicly committed to the defeat of Japan, the Soviet IPR leaders have desired to be released temporarily from active participation. The Soviet Council is, however, engaged in major studies on the history of diplomatic relations in the Far East.

The Conference was private and, in accordance with previous IPR practice, the identity of participants in the round tables is not revealed in the report of the discussions.

### *Preface*

The undersigned, and Mr. T. A. Bisson and Mr. Bruno Lasker are responsible for the editing, selection and arrangement of the material.

Neither the Institute of Pacific Relations as a whole nor any of its National Councils is responsible for statements of fact or opinion appearing in this report. All statements at the Conference were made solely on the individual responsibility of the speakers. The editors, of course, and not the Institute or its National Councils, are responsible for the selection of the material to be included and any judgments which may have been necessary in its use.

*New York*  
*February 9, 1945*

H. BELSHAW  
*Research Secretary*

*For the convenience of readers, the text of the Dumbarton  
Oaks Proposals is included, p. 137.*





## FOREWORD

As this introduction was being written the radio announced that representatives of the United Nations were to meet at San Francisco on April 25th to fashion the Dumbarton Oaks proposals into the new pattern of world security. To a generation which had been but uneasy transients in the house of peace and who long years before had been hustled half-prepared to travel the bitter road of war, there was now at least a more secure promise, which would hasten the remaining miles of a shortening journey.

The reports of the Yalta meeting of the leaders of the Big Three created an international atmosphere which was very different from that when the Conference met at Hot Springs only a month before. At that time, despite the certainty of victory, and indeed in a measure because of it, doubts of the will to cooperate among the United Nations in the cause of durable peace were brought into the open.

When the previous conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations met at Mont Tremblant in December 1942, there was belief in victory, but no one knew how long it would be, or how arduous the achievement. So the Mont Tremblant Conference had devoted a great deal of attention to the promotion of fuller inter-allied cooperation in hastening at the end of the war. Since then, the tide of German and Japanese invasion, already about to ebb, had been rolled back with an accelerating speed. German forces had been driven into Northern Italy. "D" day, long awaited, had broken, and the enemy was driven across France and Belgium to the Siegfried Line. Soviet armies had forced him back to his own frontiers. In the Pacific the Japanese navy was decimated in a series of dramatic defeats. Bases ever closer to Tokyo were captured, and the Japanese homeland increasingly felt the weight of American air power. On the eve of the Institute's conference, Russian armies were massing to leap on Berlin. The liberation of the Philippines was well under way. The news from China, however, was grim; the military situation still prevented adequate supplies from reaching armies, weary after eight years of war, but still in the fight. It looked as if Japan might advance her strategic design on the mainland, heap more distress and humiliation on an already long suffering people, and prolong the war. But the over-all picture was very promising indeed.

In the political and economic spheres also there had been much which seemed noteworthy in terms of achievement or promise. Moscow, Teheran, Cairo, and Dumbarton Oaks were names symbolic of the will

## *Security in the Pacific*

to cooperate not only in pursuit of the war but also in laying the foundation for durable peace. In the hotel where the IPR Conference was meeting, the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture had made initial plans for a world organization which would aim to insure higher standards of nutrition and improved agricultural efficiency and rural welfare. It was followed by the establishment of UNRRA, by Bretton Woods and other conferences. The Presidential election in the United States had given greater confidence that American participation in international affairs would continue in full measure after the war.

Yet in January 1945 the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations was set against an uneasy international background. The German counter-attack from the Ardennes in December was sufficiently unexpected to prick the bubble of over-confidence. It might even prolong the war in Europe somewhat; and there was still the dragging struggle in China. But the reasons for the uneasiness went deeper. The situations in Poland, Yugoslavia, Italy and Greece revealed conflicts of policy, signs of Allied disunity. Perhaps the stage was being set for the old game of power politics. There were mutual recriminations in the United States and Great Britain. France was restless over delayed recognition of her return to the status of a great power. Criticism in the American and British press of conditions in China was disturbing public opinion in the former countries and causing some Chinese resentment. The continued deadlock in India and the belief of many that acceptable colonial policies had not yet been clearly formulated gave some concern, while countries with colonial interests resented criticisms which they regarded as over-simplified generalizations based on insufficient knowledge of the facts. Especially were they irritated by such criticisms when they came from America, where, in their view, the problem of racial minorities still awaited determined attempts at a solution. Equally, the rest of the world still asked firmer assurance of full acceptance by the United States of its responsibilities to promote world freedom from want and fear. In some quarters there were suspicions over America's postwar economic policy which it was feared might be pursued aggressively, as a form of commercial imperialism.

The incomplete Dumbarton Oaks plan was under fire; for the right of veto by the major powers weakened its moral appeal. The smaller nations were concerned because the plan took them too little into account and made for too easy dictation by the great powers.

Among peoples of the Pacific, also, there was the suspicion that the great powers, and many lesser powers as well, were Western-minded

## Foreword

and saw the problems of Eastern Asia through the eyes of Europe. Moreover, in the world of January 1945, it seemed in every country, as post-war problems came closer, that there was a natural tendency to regard them unduly from national viewpoints, in the light of national interests. There is always more prospect of difference as we move from broad general principles to the detailed problems of their concrete application. In the process the principles sometimes become confused.

And behind all this was the susceptibility to irritation of a generation suffering from a great war weariness.

The Conference was a microcosm: a mirror reflecting the frictions and uncertainties and conflicts of interest in the larger world. In this it served a useful, if disturbing purpose. But even more it brought a substantial measure of consolation; for through all the differences there emerged a substantial unity on many important questions. Conference members might differ on the precise treatment of the Japanese Emperor or the *Zaibatsu*, or on the best method of preventing rearmament, but there was very general agreement on the necessity for unconditional surrender, the disposition of Japanese overseas territories, the necessity for Allied unity in keeping Japan disarmed, the importance of an economically healthy Japan, subject always to the reservation that economic health in other Pacific countries should be given priority. There were differing views on how best the military forces at the disposal of a world security organization might be composed and applied, but there was substantial agreement on the place of regional groupings in any security organization and on the importance to world peace of functional agencies for economic and social purposes. No unanimity emerged on the timing and method to be applied in preparing so-called dependent peoples for self-government or on the precise form in which the principle of international responsibility should be expressed, but there was little denial that preparation for self-government should be the aim and that it did involve international responsibility. There was agreement on the importance of a strong and democratic China and of rising standards of living in the Pacific; and an understanding of the necessity for economic assistance from the richer countries, especially the United States, to achieve these ends. Above all, there was the recognition that, while there were special problems in the Pacific which should not be viewed entirely through European eyes, yet these must be set in a world design.

The Hot Springs Conference was a fitting prelude to the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations. It covered very many of the problems which will there call for decision. The members of the Hot Springs Con-

## *Security in the Pacific*

ference came, not as negotiators or policy makers, but as private citizens, laymen and experts in many fields, deliberating in unofficial capacities. They expressed important elements of both public and expert opinion from Pacific countries, or countries with interests and responsibilities in the Pacific area; views of which policy makers might well take account. Their emphasis was on the Pacific area, the source of many of those strains which may again shatter the peace everywhere if they are not removed or eased, but it was an emphasis which gave full recognition to the necessity for a wider harmony covering the whole world.

*New York*

*February 12, 1945*

*The Editor*

## CONTENTS

PREFACE .....	v
FOREWORD .....	ix
I. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN 1944 (Opening State- ments) .....	1
II. THE FUTURE OF JAPAN (Round Table Discussions) .....	21
III. ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND PROGRESS IN PACIFIC COUNTRIES (Round Table Discussions) .....	52
IV. CULTURAL AND RACE RELATIONS (Round Table Dis- cussions) .....	69
V. THE FUTURE OF DEPENDENT AREAS (Round Table Discussions) .....	80
VI. COLLECTIVE SECURITY (Statement and Round Table Discussions) .....	99
VII. SOME CONCLUDING STATEMENTS.....	127

## APPENDICES

I. PROPOSALS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GEN- ERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. (Dum- barton Oaks) .....	137
II. PAPERS PRESENTED TO THE NINTH I.P.R. CONFER- ENCE .....	146
III. CONFERENCE MEMBERSHIP.....	149



## CHAPTER I

### SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN 1944

#### *(Opening Statements)*

*The Programme Committee set aside two plenary sessions at the beginning of the Conference for opening statements on "Significant Developments in 1944," which was the first topic on the agenda. These plenary sessions were intended to provide a common starting point for round table discussions on the remaining topics.*

MR. EDGAR J. TARR, CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE, opened the first plenary session with the following address:

The underlying purpose of the Institute of Pacific Relations is to help in promoting mutual understanding and international cooperation in the Pacific area. We have long since fully recognized that while in emphasis of detail we stress the Pacific, that area is, nevertheless, part of an interdependent world. The objectives aimed at cannot be achieved except on an even broader basis of understanding and cooperation.

Bearing this in mind, it must be admitted that we are meeting at a disturbingly critical time, and the occasion is a challenging one for the members of this Conference. I am not referring to the military situation which confronts us, but rather to the political.

The principles of collective action for the maintenance of peace and the promotion of economic welfare have been adopted, proclaimed and reiterated in the Atlantic Charter, in the Moscow Declaration, in the Lend-Lease Agreements, at Dumbarton Oaks, and time and again through the spoken word of the leaders of the nations. Against the background of these clearly enunciated and generally accepted principles, a good many happenings of the last few months stand out in alarming contrast, and it is clearer than ever that the task of building peace and organizing for economic and social welfare is fraught with difficulty and danger.

Even under all the unifying influences arising from joint military effort in a war which is not yet won, we have been shocked by evidence of lack of mutual understanding and common purpose in a series of instances. We have seen an open dispute between the United States and Great Britain about Italian policy. We have seen the Chicago Conference end in comparative failure, or at most, meager success. We have noted an absence of agreement amongst the Big Three regarding the Polish question, when Great Britain, being in Europe, felt compelled to declare itself in advance of common agreement with the United States. We have seen the tragedy of Greece, with its unsettling reactions almost every-

## *Security in the Pacific*

where. We have noted a growing tendency to interpret conditions within China in such a way as to retard the development of broadly based mutual understanding and confidence. We have heard many criticisms of the Bretton Woods draft, some at least of which seem to arise out of a desire to unduly stress special national interests. The list could easily be lengthened, but why go on? The fact is that the Big Three and the Big Four, and all the rest of us too, while ready enough to subscribe to general principles of international cooperation, frequently fail in making those principles live in the only way they can be given life — namely, in agreed application to individual events and circumstances.

The application of the principles which have been generally agreed upon must not await the cumbersome process of formal completion of all-inclusive international agreements. If under the uniting pressures of the present struggle we cannot agree upon their application from day to day, the postwar prospect will not be bright.

As we think of the setbacks, failures and threatened failures, I doubt the wisdom of concentrating on an attempt to assess and divide the blame amongst the powers. Is it not true that each must bear some portion of the blame, and that there is a general and underlying cause from which most disturbing instances have arisen? I suggest that this arises out of the fact that in almost every nation there is a tendency to lose a proper sense of proportion between, on the one hand, the attainment of broadly based international cooperation, political, economic and social, and on the other hand, the protection of national interests in the event of the primary objective not being achieved.

In one case this may show itself in a determination to procure strategic frontiers, in another to establish or maintain spheres of influence, in another the attempt to benefit the postwar trading position, or in another the assuring in our own country or other countries a form of government in keeping with our own particular ideology.

I do not suggest that there is no proper place for any such objectives. When a military staff is planning a great and sustained offensive it gives some consideration to the defensive position in the event of the offensive not carrying through. It is possible that on the Western Front recently we have witnessed an occasion when not sufficient thought was given to this secondary purpose. Nevertheless, it remains true that if a military staff contemplating a great offensive concentrated the major portion of its thought and energy on defensive measures in the event of the offensive not succeeding, the offensive would in advance be condemned to failure.

We are engaged in a great offensive to establish peace and economic



### *Significant Developments in 1944*

welfare through international collaboration and collective action. Are we not jeopardizing the success of that offensive by devoting too large a proportion of thought and energy to national defensive measures in contemplation of failure? If so, what chance will there be for success in the great offensive?

All the second bests cannot be attained by all the nations, because many of them are mutually incompatible, but even if they could be, few long-term benefits of security and economic progress would be gained. The next world catastrophe might be delayed somewhat, but we would be travelling the road that leads to it.

Leadership, particularly the leadership of the great powers, is falling short of the expectations of mankind. For some of us this is the eighth year of war, for some the sixth, and others the fourth, and the end is not yet. Our various peoples are weary but determined, and who will dare say they are not willing to follow a leadership which is prepared to take risks in trying to secure that degree of international cooperation which alone gives promise for a long term of peace.

Is it too much to hope that this Conference of the IPR will be something of a clarion call to put first things first? This does not involve an idealistic selflessness on the part of any individual or nation. It does not involve complete unconcern with one's own nation's special interests. What it does demand is the wholehearted cooperation of all in the attainment of the primary international objectives and the recognition that this in itself is the most important national interest of each. It calls for a readjustment of emphasis in thought and effort and, doubtless in some instances, concessions of lesser short-term national interests in order to make possible the achievement of the greater.

If this Conference can make even a small contribution toward the achieving of a proper balance it will have been very much worthwhile.

During the next ten days, as we discuss various subjects, whether military, political, economic or social, there will be occasions when each of us will see what appears to be a conflict between our national interests and broadly based collective action. May we stop, look and listen before committing ourselves to the national line. Let us ask ourselves if we may not be taking too narrow and short-term a view of our own national interests and, if others did likewise, what chance of general cooperation?

It is sobering to realize that the attitudes of our peoples and the actions of our governments during the next twelve months will probably determine whether the end of hostilities, whenever that may be, will mark the beginning of another armistice or the ushering in of prolonged peace.

## *Security in the Pacific*

*The Chairman's address was followed by a number of statements by chairmen, or members of national groups. These statements are now summarized.*

MR. W. W. WAYMACK, MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN GROUP

In examining events of significance to the United States in 1944, the speaker first referred to the invasion of the Philippines. "This," said Mr. Waymack, "represents the beginning of the involvement of our army in the Asiatic theater. We are now meeting the Japanese Army. American forces in Asia will tremendously increase. Perhaps the effect of that will be a shift of focus from Europe to the Pacific, in 1945 and 1946. In the past the tendency has been to focus habitually eastward and not westward. The habit has been to force our eyes to look westward across the Pacific, and then as soon as it was possible we looked eastward again. Our want of concentrated attention on the Pacific and the problems there and beyond has had one effect—over-simplification of problems that exist in that area, along with that a deep sympathy with peoples who are suffering hardship, a feeling of deep sympathy for the under-dog. The tendency to over-simplify is a weakness that develops complexities."

The tendency to over-simplification, in the speaker's opinion, had deleterious effects on policy in relation to Japan. In his state of Iowa, everyone thought that the circumstances of the Pacific war called for a hard peace, but the understanding of what this involved was vague and there was no clear definition of the policy which should be adopted. There was distinct support for the development of a program of collective security in the Pacific and a feeling, again ill-defined, that national interests would necessitate the acquisition of permanent bases. Interest in the Pacific would intensify as the campaign progressed.

Another development of importance was the European set-back which came as a shock to the American public, prone as it was to over-optimism. The crisis in the European military situation, however, had increased rather than decreased the desire for more rapid progress in achieving international military and political unity.

In Mr. Waymack's opinion the recent deterioration in international relations had not affected the attitude of the general public, but it might be dangerous because "it encourages divisionists—ranging from Anglophobes to some semi-reconstructed ex-isolationists. We have them in the Congress, in the Senate, men who hold influential positions, who have said they were converted, but who are really fence-sitters."

In the American scene, the election campaign, which lasted through-

### *Significant Developments in 1944*

out the year, was one "dominant fact." It was of considerable consequence, because of the attitude which it revealed towards international affairs.

The very good record of Nisei troops in operations in Italy was regarded by the speaker as having a great deal of significance. There was evidence that the new veterans' associations would resent color discrimination. This did not mean a soft attitude towards the Japanese enemy, but it might contribute towards a solution of an increasingly acute social problem in the United States itself.

#### DR. CHIANG MON-LIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE CHINESE GROUP

The keynote of Dr. Chiang's address was the indivisibility of peace. "While our discussions are naturally confined to the problems arising out of the Pacific, let us not forget that just as this war is necessarily global in nature, the peace and its problems will also be such that we may find it impossible at times to regionalize our discussion. Not only are war and peace indivisible, but we shall find, I am certain, that the problems in one region are inextricably connected with those of the other regions and that in fact we shall have to consider the Pacific not as an entity in itself but as part and parcel of the world as a whole. Aviation and radio have shortened spaces to a degree to which even the most lethargic-minded individuals are forced to think in terms of world reactions rather than of towns, cities and nations.

"We are fortunate to have before us as references and perhaps for guidance as well, the important declarations of the Moscow, Cairo and Teheran conferences. But events have moved so fast that we cannot help conceiving ideas and seeing problems which have arisen since those important gatherings of Allied leaders.

"The year just past has been one of vital progress for the Allies. The Allied forces in Europe are forging ahead despite the terrific resistance put up by Hitler. In the Pacific we have seen the beginning of our naval offensive. In Burma, Allied land forces have practically come through to a point where the Chinese units fighting from Yunnan have at long last joined with the forces from inside Burma. The day will not be long when supplies can again flow into China to relieve the isolated Chinese army which has fought for eight long years. The people of China have never wavered, never lost heart in their darkest days. From the beginning of our resistance we were certain that countries like Germany and Japan would eventually be outlawed. Now we are nearer to our aim and hopes than ever. Nothing short of a total and complete defeat of Japan

### *Security in the Pacific*

will guarantee to us in the Pacific the minimum condition of peace. But what constitutes a total defeat for Japan and how we shall treat her after her military defeat are problems which we shall have to go into at this conference.

"We are also fully convinced that unless the relations between countries in the Pacific can be set on the basis of cooperation and mutual trust, there cannot be lasting peace even with the defeat of Japan.

"The last but not the least factor for peace in the Pacific is the building up of China as a democratic and industrialized nation. The Chinese Government and the people are fully aware of their responsibility and purpose in attaining this goal."

#### M. PAUL EMILE NAGGIAR, CHAIRMAN OF THE FRENCH GROUP

M. Naggiar spoke of the "miracle" of French liberation following so shortly after the desperate fighting of "D" day. This was due, above all, he said, to the bravery, skill and thorough preparation of the Allied high command, officers and men. But France was proud also of her own contribution to these victories, not only by the participation of regular armies under the command of General Eisenhower, but also of the people of France, who had very few weapons, often no weapons at all. "Nevertheless, we fought an obscure and bloody guerrilla's warfare against German garrisons and means of communication in such an effective way that the French irregular troops acted as a secret and powerful spearhead of the Allied armies. The result was to oblige the German command to retreat speedily and to withdraw from nearly the whole of France in a few weeks' time.

"What," he asked, "were the political consequences of that complete liberation of our country? They were twofold:

"In spite of serious difficulties due to the destruction of the war that is still going on, to the exhaustion of our means of production and transportation and to the long period of German occupation, our internal situation has shown a remarkably stable tendency. It could have been similar to that which we regret to observe in some other liberated countries. Different shades of political opinions exist of course among the French as is the case with all democratic people. But the nation at large is solidly behind General de Gaulle and his government. The unanimity on this ground is such that any other French government is inconceivable. The power of General de Gaulle comes from the fact that from the very first day of our disaster in June 1940, he has been and he remains the incarnation of the real French spirit."

### *Significant Developments in 1944*

France, he continued, has never been a symbol of submission to material violence or of cynical acceptance of foreign servitude. During centuries, France had stood for resolute refusal to submit to oppression in every form, material or spiritual. She had fought the battles of other people for liberty as well as her own. That was the spirit which General de Gaulle personified.

"The government of General de Gaulle," he resumed, "was recognized by all peace-loving nations as the provisional government of the French Republic. As quickly as the French territory has been liberated from the German occupation, France has recovered her former position among the great powers. She is thus able to offer her full contribution, according to her best traditions, to the prosecution of the war and the building of a practical system of general security in the world.

"The recent Franco-Russian treaty is, from that point of view, a very important supplement to the Franco-British and the Franco-American agreements on the same problems. So long as exists an actual or potential danger of aggression from Germany, a Franco-Russian alliance concluded on the same lines as the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1942 is one of the most important factors for the conduct of the war and for the maintenance of peace and security in the postwar period. This treaty is a part of Allied unity and, by its object and its principles, it fits in the general security system as it has been proposed by the Dumbarton Oaks conference in October last."

Fighting in the present war, the speaker added, was part of the general fight for security. France was determined to raise more armies to fight with the United Nations both in Europe and the Pacific; but in order to do this, arms, ammunition and war equipment were needed from the Allies.

#### MR. FRANS H. VISMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE NETHERLANDS-NETHERLANDS INDIES GROUP

Mr. Visman came as a representative of a people still in the front line of battle, and still suffering the horrors of war and the privations of occupation. Except for small areas, both the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies were still awaiting liberation. When this occurred much material devastation would be revealed and relief and rehabilitation would be urgent requirements. Plans had already been prepared with the aid of UNRRA and the United States and were ready for execution. They would initiate a period of development and economic and social progress. In the Indies also the Netherlands-Indies Government was not

### *Security in the Pacific*

unprepared for the new psychological and political situation. This preparedness was indicated by Queen Wilhelmina's speech on the anniversary of the outbreak of war against Japan.

There would also be a new international political situation, and a greater interest throughout the world in colonial problems would have been stimulated. This was expressed at Mont Tremblant in the concept of accountability. In its colonial relations, the Netherlands Government had always paid attention to world public opinion and this would again be true after the war in whatever new forms held "internationally desirable." The postwar situation was mainly dependent on world economic conditions. In the furtherance of a healthy world economy, the Netherlands had always favored the freest possible peacetime flow of merchandise and granted free access to raw material in the Indies. "In 1934," the speaker continued, "the whole world went in another direction and when the Japanese tried to penetrate Pacific countries economically we had to abandon this policy temporarily, but it now stands to reason that we would prefer to resume our former policy of the freest possible flow of merchandise as soon as possible." The speaker emphasized, however, that ability to improve the welfare and standards of living of the people of the Netherlands Indies was closely affected by the prospects of expanding markets and obtaining a fair price for raw materials.

There was no need to emphasize that a country gravely ravaged by war was deeply interested in the establishment of a system of collective security.

SIR ANDREW MCFADYEAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE BRITISH GROUP

"The liberation of Europe has been the outstanding event of 1944. Lights have not gone up in Europe but the blackout has gone and the dimout has succeeded it; the dawn has broken. In spite of the events of the last two weeks we are all convinced that it was not a false dawn." "The victories achieved," the speaker continued, "were victories in common, over forces of disorder and disintegration which had been long foreseen. We have had a foretaste of the strains and stresses which will inevitably confront the statesmen of the United Nations when the war is over."

Among the important changes which had occurred in 1944, Sir Andrew referred to the great progress which had been made in the United Kingdom in social legislation, or in substantial preparation for it. These represented "a whole series of social revolutions" which were a remarkable achievement, in view of the tremendous effort required in

### *Significant Developments in 1944*

the prosecution of the war. The magnitude of this effort was shown in the recent White Paper. Naturally, the program could not be completed during the war itself, since the ministries concerned with the principles involved were preoccupied with the task of bringing the war as quickly as possible to an end. "You will see," the speaker added, "how British policy in the domestic sphere links up with wider issues. We shall be unable to see full policy operated for the betterment of our people until we know what the concerted policy of the world is likely to be." He then indicated the difficulty in clearly formulating the principles of a policy and putting it into operation in a government made up of different parties. It was for this reason that the Government had decided not to prolong the life of the present Parliament beyond the end of the war with Germany. This, he added, was in conformity with the British conception of democracy. He could not emphasize too strongly that this did not mean that the British people were going to relax their efforts and consider the war with Japan as secondary. Britain's vital interests in the Pacific were such that, as Mr. Winston Churchill had said, she would insist on playing a full part in the Pacific war.

In his opinion, however, perhaps the most significant event in 1944 was something imperceptible—the march of time. "With each year that passes," he continued, "our natural hatred grows and justifiable anger rises, and disintegration sets in, in numerous ways. With every day that passes there are more destructions and the work of reconstruction when the war is over becomes more and more difficult. In the psychological sphere also there is a disintegration and personally I think it is in a sense more serious to deal with than in the physical sphere. Our vision has become blurred, our nerves are frayed. Neither physically nor emotionally do we react as easily to the old stimuli. We knew five years ago that this was a civil war and not merely a repetition of the old national wars of last century. We knew that it was due to a deep-rooted international anarchy. We knew that one of the things for which we had failed to provide was peaceful change. We knew that economic ill-being was at once the cause and effect of what I will call in shorthand economic nationalism. We knew that the rule of law must be made to prevail in international affairs as it has been made to prevail in domestic affairs in every civilized country of the world. We knew that right and law were not sufficient but that force must be put behind them; we knew that what we call national sovereignty would have to be abated. Now these were epitomized for us at a fairly early stage of the war in the Atlantic Charter. It was the outline of an international program for an

## *Security in the Pacific*

independent world." This, he added, had as much, or as little force, in all parts of the world. He could say "without hesitation and with complete confidence" that the vast majority of the people in his country still believed in the Atlantic Charter; believed in it for victor and vanquished and that if we could frame an international agreement on the basis of the Atlantic Charter it would be accepted by 99 percent of his countrymen.

At the Mont Tremblant conference in 1942, it was a working assumption that military security would be obtained. For the long run, obviously, it must be, but the speaker insisted on the necessity for reexamining the assumption. Dumbarton Oaks was something and he could assure the Conference that Great Britain would accept it, or anything better which was offered. It was not sufficient, however, to insure for ten, twenty or even thirty years against renewed aggression from Germany or Japan. "Is it not true that in the Pacific, as in Europe, we wait for the full acceptance of responsibility by the Great Powers?" "Moreover," the speaker asked, "can peace be maintained, can independence be achieved, and has it any meaning, unless we succeed throughout the world in creating a condition of economic well-being?"

Various international conferences on economic matters had established agencies which, taken all together, provided a very good machine and a very good engine, but it was without fuel. This could only be provided by a *concerted* policy toward economic expansion. All nations had some contribution to make, and all could put some sand in the machine. But it was a fact that the world's future depended to a very special degree on the policy of the United States—the world's greatest industrial power, the world's sole creditor—during the next few years. On this policy, which would substantially determine the prospects of world economic expansion, the issue of war and peace in the future might well depend. "The world's whole standard of living depends on the adoption of an expansionist and not a restrictionist policy by all the industrial nations of the world and above all by the United States." This was true of the Pacific, as it was of Europe. So the Conference should concentrate on the vital, interdependent problems of freedom from want and freedom from fear.

"Suggestions made at the last conference of the IPR," he concluded, "have certainly influenced British policy and have led to certain rather remarkable reforms or a certain reorientation which was, I believe, almost the direct result of the discussions which took place in your own Councils. I hope that we shall prove to be a worthy successor to Mont Tremblant, and without formulating conclusions and without passing



### *Significant Developments in 1944*

resolutions there will emerge from us some consensus of opinion which may prove of value to the statesmen of the world at the present juncture."

#### MRS. V. L. PANDIT, LEADER OF THE INDIAN GROUP

In her opening remarks, Mrs. Pandit began by supporting the emphasis placed by previous speakers on the indivisibility of peace, but expressed the view that there had been no attempt to apply this principle to realities. "I believe," she continued, "that we cannot think in terms of national issues; that has been disastrous in the past. In the future we need a wider vision, and international rather than national perspectives. I know that the persons here are in agreement with this view.

"India is intensely interested in collective security, and wishes to have the peace proposals placed on a sound economic basis. It is not possible to lay a solid foundation if one looks only at the political side.

"Many nations are being influenced by the fear of their own economic decline, and therefore of a resulting fall in their standard of living. Which direction their policy will take depends on whether they wish for lasting peace and prosperity or whether they think only of the immediate future. It is for us to decide today if we are to have abiding peace or more and more conflict. Although the voice of this Conference may not have great strength, yet it has its importance and each should be the right voice.

"We agreed that economic expansion and full employment should be the goal of all peoples. India and China are anxious to create conditions for such an expansion. But here we come up against the issue of freedom, the freedom to plan and to translate such plans into action without which economic expansion cannot take place."

In referring to significant developments in India in 1944, she continued, "This has been a sad year for India. The hopes of the nation have been crushed — she is silent and sullen. But a spark of hope exists, and that is why we can continue to work and plan for the future. In the last few years we have lost millions of lives, partly through the war and partly through hunger. During a long period of depletion of resources, and maladministration by those responsible, conditions of hunger and distress have risen approximating those in occupied Europe. While other nations are given help, India remains a forgotten corner of the world. It is heartening to hear from Sir Andrew McFadyean that 99 percent of British people believe in the Atlantic Charter. As we have been recently told by Prime Minister Churchill that the Atlantic Charter does not apply to India, I presume that the remaining one percent

## *Security in the Pacific*

constitutes the governing class. I hope, however, that this small percentage may be won over to the right views so that there may be unanimity regarding the applications of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

"The discussions here will center on many important subjects, and we shall be in a position to formulate basic opinions. Therefore I appeal to you to consider matters from a wider view, thinking of the world as one family where each nation can contribute towards the welfare and strength of the other and all may live in equality. Let me remind the members of the words of a great Englishman:

"Freedom is in peril, defend it with all your might."

PROFESSOR K. H. BAILEY, MEMBER OF THE AUSTRALIAN GROUP

Professor Bailey reminded the conference that at the time of Mont Tremblant, the enemy was at the northern gate of Australia and had barely been checked. During the intervening two years, plans had been laid for victory, and for security, development and reconstruction.

He expressed the anxiety of Australia and New Zealand over the plans laid down at Moscow and Dumbarton Oaks and emphasized that the important thing was not so much whether the anxiety was justified, as that it existed. The small powers would be called upon to accept and discharge obligations, but it was not so clear whether Dumbarton Oaks was based on what was called at Moscow "the equality of all states, large or small," or whether emphasis was placed on the importance of the larger powers. The Canberra Agreement, made between Australia and New Zealand a year ago, expressed the opinion of the southern Dominions, and it might be profitable to examine it as arising from the misgivings of two small powers.

"During the past year," he added, "there has emerged in Australia as a small concrete problem that of the future regime of the dependent territories. One area has been liberated and the Australian government had to decide on conditions of civil government. Furthermore, the representatives of the governments of Australia and New Zealand met a few weeks ago, and accepted the doctrine of accountability in respect of all dependent territories."

In concluding his address Professor Bailey emphasized the importance to Australia and to other countries of an expanding world economy as a necessary basis for full employment. "Policies aimed in that direction may fail if they are unsupported by the world as a whole. Therefore Australia would strongly desire to underline the importance of the issue between policies of a restrictionist and an expansionist type. One makes it possible to achieve freedom from want, and the other does not."

### *Significant Developments in 1944*

PROFESSOR EDGAR MCINNIS, VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE CANADIAN GROUP

The position of Canada was described as being very different from that existing in many of the countries whose members had spoken. "In Canada," Professor McInnis observed, "there is no immediate problem of restoration from enemy occupation, or of resuming or desiring possessions outside the borders of our own country. Furthermore we are relatively free from attack. However, we realize that with peace more than ever indivisible, international cooperation will affect Canada by protecting it from the results of any new conflict.

"One of the consequences of the war effort," the speaker continued, "has been that trade has become more important than ever. We have no illusions of the possibility of solving our problems alone, or of solving the problem of security by isolation. Canada has been accused of concentrating on the problem of status, rather than function. In the international field, the reverse is true. We are concerned over status, which will determine the functions to be placed on us. We have no illusions that states of the middle order like Canada can represent decisive forces in the world decisions. However, our industrial potential, and our geographic position which is so strategic for air transport both indicate an important role for Canada. We are not satisfied to have the role assigned. We are not completely satisfied to be placed on a status with other states without a similar industrial potential. We hope attention will be directed to the organization of world economic relations and the organization of world security, and to the position which a state like Canada can occupy."

DR. URBANO A. ZAFRA, CHAIRMAN OF THE PHILIPPINE GROUP

The campaign in the Philippines and the hopes of early liberation attached considerable interest to the statement of the leader of the Philippine delegation. It was natural that he should give special attention to the progress of his country towards independence. This he described as having three phases:

"1. Gradual progressive steps taken by the United States in according the Philippines the status of an independent nation;

"2. Cooperation between the United States and the Philippines in the war effort; and

"3. Mutual protection and security of the United States and the Philippines.

"Under the Tydings-McDuffie Law passed in 1934, the Philippines will become fully independent on July 4, 1946 after a period of 10 years, which was designed to give time for preparation for final independence

### *Security in the Pacific*

and economic adjustment. During that 10-year transition period the Commonwealth was established and accorded all the powers of government, and authority to deal with local and internal problems, except those relating to currency, coinage, and imports and exports, which require approval of the President of the United States. Another important exception to the grant of powers to the Commonwealth was the provision in the Independence Law that foreign affairs were to be under the direct supervision and control of the United States. With these few exceptions, however, the Philippine Commonwealth has practically complete autonomy. On June 20, 1944, Congress passed a law whereby the date of Philippine independence may be advanced prior to July 4, 1946. As soon as the power of the enemy is destroyed and the constitutional processes and normal functions of government are restored to the Filipino people, independence will be achieved."

The Philippines had been granted the privileges accorded only to sovereign nations by participation in UNRRA, the Bretton Woods, Civil Aviation and other conferences with the same rights as other United Nations. The Commonwealth Government was already functioning on the soil of the Philippines, for President Osmeña had landed on Leyte at the same time as General MacArthur, and civilian government had been handed to him and his war cabinet. "The Leyte liberation," the speaker added, "has demonstrated to the world that the cooperation and collaboration of two peoples of two different races but of one human standard of relationship at its best, could be made a basis for understanding and solving some of the problems arising in the Pacific. . . . here was a country which, forty-five years ago, was defeated, conquered and frustrated by the force of a mighty Power. But that Power has raised that country, helped and nurtured it, as a guardian cares for its ward. The same conqueror, now a benefactor, is ushering that same country into the family of nations. That, Mr. Chairman and my friends, is the picture today of American-Philippine relations."

#### STATEMENTS BY OTHER MEMBERS

A Chinese member issued a timely reminder that the war was not yet won in the Pacific and might last for many years to come. It must not be forgotten that the war would probably have to be fought on the mainland of Asia, and the major battles must be fought and won in China, Manchuria and Korea. China would play a leading role and it was important that our attention should be directed to providing assistance to China in that struggle in which she had such a vital interest. The

### *Significant Developments in 1944*

Japanese land offensive, which was the major event for China in 1944, was the best proof of the importance which Japan attached to preventing supplies from reaching his country. The proper equipment and training of the Chinese army had been delayed, but it was still the important problem to be faced. "There is an old Chinese proverb which says: 'For a seven year disease there is time to cultivate a three year medicine.'" He thus pointed the moral that although effective aid had not yet been given, "this is a long war and there is still time to seek the medicine."

An American economist emphasized the interdependence of freedom from want and freedom from fear. In his view, the rise of fascism was due in part to economic disturbances which produced frustrations, depressions, loss of jobs and loss of investments. Improved buying standards and a higher level of employment would contribute greatly to the prospects of durable peace. He agreed with other speakers on the key position held by the United States in the promotion of world economic expansion, but could not predict what would be the trend of American policy.

A fellow American, an authority on Eastern Asia, struck a new note by drawing attention to the significant events which *did not happen* in 1944. Important among these was the failure to arrive at a proper realization of the nature of the war. "The United States," he interpolated, "speaks of the war having lasted three years, our British friends spoke this morning of the sixth year of war, thus conclusively proving that it is a long war, that it has not been successfully fought as a short war. Six years is not impressive to the Chinese who have been at war much longer." He regarded it as somewhat ironical, that in spite of our regional devotion to the Pacific, there existed the assumption that the center of the world was in Europe. Be that as it may, the really decisive problems were problems which were unsettled when the war started, and many of these centered in the Pacific and colonial areas. "We forget," he continued, "the important part that colonial ambitions played in the rise of Hitler and Mussolini and the Japanese menace." However delicately we trod in the use of words like colonial areas, dependencies and self-government, the fact remained that one-half to one-third of human beings lived in a condition which he described as one of "collective slavery." He concluded by an appeal to his fellow members of the United States Group. "I am sensible, as an American," he said, 'of the strong, and on the whole, just British criticism recently of the United States. For that reason I want to appeal to our U. S. members.

## *Security in the Pacific*

We have had held out to us this morning the advantages to us, real advantages, if the United States accepts leadership in the solution of international problems. I want to appeal to Americans to consider the appalling and ghastly results if we fail to accept leadership."

A Free Thai member of the Conference considered that the outstanding event in Thailand in 1944 was the overthrow of the Japanese puppet regime, for to Free Thai abroad, that had been a justification of their faith. "From sources within the country we have learned that a resistance movement came into being on the day the Japanese Army marched into Bangkok. As a result of the widespread opposition of the people, the collaborationists were overthrown last year. We know we have to pay dearly for the error of our misguided rulers and that our redemption will be hard and long. We believe, however, in an old Thai saying: 'Even as the crocodile has the river, the tiger has the jungle, so man has his fellowmen to depend on.' We shall continue to look to the future."

An Indian member expressed the conviction that any schemes to prevent aggression would fail, as long as there were two worlds, one of domination and one of subjection. In his view protection extended to subject peoples should be an international responsibility.

Criticisms by some speakers of the colonial powers called forth a mildly worded protest by a French member, long experienced in colonial service. Experienced administration had provided very great improvements in colonial countries in the past fifty years and greatly benefited the welfare of the people. "I am not qualified to speak in the name of the United Kingdom, or the Netherlands Indies," he observed, "but I know the enormous work which has been accomplished in every domain by the governments of colonial countries. Even from the political point of view, I must remind you that the National Congress of India has been meeting since 1885. So-called oppressed peoples have been allowed to discuss fully the questions which interested them. In the efforts to fight famine, in irrigation, in communications, you must express admiration for the colonial genius and humanity of the British people. And I will say about the Dutch — I have been some time in Java and Sumatra — I have seen what the administrators of Holland have done for the people of the Netherlands Indies." He concluded, "You won't settle the questions of colonies without understanding them."

Issue was joined by an Indian member who took the view that the scientific developments of the 19th and 20th centuries had brought us so near to one another that we must live as neighbors or perish. "To live

### *Significant Developments in 1944*

together as neighbors, we must be prepared to respect the individuality of every people. We must recognize that the urge to self-expression which is one of the deepest needs of every nation, must be given full sway. The desire for freedom is an essential part of this desire for self-expression. No material developments or benefits of any other kind can compensate for the loss of freedom. This is, incidentally, a sufficient reply to the observations which fell from the gentleman to my right, who in the course of his remarks made references to India which showed that he was either very imperfectly acquainted with the situation in India or that he did not value self-expression as everyone should."

He then referred to material developments as an international objective and emphasized the importance to India of developing a balanced economy. In reference to security, he returned to the plea made by a previous speaker for Anglo-American cooperation, and warned against the danger of regarding this, important though it was, as a *substitute* for the voluntary cooperation of all countries, large or small.

"If you want to make it impossible for a country like Japan to disturb the peace of the world," he concluded, "it is not enough that you should strip it of its power and reduce it to the humble position which it occupied about fifty years ago. But make Asia as a whole feel that you will help other countries like India and China to occupy that position which Japan has hitherto occupied as the upholder of Asiatic self-respect. It is this sentiment which Japan has cleverly played upon up to the present, and to which Allied propaganda has found no answer, because it fought more or less shy of those principles of freedom and human equality which alone could enable the United Nations to gain the whole-hearted and enthusiastic and unreserved support of the nations of Asia."

An American member now reverted to Sir Andrew McFadyean's designation of the present war as a civil war. This, he stressed, was one of the consequences of our interdependence, which was strikingly illustrated by the world-wide interest in the recent Presidential election and the importance attached to it in other countries, and by the great and increasing attention given by the American press and public opinion to developments in other parts of the world. "Discussion in the United States," he added, "of events in other countries is frequently characterized by a rather abrupt quality which we reserve for our friends. It is not always appreciated by them. It is a kind of back-slapping of a younger people toward older and more cultivated peoples in the world. You are getting somewhat used to us and realize we do not mean very much by it."

## *Security in the Pacific*

In pursuance of the general theme of interdependence and mutual interest in each other's affairs, he drew attention to the fact that the World Court had pointed out that there were no absolute tests of what were domestic and what were international affairs. They changed from decade to decade, with the trend of international developments. The speaker continued, "I was struck in reading a speech made recently by Mr. Haldore Hansen of our Department of State — he was talking about the fact that we were learning more about our neighbors and they were learning more about us. Speaking of the significance of this for China and the United States, he said: 'China and the United States are going to know far more about each other than they have known in the past, and when the peoples of two countries as different as China and the United States become acquainted with each other for the first time, there is likely to be some friction.' It is of the utmost importance for the people of the two countries to make the utmost effort to understand each other. I stress that because I think friction is engendered by the process of becoming more acquainted with each other and each other's countries.

"Many references have been made today to freedom — of nations, of peoples, of expressions, of trade — all kinds of freedoms. We have not as yet entered what I think Tagore called the heaven of freedom where the world has not been broken up into fragments by narrow domestic walls. We shall not arrive during this Conference, but it seems to me that one part of the process of discussion is to prevent those narrow domestic walls — which do concern our own people and nations and tend to separate them one from another — from acting as barriers to the exchange of thought. It has not been our practice, and I assume it will not be, to adopt formal resolutions or pass along advice to statesmen. Our role is a more modest one. Yet it is a role that is not without some importance in international affairs, as indicated by the fact that so many of you have come here such long distances."

*At the invitation of the Programme Committee, Sir Frederick Whyte, a member of the British Group, concluded the opening plenary session with the following address:*

I cannot help singling out for their psychological effect the references of two members to the war in China. I don't think even the IPR is completely aware of the meaning of the words "long war" when applied to China. China has been engaged in a revolution of immense magnitude for 31 years. She has been engaged in warlike operations for 13 years; in a major war for eight. That would be a severe trial for a great power



### *Significant Developments in 1944*

fully equipped with all the panoplies of civilization. For China, it has been severe. We know the Japanese struck at a time when they saw the Chinese Republic moving out of the first phase of civil war to lay the foundations of its own structure. The Japanese hoped that they would be able to forestall the forces of history and destroy the hopes of China and her friends. The Japanese have been prevented from realizing that dream.

As one of the "significant events of 1944-45," I would choose China and place it in the forefront of the picture. One further remark is called for in the present situation. It is not improbable, if we could have read the Japanese mind, that they intended to do what they could to provoke the very kind of predicament in which our Chinese friends find themselves today. I want to appeal to every member of the Conference to take a balanced view of the Chinese situation as it has been recorded in sometimes very illuminating dispatches, both in the press of the United Kingdom and, particularly, in the press of the United States. A certain picture was revealed to the eyes of the Western world of the Chinese predicament at the end of the eighth year of the war that was such a shock to American public opinion that some parts of it swung from unreasoning admiration of the Chinese in the past, to dismay and criticism because of certain elements of Chinese civilization which were presented before their eyes. I have felt in England, and even more in the United States, a tendency to find fault, to say, 'We have been misled by Chinese propaganda,' and thus to underrate the position in which the Chinese people stand today — notice I put the Chinese people in front of the Chinese Government — and the part that they will be able to play in the future. We know very well that our Chinese friends do not conceal from themselves the nature of their predicament. They are entitled to say to us that we should not take even the most authentic dispatches as representing the whole story of China in 1944. These dispatches contain a large element of truth but not the whole truth. We must retain the proper perspective.

If I were to single out two other countries as significant in 1944, I should choose the two southern dominions, New Zealand and Australia, because of the peculiar contribution they have made to the future of the Pacific by the signing of the Anzac Agreement. The map of the Pacific must be redrawn. There in the southwest corner those two stalwart nations have drawn more than the outlines of the kind of international structure in which they wish to live in the future. They have held up an object lesson to the other governments of the world. If it be true that

### *Security in the Pacific*

those two governments had a comparatively simple task, that the nature of the larger task is infinitely more complicated, the answer is: the greater the government, the greater the obligation.

One of the main reasons why our attempt to establish collective security has failed in the past was because, having written a beautiful Chinese character on the international screen, because we had written it, we thought the system would work of its own motion. Nearly every one of us thought it was a self-propelling machine. When it began to go wrong, we looked around for alibis. Europe said it was because the United States was not there; others, because the enemy powers were brought in too late or too soon. There is little evidence that they were prepared to examine their own consciences on the subject. The old phrase from Scripture is applicable — “Let him that is without blame cast the first stone.”

The main argument is: While we must agree that great problems of social and economic advance, described as expanding economy, are the root from which the program must spring in the period to follow the war, it won't survive unless it is founded on and backed up by the military power of the United Nations.

## CHAPTER II

### THE FUTURE OF JAPAN

*(Round Table Discussions)*

Several general principles or working assumptions, expressed repeatedly in various forms, underlay the discussions in the four round tables on Japan. Although the agenda centered on postwar issues, it was recognized that the war itself had yet to be won and hostilities in the Pacific might be of a prolonged character. In achieving the primary goals of unconditional victory and durable peace, overwhelming importance attached to the maintenance of the strength, the unity, and the determination of the United Nations coalition. Many of the detailed problems of how to treat Japan proved to be dependent, in the last analysis, on the larger question as to how successful the United Nations were in creating effective international machinery for security and economic development. Within the framework of this common approach, there was room for considerable disagreement on certain of the policies to be applied to Japan, both as to objective and as to method and timing. The more fundamental of these issues arose over the handling of Japan's postwar economy and the nature of the political regime which might emerge, or should be encouraged to develop, in postwar Japan.

#### PRELIMINARY DIAGNOSIS: JAPAN AFTER DEFEAT

Varying opinions were expressed on the highly speculative topic of the general conditions which might be expected to exist in Japan after defeat. No doubt was entertained as to the prospective gravity of these conditions, or as to the difficult problems they would present to the Allied forces of occupation. There would probably be heavy destruction, widespread disorganization, and serious unemployment, especially after the troops returned. Parts of the army might become guerrillas, possibly led by the reactionary secret or patriotic societies or by younger officers.

The effects of defeat on Japan's military and industrial potential, as reported by one of the round tables, were expected to be of a nature and scope sufficient to inhibit further attempts at aggression. Application of the terms of the Cairo Declaration would deprive Japan of Manchuria, Korea, Formosa, and her island bases in the Pacific. The resultant economic handicaps to aggression would be felt both in relation to food supplies and to the Japanese strategic industries. These latter would also suffer from direct damage or destruction, although the extent of this

## *Security in the Pacific*

loss could not yet be calculated since, apart from long-range bombing now in its initial stages, Japan's industrial cities had not been subjected thus far to the full ravages of war. Loss of the dependencies would not only weaken Japan's sinews of war but also deprive her of military bases and the hopping-off facilities for future aggression. Some dissent was expressed to the effect that this prognosis was contingent on the premise that Japan should not find a powerful ally or be aided by confusion in Asia. At another table it was also thought uncertain that Allied unity on the treatment of Japan would be maintained beyond the period immediately following defeat. The overriding necessity of unified action, which was a recurrent theme, thus appeared at the very outset of the discussions in the Japan round tables.

A third group approached the subject of the consequences of defeat on Japan's military and industrial potential from a much broader standpoint, and with rather less assurance as to the outcome. Many factors, of differing importance, were indicated as entering into the equation. Among these were noted the internal economic consequences of a long war; the extent of disarmament, reparations, and other economic controls imposed upon Japan by the United Nations; the ability of the Japanese to revive their industrial strength which, it was held, should not be underestimated; postwar world economic conditions, notably the possibilities of Japanese access to raw materials and markets; and, finally, the relative strength of the United Nations security system and the economic and military strength of individual nations in the Pacific area vis-a-vis Japan's postwar industrial potential.

### *Japanese Reactions*

Some attempt was made to estimate possible Japanese reactions within the setting of the general conditions imposed by defeat. Little doubt existed that to a people who for decades had been misguided and mis-educated by their leaders, total defeat would come as a shock. There would be widespread disillusionment, sullenness, hatred. The life of the country, in virtually all its aspects, would be largely disorganized. As a result of hostilities, and also of an increasingly tight blockade of the islands, the people would already have been subjected for some time to intensive bombing and to food and raw material shortages. Either before or immediately after surrender, there would be a breakdown of political authority and, as a very minimum, economic confusion. The disruption of Japan's economic life might be so great that the occupying forces would be faced with chaos, with widespread disobedience, with riots.

## *The Future of Japan*

There was no agreement in the group which developed this picture of immediate postwar conditions, especially in view of the necessarily tentative character of the discussion, as to exactly how serious the situation would become. It was pointed out, however, that Japan had never before tasted defeat on the scale she was now about to suffer, though she had experienced diplomatic setbacks. After the last war, for example, Japan thought she had a considerable part of China already in her pocket. Her forces were in parts of Manchuria outside leased areas and railway zones, and she occupied a large portion of Siberia. From all of these vast areas she was forced to withdraw. While this point was noted, a large majority held that the circumstances of the defeat now anticipated for the Japanese would be so immensely greater than anything experienced heretofore as to bear no comparison.

Total defeat, some members believed, would oblige the Japanese to reconsider the political and social assumptions of their society. They might or might not reach conclusions that would meet with United Nations approval. Others thought that there was almost certain to be hatred of the victors, and especially of the United States and Great Britain. Along with this, however, there would be a desire to understand the secret of Allied success, leading perhaps to an effort on the part of the middle or upper classes to emulate the Western democracies and on the part of the working class to copy the U.S.S.R. It was suggested that the end of the war, and with it the defeat of the Japanese rulers who had so severely oppressed the people, might be popular among certain groups of Japanese. As evidence the pre-Pearl Harbor strikes in several war industries, during which anti-war slogans were raised, were cited. While it was hoped that the prediction would turn out to be correct, the evidence was thought to be far too slender to enable us to count upon such a development. Note was taken of the potentialities of anti-fascist Japanese, who have been captured or who have surrendered in China, as supporters of a peaceful, democratic development in Japan. It was regarded as significant that potential opposition to the war and support for a constructive United Nations postwar program stemmed mainly from broad popular groups, while the diehard guerrilla resistance forecast in several of the round tables received its leadership from the reactionary and super-patriotic old guard.

### *Groups in Japan*

These general considerations led to a more specific estimate of the probable strength and trustworthiness of the various political and social

## *Security in the Pacific*

groups in Japan. A Chinese member suggested that there might be three main categories:

(1) Reactionaries, militarists, industrialists, and other ardent nationalists and their supporters. Their trouble-making capacity will depend upon the efficiency of United Nations controls. These groups can be considered most untrustworthy since they are the most ultra-nationalistic.

(2) Moderate or liberal groups whose strength can be built up if they are willing to assume responsibility. While not so ultra-nationalistic, they are still patriotically empire-minded and their trustworthiness will depend upon the nature of United Nations policy toward Japan.

(3) Radical groups, that is, representatives of people's parties, socialists, communists and others, whose strength will be small unless there is social upheaval in Japan, itself unlikely unless outside support or intervention is given. These groups may be the more trustworthy, comparatively, because they are far less nationalistic and imperialistic than the others.

This division rested mainly upon degree of trustworthiness. The various round tables experienced considerable difficulty in disentangling the three criteria of trustworthiness, strength, and usefulness. On grounds of expediency, it was argued that certain groups might prove useful in a transition period, even though they were not wholly trustworthy. In the case of the *Zaibatsu*, their strength was linked to their possible usefulness. Thus some members urged that the tremendous financial-industrial combinations, because of their great strength and virtual dominance of the Japanese economy, might survive defeat and offer the Allies a useful instrument for the immediate postwar period. Other members thought it more likely that a complete breakdown of the economic structure would accompany the late stages of the war and lead to economic chaos, in which even the *Zaibatsu* would be overwhelmed.

The same argument occurred over the Army. On the one hand, the conviction was expressed that whatever happened it would be extremely difficult to exterminate the Army and all that it meant in Japan. While it might be possible to discredit the militarists with the business groups and intelligentsia, their prestige would still remain high among the mass of peasants because of their ignorance and their indoctrination by the Army. The military clique would go back to the soil, back to the very roots of Japan, and to eliminate them by pressure from without would be virtually impossible. Against this, it was argued that the masses of Japan would have suffered severely from the war and been reduced to a bare subsistence basis, so that they might be induced by proper means to

## *The Future of Japan*

reject the militarists who had brought them to such a plight. To regard the peasantry solely as a conservative force was an inadequate appraisal, since this group had significant revolutionary potentialities as well. In certain circumstances the Army might become so discredited that it would virtually cease to exist.

### *Democratic Forces*

This argument, turning mainly on the postwar role of the military, was preliminary to an even sharper and more basic cleavage which developed over the strength of the democratic potential that might be expected to exist in Japan after defeat. Some members noted the existence of Japanese — among the intellectuals, lower ranks of the bureaucracy, small businessmen, and left-wing groups — who have opposed the militarists. Others felt that the so-called moderates, liberals or radicals in Japan were too weak and lacking in prestige to offer a sound basis for a stable government after defeat. One member in particular insisted that there was no real basis for democracy in Japan as yet, and that a democracy was not something that could be created *ad hoc*, especially by the victors. The mere fact that Japanese moderates were being supported by the Allies would discredit any government they might set up and probably put them in imminent danger of murder by Japanese “patriots.” While this difficulty was generally recognized, it was noted that Italian experience had shown that the emergence of anti-fascist groups after defeat might be quicker than we now expect, though admittedly the analogy was not complete. The Japanese authorities feared the strength of popular and anti-militarist groups sufficiently to maintain a large and very repressive system of police and gendarmerie.

Attention was also drawn to the long record in Japanese history of violent peasant revolts and to the fact that in the Meiji Restoration the peasants, until finally repressed, took a lead in popular uprisings. The dichotomy between a “stable” and “revolutionary” peasantry was illuminated by a pungent metaphor — the peasantry, it was said, represented a double-barreled gun, with one barrel aimed by the militarists at the outside world, while the other barrel pointed back directly at them. The same member held that the role to be played by the peasantry in Japan might well form part of a general world movement. Acute agrarian problems, notably in Asia but in parts of Europe as well, were generating pressure for social and political reforms in movements which were afoot throughout the world.

Relatively little attention was paid to the working class in Japan,

### *Security in the Pacific*

although one member noted that Susumu Okano, leader of the Japanese Communists working at Yen-an to subvert the Japanese army in China, was elaborating a program to unite all opposition elements in Japan and might play an important role in the future.

#### IMMEDIATE POST-SURRENDER MEASURES

At nearly every round table the possibility was raised that Japanese forces might continue the war on the Asiatic mainland after the home islands had been conquered, in which case surrender might occur in two or more stages. Large undefeated forces on the continent might refuse to accept the terms of an armistice signed in Tokyo. Alternatively, the Japanese government, including the Emperor and his entourage, might flee to the mainland and set up a government-in-exile in Korea or Manchuria. Some members felt that, in either case, the Japanese might be able to conduct a protracted war on the continent. It was pointed out that Chinese guerrillas had often been successful in operations against heavily equipped Japanese troops and that Manchuria, Korea and North China might provide an industrial base for a Japanese army cut off from the homeland. Majority opinion, however, was not inclined to accept this view. Production on the continent was not considered sufficiently large or diversified to support large forces for any length of time. Again, the close identification of interest between the Chinese guerrillas and the peasantry upon which much of their success depended would operate in the opposite sense were Japanese guerrillas to attempt to make a stand in territory inhabited by millions of Chinese peasants. It was noted that eventual Soviet action might be the decisive factor in this problem and here, as at numerous points in the round tables on Japan, it was recognized that the discussion was rendered somewhat unrealistic by inability to foresee what Soviet policy might be.

In approaching the problems of the armistice period, renewed stress was laid on the necessity for full Allied unity. One member noted the possibility that Japan might sue for peace (on terms) after the defeat of Germany, in which case there would be need for not allowing disunity to be created among possibly war-weary Allied nations. Others thought that the national characteristics of the Japanese forbade acceptance of any terms and that the Allies would therefore have to dictate the conditions of peace. This course was in any case rendered necessary by the policy of unconditional surrender to which the United Nations were committed. One group agreed that the terms of surrender and the later peace settlement should be formulated by the joint efforts of all the



## *The Future of Japan*

United Nations engaged in the war against Japan, with due recognition to the special capacities of the smaller powers and their willingness to exercise special responsibility as evidenced by the Canberra Agreement between Australia and New Zealand. The greater burden placed upon the larger powers was also noted as conditioning their responsibility and degree of participation.

There was some discussion at this point of the relative merits of a "hard" and a "soft" peace. One table was agreed that, in general terms, the treatment of Japan would be similar to that meted out to Germany. An Indian member expressed skepticism as to the intentions of the United Nations on this question. His doubts were based upon a suspicion that because Japan and its people were Asiatic the "Western powers" would be inclined to impose more severe terms than upon Germany. Other members were unanimous in believing these suspicions to be groundless. Similarly, at another table, an Indian member advocated a policy of relative leniency for Japan, thereby making the more liberal Japanese feel that they would have much to gain from cooperating with the Allies and much to lose from resisting. He believed that an oppressive peace might tend to make other Asiatic nations feel that the United States and the United Kingdom merely wanted to reduce Asia to its position of weakness before the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905. Other members questioned the soundness of this policy of leniency, though it was noted that what mattered was not whether the peace was "hard" or "soft" but whether it was durable.

The note most stressed in this phase of the discussion, however, was that the ability of the United Nations to handle a defeated Japan successfully would depend primarily on the maintenance of unity and on the general system of world security and economic development to be established by the United Nations. Some members emphasized this belief even to the extent of urging that the treatment of Japan could not be effectively discussed until agreement had been reached on the later topics of security and economic expansion.

### *Details of the Armistice*

It was agreed that the armistice, or terms of surrender, would have to be signed for Japan by the highest authorities, including the Emperor himself. A British member suggested that the signatories must include the General Staff or High Command and the Emperor—the latter's assent being constitutionally required in such matters. Another member noted that insistence on this point would be one way of discrediting the

## *Security in the Pacific*

authority of the Emperor and of impressing the fact of defeat upon the Japanese mind. It was further observed, however, that if a split of authority should develop between Tokyo and the armies on the continent no real armistice might be possible, since any Japanese who attempted to sign an armistice might be murdered.

On the composition of the forces of occupation there was marked agreement. They should be fully representative of those United Nations engaged in the war against Japan, including not only the Big Three or the Big Four but contingents from the Philippines and other Asiatic countries which have been occupied by the Japanese. Some discussion occurred as to the situation which might arise in the event that a lengthy period of occupation proved necessary. There was general agreement that, in the final analysis, Oriental forces might have to bear the burden of occupation. Based on the experience of the last war, it was recognized that it would be difficult to keep any large force of American or British troops in Japan for a long time. It was thought, therefore, that the major force of occupation under the authority of the United Nations should in any case be Chinese, and the Chinese members of the table did not think there would be any difficulty in carrying out such a policy.

One round table considered at some length the qualifications and training of members of the forces that were to occupy Japan, with particular reference to civil affairs functions. It was pointed out that only the United States has an extensive program of civil affairs training for persons to be used in such occupation forces, and that few nationals of the other United Nations have been admitted to these training centers. For the purpose of effectively administering civilian affairs in Japan, the following principles were generally agreed upon:

- (1) That existing civil affairs training centers such as those in the United States might be opened to admission of nationals, both men and women, of the other United Nations engaged in the war against Japan;
- (2) That men and women admitted to such schools or centers should be selected by their own governments;
- (3) That both civilian and military officers should be eligible for admission to training in such new joint United Nations training schools as might be established by agreement among those United Nations engaged in the war against Japan; and
- (4) That the general principles of instruction and curricula should be coordinated with a view to the avoidance of conflicting national methods of operations in Japan.

Some members felt that the period of occupation should be as short

## *The Future of Japan*

as possible, but it was generally recognized that its length would be determined to a large extent by the conditions which existed or developed. The inclination was not to underestimate the difficulties likely to be encountered. It was held that the capacity of the Japanese to offer active or passive resistance might be stronger and last longer than we might expect. The experience of the French underground was cited as an example of such a possibility. Warnings were issued that there might be extensive guerrilla resistance, either by super-patriotic groups or in the form of banditry. It was noted, however, that such activity might be greatly lessened by measures taken in support of democratic elements within Japan after defeat, and particularly by weaning peasant support from guerrilla bands through stimulation of agrarian reforms.

In the opinion of one group, the military commanders would have to decide the time, place, and number of the forces involved in the occupation. The purely military functions would be those of protecting military establishments, securing communications, and preventing the population from interfering with military operations. Another group set the minimum functions as the occupation of points necessary to carry out whatever terms are imposed on Japan as a result of defeat, to impress the Japanese with the fact of their total defeat, and to engage in relief measures, restoration of transport and utilities, and food distribution.

### *Initial Political Issues*

The political measures to be undertaken during this initial post-surrender period were discussed at some length. In one case several members stressed the need to eliminate the patriotic and secret societies and many of the top civilian bureaucrats and leaders of the *Zaibatsu* who have supported the militarists. It was generally agreed that the top military leaders would be removed from power, though how and in what number was not decided. Fairly sharp disagreement occurred over the question of how far the Allies should permit or encourage a period of upheaval inside Japan. Some members felt that this was essential in order to let Japan complete what was called her "unfinished revolution," and that out of the turmoil would come new, more progressive leaders. Others, notably a British member, doubted whether the completion of the revolution would in itself ensure a peaceful Japan in the future. While the outcome would be affected by the exact circumstances of defeat, it was thought likely that a defeated Japan would go through several and perhaps violent changes of government before finding a stable regime with which the United Nations could deal. Much would depend,

### *Security in the Pacific*

however, on the policy of the occupying Allied forces, and particularly on how they intervened or in what way they supported the Japanese local authorities in dealing with internal disorders.

One round table held that the speedy arrest of the leaders of Japanese aggression, the trial of the war criminals, and the removal of oppressive laws and institutions should be among the very first duties of the occupation forces. This clearing of the decks of all fascist or aggressive leadership, whether national or local, and of all its institutions, was considered to be a first and essential step toward releasing whatever democratic forces there might be in Japan. It was not thought possible to predict whether such groups would come forward quickly or only after a fairly long period of occupation. Nor could the round table determine from where these democratic leaders and forces would come or who they would be. Emphasis was placed rather on establishing the principle that the Allied Commander or the civilian commissioners should do nothing to frustrate the upsurge of progressive forces; that they should, indeed, do everything possible to encourage it. It was suggested, by way of example, that there might be rice riots in a city like Osaka and that while these riots might be primarily an expression of poverty and starvation they might also involve democratic elements of the population. It would naturally be incumbent upon the forces of occupation to maintain law and order, but this principle should be applied in such a way as to support rather than discourage any genuine popular movement.

It was the opinion of this table that Japanese services and institutions should be utilized as far as possible, both during the initial period of occupation and the longer period of control. The principle of security should at all times be in the driver's seat. For reasons of security it might be found necessary to administer the Japanese nation directly by mass occupation, but it was hoped and indeed expected that, assuming a Japan purged of its aggressive leaders and apparatus, the administrative tasks could be performed indirectly by a system which would take full advantage of such Japanese institutions as the postal system, the railways, the banks, and even the courts of law. It was brought out quite forcefully, however, that it would be extremely unwise to use the Emperor in any way during the period of occupation. At first he would be a menacing factor whose dangerous attributes would have to be stripped from him. The expedient policy, according to this view, would be to by-pass him, after securing his signature to the armistice, and let the situation develop as it would. Should he become associated with democratic elements, he might eventually be accepted; if not, he would

be forced out by the growth of healthy democratic institutions. This procedure was also supported by those members who feared that if the Allies got rid of the Emperor they might achieve the opposite of what they intended, for such an action might make a hero and martyr of him.

### *Repatriation*

Repatriating large Japanese forces on the continent and in isolated Pacific islands was expected to present great difficulties, especially at a time when shipping would be needed by the Allies for relief and other purposes. At one table the Australian members were insistent that the Japanese troops be quickly repatriated, while both Chinese and Netherlands members thought it would be undesirable to use Japanese prisoners for forced labor. Others held that such troops should be sent back to Japan promptly as they would be embittered and disillusioned about their military leaders and would thus influence the Japanese people at home.

With respect to repatriation of Japanese civilian residents in re-occupied or restored territories, one group, after noting the problems created by dissident minorities in Europe and the successful transfer of Greek and Turkish populations after the last war, suggested the following factors as conditioning the policy which should be pursued:

(1) The extent to which a Japanese minority had become integrated in the economic life of the area and the effects of its removal in creating an economic vacuum which would have to be filled.

(2) The potentialities of fifth column activity among Japanese persons permitted to remain in formerly Japanese-held territory.

(3) The effects on Japanese economy of the loss of overseas remittances from Japanese residents abroad, and the economic consequences of returning some two million Japanese to their homeland. Repatriation might increase the population pressure on Japan's economic resources, involving a proportionate increase in United Nations responsibility for assisting in the development of an economically healthy Japan.

(4) The nature of Japanese activity abroad, in such areas as Korea, Manchuria and China, into which the Japanese came as conquerors, imposing their own economy and their own government upon the area rather than integrating themselves in the life of the local communities.

In view of these considerations and the special problems peculiar to particular territories, it was agreed that each area would have to be treated as a special case. While it was suggested that Japanese technicians might be used in facilitating the transfer of large industrial or

## *Security in the Pacific*

transport facilities in reoccupied areas, Chinese members expressed objection to such a policy. Note was taken of the possibility of United Nations assistance in the training of replacements for Japanese technicians.

### DISARMAMENT

It was unanimously agreed that Japan's existing armaments (land, sea and air) and armament factories should be destroyed, and that the conscription system, the gendarmerie and the secret police should be abolished. These measures should be enforced in the initial stages of the occupation, and United Nations occupying forces should be adequate for the fulfillment of these objectives.

One round table advocated the abolition of the Army and Navy, but at others there was some dissent to this proposition. A British expert thought that the Japanese Navy should be limited to very small patrol ships and coast guard vessels. He argued, also, that some armed force (perhaps a new gendarmerie, but certainly not the present Imperial gendarmerie) in addition to the civil police would be needed for internal order, despite the risks it might entail. Others maintained, however, that any such force should be permitted to have only light arms and stressed the further qualifications that the higher organs of army administration and education, along with the conscription system, should be abolished.

The same British expert noted that some small secret military preparation, especially in scientific research, radar, staff planning and the like, could not be prevented, but that in itself this was not dangerous since preparations for large-scale modern war could not be concealed. A French member contended strongly that the real protection lay in preventing the training of a large mass army, which could not be hidden and thus could not be created if the determination to prevent it existed. A system of Allied inspection to check on the continued observance of these specific disarmament measures, and with power to take action on the spot, was held to be necessary, and it was generally agreed that all these measures should be maintained until Japan was admitted to full rights of membership in the international community.

### *Preventive Measures*

On the prevention of rearmament in its industrial phases, the widest variety of opinions and suggestions was advanced. Some members favored complete elimination of heavy industry, some advocated control by an outside authority, and some desired the retention of only those

sections needed for maintenance of Japan's normal standard of living. Many believed that control of industry through imports was possible, although some noted that the ramifications of such a control system would impose a complicated and onerous task on the Allied nations. At one table it was indicated that "spiritual disarmament," through education and economic advancement, was required to change Japanese militaristic propensities. Until such a change of heart was demonstrated, however, Chinese members felt that heavy industry, though not itself a cause of war, could not safely be left to Japan without outside supervision. They urged the necessity for an Allied Board to check on Japanese industrial production and on imports of those few key commodities needed for war.

There was substantial agreement that Japan be denied war planes and a civil aircraft industry. A Chinese held that Japan's imports of civil aircraft should also be strictly limited, especially until nearby countries like China had built up much stronger air fleets. Technically, it was noted that the rapid divergence between combat and civil aircraft meant a reduced risk of Japan using civil planes for war purposes. An expert in this field, after reviewing the unsuccessful attempts to control German aviation after the last war, advanced two proposals in which aviation authorities now had some confidence: a ban on the manufacture of planes and parts, and prevention of any Japanese from piloting on Japanese airways. Japan would be entirely served by foreign pilots flying planes purchased abroad. Even in this scheme, some members noted possible loopholes, as in the use of pilotless planes, the training of Japanese pilots abroad in nations friendly to Japan, or the establishment by Japan of manufacturing plants abroad.

It was noted that the bulk of Japanese merchant shipping would probably have been lost by the end of hostilities and that any additional vessels that threatened security would be turned over at the time of surrender. In the interests of Japan's peacetime economy, however, it was not thought desirable that Japan should be entirely stripped of its merchant tonnage. The essential problem was to prevent Japan from building a merchant fleet that could be used aggressively, for which a qualitative control of the types of ships to be built was generally supported. By some the criterion of speed alone was held to be adequate as a limitation, by others size was also mentioned as a necessary criterion.

Qualitative controls were discussed also in connection with several other industries, notably chemicals and machine tools. Restrictions on the machine tool industry, directed toward prevention of the manu-

## *Security in the Pacific*

facture of armament machinery, and reduction of the number of highly skilled workers engaged in the industry were suggested. Finally, it was advocated that controls be placed over Japan's sources of power, whether hydroelectric or fuel, and that special supervision be exercised over Japanese refineries and the importation of petroleum.

In one round table a fully rounded scheme to prevent industrial rearmament was offered. This program rejected a complete system of direct control as presenting too staggering an administrative problem to be practicable. Instead, it proposed a scheme of remote control, defined as a system of indirect controls through regulation of imports and raw material allocations plus specific controls at a relatively small number of key points in the economic structure. The specific controls were to be applied generally to the electric power industry and qualitatively to the machine tool, chemical, and shipbuilding industries, while imports were to be restricted to those required for peacetime consumption. This group felt that controls of this type should be employed for a period; if they failed, it would probably be not so much because of the nature of the controls themselves as of the breakdown of the whole security system.

### *Need for Unity*

This last note was struck again and again in all the round tables. A number of members were skeptical over the possibility of preventing Japanese rearmament, both on technical and political grounds. Only an unrelaxed watch and an eternal vigilance would render it possible. The essential thing was that the United Nations maintain their determination to continue the controls.

The whole problem, in the last analysis, came down pretty much to what held us together and what threatened to split us apart. A British member suggested that the question might be approached at three stages. Stage one was the disarming of Japan and keeping her disarmed. There was danger that commercial enticements might disrupt unity even at this level. Stage two he described as the maintenance of Pacific area frontiers, while allowing for a system of peaceful change. Could we go as far as that, he asked? Stage three involved general security and was hard to define in concrete terms. It involved the determination to nip aggressive tendencies in the bud. Problems of this sort might not arise for ten years, but when they did would we be prepared to meet them?

A Chinese member suggested that an international view must override narrow nationalistic considerations before there could be any assur-



## *The Future of Japan*

ance of peace. In connection with immediate factors making for and requiring common action, he pointed to (a) the total disarmament of Japan; (b) the industrialization of China and free trade between nations in the Pacific and the world in general; (c) amicable settlement of possible disputes in the Pacific area; and (d) the gradual emancipation of colonies and dependencies as circumstances permitted. He also pointed to the difficulty of drawing a clear line between the immediate and long-term factors.

Another member stressed four elements in the possibility of a renewal of Japanese aggression: (a) the lack of full collaboration between the major powers; (b) the opportunity for Japan to ally herself with other small powers in the Pacific; (c) the resumption by the Japanese of their former economic status; and (d) the return to power of the Japanese reactionaries. He suggested as remedies: first, to satisfy the small powers in the Pacific by allowing them their desired status as soon as possible; and, second, to enable Japan to have the opportunity of joining the international organization as soon as possible after the time needed for the re-education of the Japanese people.

The idea was suggested that the question of whose friend Japan would be in the future was tied up with the security problem in that if there was disunity between the victors, one of them would try to see what use could be made of Japan. It was therefore as dangerous to put Japan in the position of a debtor nation for long as it was to restore Japan's power too rapidly. One member had referred to Russia and China as standing for the under-privileged, but it would be dangerous if the impression arose that the other nations in the world were not interested in the under-privileged but were only interested in restoring the power of the over-privileged.

A suggestion was made that the supervision of Japanese rearmament could possibly be relegated to an administrative agency, with the right to dispose of any force necessary for its task. It could thus be removed altogether from the sphere of politics and from the responsibility of the Security Council under the Dumbarton Oaks plan. Such a course would help to dissociate the necessary repressive measures from the new international organization. If, moreover, Russia did not enter the Pacific war, her position would be distinctly ambiguous if the responsibility for enforcing disarmament rested with the Security Council of which she had become a member. The consensus however, was that the treatment of Japan would impinge on the general problems of security at too many points to permit of isolation. Two different and

## *Security in the Pacific*

concurrent organs in the field of security could not be contemplated. It was thought desirable, however, for reasons noted, to relegate the necessary administrative tasks to some *ad hoc* body, to the maximum extent possible.

In the long run, it was held that only changes both within Japan and in the outside world would create the conditions for success. Within Japan changes had to go far enough to produce a well-balanced, peace-loving democracy, both in its social and political life. In this connection it was noted that disarmament would have some real advantages for Japan in freeing the people from heavy taxes and permitting more imports of civilian goods. Outside, a working and workable system of collective security had to be combined with agreements in the economic field that would facilitate an expanding world economy. An Indian member pushed this thesis to its logical extreme when he maintained that, except for the initial period, conditions must not be imposed on Japan, e.g., as to disarmament or trade disabilities, which other nations were not themselves prepared to accept as part of a world order. This part of the discussion was perhaps summed up in the general feeling that it was necessary to secure a world order in which a reformed Japan would no longer want to make war; otherwise, it was likely that the policing of Japan would break down after a while, as it did in the case of Germany after the last war.

### POLITICAL MEASURES

There was considerable discussion of the rather wide range of questions relating to territorial changes left unsettled by the Cairo Declaration, such as the future disposition of the mandated Pacific islands, Hongkong, other islands or island groups in the neighborhood of Japan, and the future status of Korea. It was generally agreed that the question of the mandated islands should be settled on the basis of an agreement by all interested nations. Australia and New Zealand were noted as powers having a special interest in this question, along with the United Kingdom, and it was further noted that the League mandate system should not be ignored in the eventual decision as to the islands' disposition. The feeling was general that United States administration under a trusteeship plan would probably not meet with objection. While the considerable sentiment in the United States for direct annexation was noted, it was also pointed out that many Americans support the idea of international trusteeship. As regards other islands or island groups, the varying interests of China (the Liuchiu islands) and

### *The Future of Japan*

possibly Russia (the Kuriles; southern Sakhalin) were considered, with the general conclusion that their disposition should be governed in the main by the question of security. It was agreed that the prewar legal status of these territories, including also the Bonin, Volcano and Marcus islands and those in the Tsushima straits, should be secondary to their removal from Japanese control in terms of the strategic and political needs of the United Nations in preventing future Japanese aggression.

#### *Korea*

The phrase "in due course" in the section of the Cairo Declaration referring to independence for Korea attracted considerable attention. Some members believed that, though the Korean people have a will to rule themselves and are a homogeneous group with one common language, it was nevertheless probable that the removal of Japan's domination might necessitate a period of assistance from some members of the United Nations. One member stated that, judging partly from the experience of Burma, it was likely to take a long time to place Korea on a stable, independent basis. Someone would have to create a whole corpus of law and work out tariff and customs arrangements. Korea had been so closely integrated with the Japanese economic system that it would require a major surgical operation to separate her. Who would meet the cost? The resources of Korea herself might be quite inadequate. Finally, it would take years to establish a satisfactory working administration.

This view was by no means generally accepted. On the contrary, there was fairly general opposition to interpretation of the "due course" phrase in terms of a lengthy period. One Korean representative asserted that the period before Korea assumed full sovereignty would not exceed six months. Another Korean stated that his country had two main interests: first, to get rid of Japanese domination, and second, to secure international cooperation, particularly by the great powers, in establishing Korean independence. In his view, the independence of Korea required the establishment of an effective international organization. By its history and its geographical situation, Korea was vulnerable to aggression. Japan should of course be disarmed, but Korea would welcome the growth of a strong China. An interim arrangement between the great powers by which Korean peace and security could be guaranteed might be valuable. Korea, however, did not desire to remain a protégé of the great powers, but wished to stand on her

## *Security in the Pacific*

own feet at the earliest possible moment. She would prefer international to national assistance or control.

A Chinese member also expressed the hope that there would be an early agreement regarding the independence of Korea. In his opinion early establishment of a free Korea would help maintain the security of the whole region. During any period of temporary military occupation of Korea by Allied forces, management of civil affairs should be left to the Koreans themselves. An independent Korean government should be established as early as possible, and Korea should then be admitted to the world organization. An American member suggested that "in due course" might be taken to mean "as soon as an election can be called." Another member proposed that full Korean independence be recognized, that Korea be encouraged to develop a provisional government as rapidly as possible, and that United Nations forces in Korea be withdrawn as soon as a provisional government was established. In this problem, again, it was noted that a full quorum was not present until the U.S.S.R. had given some indication as to its policy.

### *Methods of Procedure*

Certain postulates as to United Nations procedure had been generally accepted by the round tables when the time came to discuss the final peace settlement with Japan, and particularly the thorny issue of internal political measures. It was thought that peace negotiations and terms should be jointly formulated by all the United Nations engaged in the war against Japan. To facilitate the translation of this principle into practice, approval was given to a Chinese suggestion for the creation of an Allied Control Commission to evolve common policies on the treatment of Japan and a later Allied Advisory Committee to supervise local government authorities in Japan during occupation. While the smaller powers would be represented on these bodies, with recognition given to their special capacities, the larger powers would share a responsibility and degree of participation commensurate with the greater burdens placed upon them.

A preliminary issue arose at one table over what Japanese authority should be permitted to negotiate and sign the final peace treaty. Two points of view developed. One group held that no definitive peace treaty should be signed until a liberal government, truly representative of the people, was established in Japan. Another group felt that it would be impracticable to await the establishment of a satisfactory

## *The Future of Japan*

government and therefore favored signing a peace treaty with whatever government promised temporary stability, but with the understanding that the admission of Japan to the comity of nations would await the emergence of a Japanese government which showed promise of representing the wishes of the people and of a desire to cooperate in the maintenance of peace.

As to measures affecting Japan's domestic political structure, agreement was registered in the main only on the minor or less essential points. As previously noted, it was considered necessary to abolish the secret police, the gendarmerie, the secret societies, and the super-patriotic societies. Elimination of these latter groups was recognized as a difficult task, since the Japanese would doubtless anticipate defeat by organizing elaborate underground movements. Yet, in the opinion of some members, the task was not one that could be avoided even if it meant doing the job directly in every locality where these societies had a hold. At the same time, the building of a new Japanese environment was recognized as the soundest way, in the long run, of ensuring against the continuance of these evil organizations.

Suggestions for certain constitutional changes, which some members thought to be of more importance than others, were generally approved. These included the removing of restrictions on the Diet's power over the purse, as well as the elimination of various practices, mainly extra-constitutional and always anti-democratic in nature, such as the right of direct access to the Throne by the service ministers, the requirement that the service ministers be ranking officers in active service, and the extensive ordinance-making power vested in the executive. Abolition of certain institutions, such as the Privy Council and the Elder Statesmen now reconstituted as the group of ex-Premiers, was accepted as desirable. But on the major issues—treatment of the Emperor and of the *Zaibatsu*, or on the extent to which positive efforts should be made to establish a government headed by genuinely popular representatives—no consensus emerged.

### *The Emperor*

Views on the treatment of the Emperor took account of three separate points: his immediate uses, attitudes toward the Imperial institution, and procedures advisable for the United Nations to adopt in eliminating the Emperor or the institution. As to the first, one view already noted held that the Emperor should be by-passed after being made to sign the terms of surrender. At the other extreme was the opinion that the

### *Security in the Pacific*

Emperor could become the focal point of some government with which the occupation forces could deal. Some felt that the United Nations could use the Emperor as long as he served their purposes and then discard him, but this view was vigorously disputed. It was noted that the decision as to the present Emperor's war guilt might govern policy on this matter.

There was no dissent to the opinion that the Imperial institution as now constituted was a danger that had to be eliminated. The real issue turned on whether the institution could be safely left to evolve into something better. One view opposed any compromise on an issue of such importance as involving too great dangers. Its supporters held that the institution—more precisely the theory of Imperial absolutism—was the foundation of Japanese militarism, and that the Emperor was today and always would be an instrument used by Japan's most reactionary elements. As a result, they strongly advocated the abolition of the whole Imperial institution. In the other view, the possibility was held out that the Imperial institution as presently constituted might evolve into a constitutional monarchy if no outside interference occurred or if the constitutional changes noted above were encouraged or enforced. In support of this view, reference was made to the theory of Professor Minobe which held that the Emperor, while being the visible embodiment of the Japanese state, was not to be held responsible for the execution of policy which should be in the hands of his constantly changing advisers. If this theory should be accepted and applied, the United Nations, it was maintained, might find themselves willing to tolerate the Imperial institution.

When it came to the question of procedure, advocates of United Nations' action to abolish the Imperial Institution found themselves on the defensive. While it was noted that, historically, there was precedent for almost every conceivable type of treatment of the Emperor by the Japanese, there was no precedent for his deposition by an outside authority. Virtually all members joined in deploring the possibility that deposition by an outside agency would make a hero and a martyr of the Emperor. Some intriguing theoretical procedures were evolved at this point in the discussion. The "ice box" theory involved sending the Emperor to China and keeping him there, with the right of his loyal subjects to visit him, until such time as his future disposition could be determined. A variant of this procedure, termed the "Who's Who" theory, proposed instead that he be sent to London, where he might live happily ever after—this suggestion being advanced not merely

## *The Future of Japan*

as a light-hearted attempt to arrange a reverse lend-lease of mandated islands for Mikados but as a proposal which had the advantage of removing the core of nationalist inspiration from Japan and at the same time providing a reasonably comfortable and honorable disposal of the body, a condition likely to weigh heavily in Japanese minds.

In view of all the difficulties involved, it was rather generally felt that the wiser procedure would be to let the Japanese people decide this question for themselves. At the same time, it was recognized that this decision dodged rather than settled the issue, unless the general policy of letting Japan "stew in its own juice" by applying merely external blockade or import controls, as some members advocated, became the accepted policy in dealing with Japan. If forces of occupation entered the country, some decision on the Emperor would have to be made, with the choices ranging between using him as the focal point in a new government, deposing him, or subtly encouraging democratic Japanese forces that might themselves overthrow him. Few members felt that a policy of absolute neutrality, however attractive in theory, could be maintained in practice.

### *The Zaibatsu*

Discussion of the future role to be played by the *Zaibatsu* ran along similar lines. To some members the *Zaibatsu* were held to have their uses, especially on a short-term basis under Allied surveillance. If we were looking for a party which might lead the Japanese people to a more reasonable government during the transition period, the business leaders might well emerge at an early stage as a focal point for collaboration with an Allied military administration. Big business was likely to cooperate. It had already shown signs of doubt as to whether the war which it had helped bring about might not cause its own destruction and that of the country as well.

To other members, however, the continued existence of these great family monopolies was viewed as a grave danger, both to world peace and the prospects for democratic growth in Japan. If they were accepted in the beginning, it would not be easy to discard them later; in effect, the decisive choice would have already been made. The *Zaibatsu* were essentially expansionist-minded, as their close cooperation with the militarists in the preparations for this war had demonstrated. If they were brought back under our auspices, new life would also be given to the militarists. The *Zaibatsu*, moreover, stood squarely in the path of much-needed economic reforms that would limit monopoly control and of the

## *Security in the Pacific*

changes needed to facilitate achievement of effective popular government.

It was recognized, however, that there were degrees even among the business groups and leaders. The *Zaibatsu* themselves were likely to be much more committed to a nationalistic policy than the managerial personnel. If the latter could function in a democratic society, which had perhaps taken over control of the monopolies, they might form a reasonable body of opinion and be counted upon to use their managerial skills in the public interest.

As to procedure, again it was generally thought that the wiser course would be to let the Japanese people themselves settle the issue, but again also it was recognized that the United Nations occupying forces could not remain neutral but would be forced to make a choice in practical policy. The most promising line of policy would be to support those groups among the Japanese which were advocating a program that would limit the vast powers formerly exercised by the *Zaibatsu*.

### *Prospects of Democracy*

From a lengthy discussion at one round table on the more general and more basic issue of the future of democratic government in Japan, two definite points of view emerged. One school of thought held that if changes were to be made in Japan's political structure, consideration must be given to the necessity for organic growth toward democracy—a slow process dependent, among other things, upon the Japanese people's achievement of a margin of strategic and economic security. It was maintained that if economic restrictions were imposed upon Japan on the one hand, while attempts were made to encourage democratic government on the other, there was the danger that we would be hitting the Japanese on the head and slapping them on the back, in which case the head would remain bloody but unbowed. It might be rash to assume that the Japanese generally would desire to become democratic, since their wishes would perhaps run in the opposite direction. Therefore, since it might be a long time before the Japanese reorganized their life along democratic lines, it would be undesirable for the United Nations to attempt too much by way of supporting democratic reforms within Japan. A minimum program would involve elimination of those elements of Japanese constitutionalism, referred to above, which have represented anti-democratic tendencies, the primary object being to maintain internal stability in Japan in the immediate postwar period.



## *The Future of Japan*

An opposing view held that if only minimum or isolated changes were accepted as desirable in giving the Japanese a start toward democratic development, there was grave danger that the old autocratic ruling groups would remain entrenched in power under the authoritarian constitution and thus easily succeed in blocking further political and economic reform along democratic, liberal and peaceful lines. It was highly desirable for the United Nations to follow the policy of giving new, liberal, democratic forces within Japan the opportunity to reveal themselves, to appeal for support, and to institute those fundamental political and economic reforms that would give the Japanese people for the first time the chance for free expression, for the exercise of the responsibilities of democratic citizenship, and for attaining control over their government. Achievement of immediate stability should not override consideration of the means by which these fundamental changes could be brought about as the best guarantee of a peaceful Japan in the future. Furthermore, United Nations security from future Japanese aggression could best be safeguarded by the earliest possible growth of democratic forces within Japan, even though this growth might be accompanied by some internal disorder and instability. Paraphrasing the expression used by representatives of the first school, a blow on the head accompanied by a pat on the back was sometimes just the thing needed to restore a victim of amnesia to his right mind.

At this table there was also considerable discussion of the direct and indirect means which might be used by the United Nations to influence and assist the Japanese toward democratic and peaceful development. There was no disagreement as to the final objective—a peaceful, democratic Japan. Differences of opinion were expressed over the methods of achieving this objective and the part the United Nations should play in such a process. One group insisted that it was the attitude of the people which was important and that this attitude, if favorable to democracy, could be expressed through the present constitution or through such modifications as might come from the voluntary action of the people. The other group held equally strongly that the Japanese constitution was expressly calculated to perpetuate totalitarian action and that hope for change through amendment was unrealistic. Fundamental political changes were therefore necessary, under a United Nations policy of support for liberal, democratic forces, before these changes could become a fixed part of the life of the Japanese people.

## *Security in the Pacific*

### *Educational Procedures*

In considering measures relating to civil rights and educational policy, it was noted that proposals for the formulation of an international bill of rights, including opening of press and radio channels to unrestricted use, might be applicable to expansion of civil rights in Japan. The importance of preparations by joint action of the United Nations for dissemination of information within Japan immediately after defeat was emphasized as a means of preventing the Japanese from playing one nation off against another. Acceptance by the Japanese of the civil liberties associated with democratic government and provision for freedom of communication within Japan were generally held to be important requirements for peaceful development.

While there was little enthusiasm for an effort to impose an educational system upon Japan, it was thought that a purging of present textbooks by a committee of Japanese scholars might be initiated. Exchange of scholars and students on a substantial scale should be encouraged as soon as possible. United Nations insistence upon freedom of expression and opinion might do much to change Japanese attitudes. In addition to the widespread dissemination of foreign books, journals and newspapers, the importance of using trained and qualified personnel within Japan during the period of occupation to assist in reopening channels of communication and information was emphasized. Measures such as these, it was thought, would help break down the narrow insularity in which the Japanese people had been forced to live by their rulers, but it was recognized that their permanence would depend on whether a fully democratic regime was established.

### *ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS*

The concluding sessions examined Japan's position in terms of the economic interdependence of nations and of world prosperity and security. Reparations, along with the territorial measures and economic controls previously outlined, were necessarily linked with Japan's problem of livelihood in the postwar era. There was little doubt that, under the best of conditions, the problem would be acute. How fast might Japan's economy be permitted to recover without threat to her neighbors, such as China or Korea, and to the world at large? If Japan's recovery was unduly delayed, what would be the effects on world economic stability and, correlatively, on general international security? Answers to these questions required that closer attention be paid to the character of the Japanese economy, to such modifications of Japan's

## *The Future of Japan*

social and political regime as might conduce to peace, to the specific obligations of the United Nations in relation to Japan and generally to world economic expansion, and to the means for reintegrating Japan into the world community.

### *Reparations*

It was noted at the outset that Japan could not possibly pay for the devastation wrought in the conquered areas. The most optimistic estimate of what could be obtained from Japan in reparations was described as exceedingly small compared with the damage done. On the whole, therefore, the question of reparations was approached not so much with a view to obtaining full payment for damages as to making it a means of strengthening the security system in the Pacific area.

With the experience of the last war fresh in mind, reparations in cash were considered impractical and undesirable. Long-term reparations might also place the United Nations in the position of building up Japan, e.g., through loans, as was the case with Germany after the last war. Some thought that transfers in kind should be limited if possible to one transaction or at least confined within a brief fixed period, but others held that it would be premature to make any final decision as yet on this point. An Indian member argued strongly that large transfers in kind over a long period would be disastrous to the Japanese economy and should therefore not be demanded, but a Chinese member took exception to this view. Other Chinese members stated that, except for the transfer of all properties in restored territories, China would ask only for certain Japanese industrial machines, in amount and type which could not yet be specified. They were not enthusiastic over using Japanese skilled labor as part of a reparations scheme, protesting that China would certainly prefer to use technicians from other countries.

No clear decision was reached as to what reparations in kind might be exacted, over and above the basic transfer of Japanese properties outside the home islands. A middle-of-the-road point of view on this subject, which may be taken as representative, suggested that reparations in kind might be required of Japan on the following terms:

(1) Transfer of goods and services to a relatively small fixed amount expressed in an over-all money valuation, with payments limited to a relatively short period of time.

(2) Payments in kind, such as consumers goods, capital equipment and the like, to be fixed (a) in relation to the reconstruction needs of

### *Security in the Pacific*

other Pacific countries, and (b) in relation to Japan's capacity to produce such goods and to finance the necessary imports of raw materials for their production.

(3) Control of reparations payments to be exercised by a United Nations Reparations Commission, which would supervise payments, regulate the flow of necessary imports and exports, and make arrangements for financing necessary imports.

The bulk of Japan's reparations payments, it was agreed, would be covered by the transfer of Japanese properties in reoccupied or restored territories to the postwar authorities in those areas. By this procedure China, the largest claimant to reparations, would be the major beneficiary. Payment could also be made at one stroke, thus avoiding the difficulties of a long-term transfer problem. The interests of security in the Pacific would be served, since restoration of Manchuria and Formosa along with their industrial equipment to China would mean a considerable reduction of Japanese and increase of Chinese economic potential. The probable value of properties thus transferred to China was estimated at a minimum of 20 billion (prewar) yen, roughly half of which would be in Manchuria.

The general inclination was to attach few or no limitations to this transfer of Japanese properties. The most valuable installations, aside possibly from real estate, were either owned by Japanese official or semi-official corporations or else were nationalized enterprises vested in puppet governments. Private property of large Japanese corporations could be treated as Japanese government property and thus made subject to seizure, with the Japanese government held responsible for compensating its citizens. A Chinese member also insisted on the need to compel restitution of property seized by Japanese soldiers or civilians from the people of occupied areas and to see that contracts signed under duress in these areas be voided. Due regard should be paid to the economic advantage to China and other countries of refraining from confiscation of small Japanese business holdings or personal property. Note was taken that repatriation of Japanese civilian residents, if generally enforced, would drastically complete the elimination of Japan's economic domination in reoccupied areas.

While these principles were argued principally with reference to China, they were also made applicable to Japanese properties in Korea. Prewar Japanese enterprises in Southeast Asia countries were not significant enough to provide much compensation, but some of these countries, notably the Netherlands Indies, might be anxious to obtain Japanese

## *The Future of Japan*

textiles on reparations account. It was expected that Japanese financial assets in Western countries, particularly the United States and Britain, would be attached for reparations payments. In general, the discussions proceeded on the assumption that reparations would completely wipe out Japan's prewar foreign assets, including those held in former colonies.

### *Japan's Recovery and World Security*

The reparations problem served to bring out the handicaps to which Japan's postwar economy would be subjected. In the long list of disabilities, the following would be prominent: all foreign territories and assets eliminated; a considerable portion of industrial plants destroyed or damaged, with an undetermined amount of remaining factory equipment transferred to devastated countries; the merchant fleet crippled, and foreign trade non-existent. To these would have to be added the possibility of controls over imports and the basic industries, including perhaps shipbuilding, chemicals and machine tools, along with suppression of the aircraft industry. As the postwar era began, Japan's economic life would indeed be at a low ebb.

Relief, which would have to be provided by the United Nations forces of occupation, would quickly merge into the more complicated problem of recovery. Two distinct points of view developed on this issue. It was not always clear whether differences arose merely over method and timing, or over principle, although all members spoke from the avowed premise that considerations of security, rather than purely commercial motives, should govern whatever policy was adopted.

In the first view, Japanese economic life must be permitted to recover fairly soon after the initial occupation. Severe repression of the Japanese economy was dangerous. Within Japan it would prolong the period of instability, in which political and social unrest would prevail, while for the outside world it would create a center of economic infection, a running sore in the Pacific. This would threaten security, also, since prosperous expanding economies are less likely to be aggressive. Japan must be afforded the opportunity to establish a minimum standard of living, defined as one adequate to permit the growth of democracy and prevent renewal of aggression. To accomplish this end, positive efforts should be made at an early date to open avenues of peaceful Japanese trade and economic relations with other nations. If only to cover her food deficit, Japan had to be allowed to engage in foreign trade and to restore some part of her merchant marine and fishing

### *Security in the Pacific*

fleet—in a word, she needed the chance to establish a reasonable place in the world economy.

Thus a British member urged that it was a delusion to think that we could take away Japan's possessions, demand reparations, destroy part of her industry, and still expect her to maintain her already low standard of living unless we were prepared to offer her much greater opportunities to export than she used to have. Even allowing for the removal of war materials, such as scrap iron and petroleum, from the list of her imports, she would still need to import food and textile raw materials and would have to find new export markets in order to obtain foreign exchange to pay for such imports. Competition from Europe, America and India would have to be expected, and there was no assurance that China, India, the United States or Europe would import Japanese manufactures on a large scale. In the long term, there was an underlying gravity in Japan's trade position that could hardly be denied.

According to the second view, a rapid Japanese economic recovery also carried dangers with it. While adherents of this school were not inclined to minimize Japan's economic plight, they viewed it with much less alarm. They attached more weight to the economic benefits which would accrue to the Japanese people from removal of the heavy burdens entailed in Japan's earlier preparations for war. If domestic economic reforms were instituted, notably by limiting the monopolies and reorganizing the agrarian system, the bulk of the Japanese people would gain additional benefits. As to foreign trade, during the initial period Japan might help to meet the needs of China and Southeast Asia for cheap consumers goods. Later, with a general expansion of industry and trade in the Far East, Japan could find new export outlets, despite the admitted handicaps she would meet.

These members, however, were chiefly concerned lest interest in the restoration of Japan's economy should overshadow the needs of the victims of Japanese aggression. It should not be too easily forgotten that Japan was the power which had stolen, ravaged and terrorized, and that it was the other countries in the Far East which had suffered the tyranny of Japan's armies of occupation. A speedy recovery of Japanese industry in the postwar period could become a serious threat, owing to the ease with which it might be converted to war production. Security had to be reckoned in terms of relative industrial potential. China, for example, hoped that she might gain time for an industrialization program that would be well on its way to completion before Japan had fully recovered economically. If Japan's recovery occurred speedily,

## *The Future of Japan*

could China safely rely on assurances that Japan's trade would be "peaceful," that rearmament would be prevented, and that the institutions and habits of the old Japanese regime would be eradicated? "The whole trade of the 1930's," as one member put it, "was part of Japan's mobilization for war." There could be no doubt of Japan's ability to come back if we let her, he pointed out, but "the whole meaning of our experience is that we cannot trust her to come back freely." Only a Japan basically transformed, both socially and politically, could thus be trusted.

Despite the sharp variance in these views, perhaps rather sharper in this summary form than the opinions as actually expressed might justify, there was a considerable substratum of agreement on some elements in the problem. The conviction was generally shared that extensive long-term measures for the economic repression of Japan would not in fact be practicable, would not serve the best interests of the Allies, and would be inconsistent with the declared war aims of the United Nations. This measure of agreement, it must be admitted, did not extend to the issues of method and timing. Even here, however, it could be fairly said that the weight of opinion did not lay undue stress on the requirement that Japan's economic recovery be a speedy one. On the contrary, the majority took the position that the strengthening of other economies, and particularly that of China, deserved first attention in the interests of security. It was the Chinese standard of living, not the Japanese, that deserved prior assistance.

Welfare and standards of living, as several Chinese members pointed out, were relative. Postwar Japanese standards should be measured, not by those prevailing in the United States or Britain, but rather by those of China, the Philippines, and India. By every moral, political, or military criterion, the living standards of China and other friendly nations should have preference over those of Japan. This principle, expressed in the aphorism that "Japan has last priority in Far Eastern rehabilitation," was considered by many to be generally applicable even as to method. Japanese recovery, it was thought, should be viewed basically in relation to the needs and demands of reconstruction within the nations of the Pacific area. Primary consideration would thus be given, not to Japan's economic welfare, but to the contribution that Japan could make to the welfare of the Far East.

### *A Non-Aggressive Japan?*

Disagreement over the pace of Japan's economic recovery pointed up

## *Security in the Pacific*

the fact that this issue could not be considered in isolation, but was closely dependent both on United Nations policies and on changes that might or might not occur in Japan itself. In its simplest terms, the problem continually posed before the round tables was whether a non-aggressive Japan could be expected to emerge from defeat. Few members were prepared to face the prospect of maintaining rigid controls over Japan—military, economic, political—for an indefinite period. Such controls would doubtless be applied during the period of occupation. When the occupying forces withdrew, the burden of restraining Japan would be thrown upon the world security organization. But the dilemma would not thereby be resolved. Only the emergence of a peace-minded Japan would resolve it, by permitting Japan's untrammelled readmission to international society—a consummation, mentioned constantly, toward which all members looked.

In the achievement of this end the special responsibility in economic matters which rested on the United Nations, and particularly upon their leading members, was consistently recognized and underscored. From many members stress was repeatedly laid on the supreme necessity for the leading Western powers to adopt and pursue liberal trade, investment, and development policies. They alone held the key to the creation of an expanding world economy, in which lay the most efficacious preventive of aggression. The obvious advantages of full participation in such an international economy, as many pointed out, would supply a powerful lever in fostering necessary reforms within Japan itself. A British member noted the fact that the restrictions originally imposed upon Japan in the unequal treaties of the 1850's and 1860's caused the Japanese to direct their energies toward removal of these restrictions by meeting the conditions imposed, which they were able to do by the end of the century. This historical precedent might offer a clue to a method of persuading the Japanese to adopt new ways, if conditions were imposed in a peace treaty or in subsequent bilateral treaties with members of the United Nations. While economic (or other) restrictions should be rigidly applied so long as the need was clearly evident, they might be gradually relaxed in accordance with Japan's development as a trustworthy nation.

No generally accepted criterion of the term "trustworthy" as applied to Japan was evolved in the course of the discussions, although it was in frequent use and recognized as another of the key factors in the equation of Far Eastern stability and security. At various times a number of suggestions were made as to the elements which would



### *The Future of Japan*

have to be embodied in a new policy if Japan were to win the confidence of the outside world. The emergence of a political system through which the popular will could be effectively expressed in government was perhaps most universally accepted as the basic desideratum. To many this meant not only elimination of the militarists, the Emperor system, and the old bureaucratic structure, but also far-reaching agrarian reforms and strict regulation, if not the outright expropriation, of the *Zaibatsu*. While the sights may possibly be set too high in this thumbnail sketch of desirable changes for it to represent a consensus, it serves at least to indicate the general direction in which many members thought that Japan should move in order to regain her full rights in the international community. Most members were prepared to say, in addition, that the United Nations should give direct encouragement to those groups in Japan likely to promote the establishment of really democratic forms of government.

The success or failure of the United Nations in dealing with Japan, if a summary consensus may be attempted, would eventually turn on three major factors. The first of these, adoption of policies conducive to general economic expansion, has already been noted. A second basic condition of success was held to be the development of a trustworthy United Nations security system such as envisaged in the proposed Charter of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, under which the various measures deemed applicable to Japan could be unitedly approved and executed. To this was closely linked the third major requirement—stimulation of those fundamental changes within Japan most likely to further the growth of a democratic and peaceful nation.

# CHAPTER III

## ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND PROGRESS IN PACIFIC COUNTRIES

### *(Round Table Discussions)*

The two round tables on economic problems were concerned with relief and rehabilitation, and reconstruction and development. They concentrated their main attention on China including, of course, Manchuria and Formosa, Korea and Southeast Asia and India, with only brief reference to Australia and New Zealand and the Australian territories of New Guinea and Papua.

#### RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

Discussions began with statements on the major requirements in respect of relief and rehabilitation in the areas most affected by enemy occupation. In most cases great difficulties had been experienced in obtaining the necessary information so that estimates were general and tentative. Nevertheless it was clear that the needs were of considerable magnitude and the round tables were at once impressed with the enormity and urgency of the problems to be faced.

Relief was defined as aiming at filling the gap between resources available on the liberation of territories and those required to sustain consumption at the minimum level consistent with the preservation of life, health and morale. Rehabilitation was concerned with filling the gap by increasing production, for example by the provision of seeds, fertilizers, transport facilities and raw materials. These were to be distinguished from reconstruction, which was designed to raise production and living standards to more or less the pre-war level, and development, which embodied policy directed to the progressive improvement of production and living standards.

Since these problems are closely connected, it was not to be expected that formal niceties would be observed either in the reports and discussions or in practical policies, but relief and rehabilitation were accepted as short-run problems covering a period of (say) up to two years.

#### *The Pattern of Needs*

Although differences exist in the extent of war damage and in the nature and size of the requirements for relief and rehabilitation in

### *Economic Recovery and Progress in Pacific Countries*

different countries, they fit into very similar patterns. Throughout the greater part of the Far East, food production will have been seriously reduced to well below minimum requirements, and there will be considerable shortages of clothing and medical supplies, and of machine parts, plant, equipment and materials to rehabilitate industry and agriculture.

Some countries which were previously exporters of foodstuffs may be able to resume exports to deficit areas fairly quickly. It was reported, for example, that Korea would need relief for only a short period, and that if early aid in rehabilitation were given, it should soon be able to supply other areas. But, in general, it seems unlikely that much reliance can be placed on supplies of food from Far Eastern countries for the relief of their neighbors for some time after they are liberated. Even in Burma, formerly the world's greatest exporter of rice, with a normal export surplus of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  million tons per year, production will be less than the requirements for domestic consumption. Hence for some time food imports will be needed, and it will be several years before Burma can again contribute on any scale to the food demands of other Asiatic countries.

The main reasons for the curtailment of farm production have been labor requisitioning, the loss of draft animals through disease and slaughter, their use in transport, and the breakdown of transport facilities generally. In the Philippines, the food problem is accentuated by the transfer of land from food production to cotton. No information is available as to whether a similar distortion of production has occurred in other regions.

Over very large areas in eastern Asia, the state of health is likely to be low, and there will be shortages of drugs. The number of doctors will be insufficient. In addition, administrative and technical experts of all kinds will be needed. In the Netherlands Indies, for example, there were between 40,000 and 45,000 technical and administrative personnel before the invasion. Of these only one-third are likely to be available. The rest will have died during war operations or as prisoners of war, or will be unfit for service. Because of the loss of administrative personnel and the urgency and complicated nature of the problem, the establishment of efficient systems of administration, and the provision of large staffs of trained workers will require special attention.

## *Security in the Pacific*

### *Importance of Transport*

The necessity of reestablishing transport facilities was emphasized as being of cardinal importance in every country. In some territories such as the Philippines and Indo-China, reestablishment of transport will be needed to transfer food from surplus producing areas to deficit areas even though there is no over-all shortage. While there was no precise estimate available it is certain also that much damage will have occurred to industrial plants, oil boring and refinery equipment, rice mills, wharves and public utilities, both by enemy and United Nations forces.'

In view of the general situation outlined, importance must be attached to supplies, especially of food and textiles, from other parts of the world. Under ordinary market conditions, however, the amounts available to Eastern Asia may be limited by competition from countries with a high level of domestic purchasing power. Moreover, such supplies as are available may be separated by great distances from the areas which need them. Transport again presents a basic problem and shipping may prove a serious bottleneck during the period when the need is greatest. An American member with experience in such matters stated that so long as the war continued the military authorities would preempt all shipping for their purposes and would leave little for the movement of relief supplies. Much would depend, however, on the sequence of events: if a considerable interval should elapse between the end of the war in Europe and the defeat of Japan, the peak of Europe's need might pass before shipping routes were open for the movement of large quantities of food and other items to the Far East.

For this reason, it was suggested, every effort should be made to ensure full use of such local surpluses as may be available anywhere in the Pacific area. Transport facilities essential to the movement of such surpluses should therefore have high priority among rehabilitation supplies. Given a limited quantity of locomotives, wagons and coastal shipping, Indo-China, for example, could provide for export a million tons of rice a year, half a million tons of maize and some 2 million tons of coal. Similarly, within the interior of China an improvement in transport, which has deteriorated sharply during the war, would contribute greatly to the balancing of supplies as between different zones. At the same time the need for moving supplies into deficit zones might be reduced by speedy postwar demobilization of troops to provide the manpower needed to step up farm production. In areas where demobilized soldiers cannot be absorbed quickly in such work, hardship and unrest might be prevented by employing them on necessary public works.

## *Economic Recovery and Progress in Pacific Countries*

### *The Needs of China*

The enormity of the problems of relief and rehabilitation were brought home very strongly by a statement of Chinese requirements from UNRRA, which are additional to the needs to be met by the Government of China. The estimates referred mainly to occupied areas, but in some aspects, for example health and transport, the relief and rehabilitation problem must be solved on a national scale. The total imported supplies needed in the first 18 months were valued at US\$2.5 billion out of which US\$945 million was requested from UNRRA. In addition Chinese expenditures totalling \$2.7 billion Chinese dollars at 1937 values would be needed. A non-Chinese member pointed out that this was a considerable under-estimate since it was confined as regards certain important items to redistribution costs and took no account of the cost of necessary rebuilding etc. falling on the national budget. Import requirements would need the transport of 10 million metric tons. Even these figures were scaled down to below the estimated minimum requirements of consumers.

The Chinese report emphasized the principle that much importance should be attached to the speed with which the economy could be brought back on a working basis, for example by providing farm implements for the restoration of agriculture. As in other countries reported on, a large number of technicians would be needed from abroad. An incidental advantage of the influx of goods would be to check or reduce inflation. The method of disposal of these goods would be important in this connection. Chinese members gave assurances that supplies allocated by UNRRA would be distributed among all the zones concerned in the proportions indicated in the estimates and that these estimates covered areas under communist control as well as those under the control of the national government.

India was reported to be in a different category from the other countries discussed. Its most urgent need was for medical supplies. It could pay for these but would require the assistance of UNRRA in obtaining the necessary priorities.

The situation in Australian dependencies also differs in many respects from that in the other territories considered. Systematic devastation has occurred, and the foundations of communal life have been disrupted. Industrial establishments do not exist, and the problem is one of reestablishing a primitive, indigenous economy. The Australian Government will be entirely responsible and the Rehabilitation Administration was reported to be doing a fine job.

## *Security in the Pacific*

### *Problems of Supply*

Relief needs were linked with the problems of supply by a description of the operations of UNRRA, but what appeared to be at first a clear and simple account of the principles and methods of operation was so completely confused by subsequent discussion as to indicate the necessity for their clarification even over a wider field than among conference members. Certain fears and conflicts of interest were apparent through the confusion.

It became evident that the resources of UNRRA would be quite inadequate to meet the enormous needs of the area, when account was taken of the necessities of Europe. If the latter exhausted the single contribution of 1 per cent of national income from member countries of the United Nations before the Far East was freed from the invader, would additional funds be made available? If relief and rehabilitation needs could not be completed for some years, would the operations of UNRRA be extended for a sufficient period?

China, the only country in Eastern Asia requiring financial assistance, had presented an estimate of needs of considerable dimensions. These arose because of the length of the war, the area and population involved and the extent of devastation. Would this prejudice the prospects of other Far Eastern countries?

On the other hand, some countries such as the Philippines, Burma, the Netherlands Indies and Indo-China would not require relief from UNRRA, but their demands would be financed through their own foreign resources or by the governments concerned. Would this mean that they would be given preference because supplies would be bought in the open market?

The issue narrowed down to the necessity for distributing inadequate supplies on the basis of priorities carefully determined by an independent authority without reference to financial aspects. Had UNRRA the necessary information and the authority to enforce such priorities?

Uneasiness was in some measure relieved by a careful expert statement on the principles and manner of operation of UNRRA, and there was general agreement that the system was as well controlled as could be expected. It was clear, however, that success depended on full United Nations cooperation, especially among countries of supply.

A related question arose from the fact that allocations depended on the existence of control over supply in each separate supplying country, and the danger arose that on the termination of hostilities, the system would collapse because of pressures in the separate countries to relinquish

### *Economic Recovery and Progress in Pacific Countries*

controls and return to free markets. Uneasiness on this score brought general support to the principle that necessary controls over supply should be retained at least for a long enough period to cover major relief requirements. Several members expressed the view, which was, indeed, implied in the whole discussion, that liberated areas should be brought into full production as quickly as possible in order to reduce the duration of the relief period and the volume of supplies needed from outside. They stressed the desirability of building up stockpiles of supplies by restraining further increases in consumption, and where possible effecting some temporary reduction, in those countries which enjoy the highest standards.

#### RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

From the importance of speedy rehabilitation, the round tables passed by a natural transition to the closely connected subjects of reconstruction and development. Plans at present under consideration for China, India, Indo-China, Korea and the Netherlands East Indies were outlined by members from those countries. For China, plans are in the early stages of preparation. These, and the Bombay Plan for India, and more recently various Indian Government plans, lay down provisional objectives and make a beginning in the formulation of principles of action. In other areas, plans are less advanced. Each plan has its special features but all have common features. Industrial expansion, increased productivity in agriculture and the improvement of education, housing, health and other services are regarded in every case as parallel and complementary aims. Prominent among the means counted on to achieve these aims are greatly increased imports of capital equipment, modern techniques and skilled technicians. To attract such imports, without which the pace of development would be painfully slow, some at least of the countries concerned plan to offer definite inducements to private enterprise.

#### *China's Program*

The Chinese program was stated by a Chinese member to aim at a welfare economy rather than a defense economy, and to have a strong democracy as the ultimate goal. This is to be achieved on the foundations of improved living standards reached not only by industrialization and the development of communications and other services, but also by improved agricultural efficiency. The objective, as shown by a recent resolution of the Supreme National Defense Council is to establish a

### *Security in the Pacific*

mixed economy, containing public and private enterprise. State monopolies are to cover five main categories: postal and telecommunication services, arsenals, mints, the main railways and large-scale hydroelectric plants. Outside these fields there is expected to be ample scope for private enterprise. The state may participate as an ordinary shareholder with no special privileges, or enter the remaining fields by creating business corporations, but it is planned to subject these to the same laws as non-government corporations so that they will have no competitive advantages. The more important private enterprises must be approved by the government so as to fit into the over-all government program. Regional and local programs will be encouraged to take advantage of local initiative, but these also must conform to the general plan.

According to some estimates, each of the first five years of the plan for China will cost US\$2.3 billion, and even on the most liberal estimate of national savings US\$1 billion of foreign loans will be required.

Incidentally the importance attached to the encouragement of private enterprise was also shown in a statement by a Netherlands Indies member. Free enterprise in trade and industry has been restricted in the Netherlands Indies since 1934 in order to check Japanese efforts to secure monopoly control, but a return is to be made as soon as possible to an open door policy based on reciprocity and free access to world markets. Such plans as have been made for industrial development are flexible to take advantage of whatever situation may arise.

### *Agrarian Reform*

The intense interest in and sympathy towards reconstruction in China, and the importance attached to it, were shown by the discussions which followed. In both round tables agrarian reform, especially as applied to credit and land tenure, was considered to be a necessary condition of improved efficiency in farming. A Chinese member reported that agrarian reform, traced back to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, but impeded by disturbances and war, was being achieved by the Farmers Bank. This operates through the alleviation of the problem of debt and tenancy by improving and cheapening credit facilities. A member with a special interest in the agrarian problem doubted whether the operations of the Bank would be adequate as an instrument of agrarian reform.

Importance was attached to the development of small industrial undertakings in rural communities. According to a member recently returned from Yen-an, remarkable success had been achieved in the communist-controlled areas of North China by small-scale local enterprises



### *Economic Recovery and Progress in Pacific Countries*

organized on a cooperative basis and relying largely on the spare-time services of farmers. The natural emphasis on Western large-scale methods in some industries should not, it was suggested, be allowed to obscure the great possibilities for expansion in most lines through local enterprises specially adapted to the needs and circumstances of China and other Far Eastern countries.

#### *Political Factors*

At times the discussion in one of the round tables became heavily bogged down in ideological and political exchanges. These did little to advance the argument in the precise terms of the agenda, but revealed the importance attached by some members to the dependence of healthy economic reconstruction on political conditions. They served to underline the view that long-term economic planning might be frustrated by political uncertainty.

In response to a question whether the book *China's Destiny* proposed to develop war industries and to use centralized planning to develop certain areas at the expense of others, a Chinese member replied that there could be no clear differentiation between war and non-war industry, and that there was no real point in the question unless it was assumed that other countries did not have war industries. Plans he stated were designed to cover the whole of China and would not discriminate against particular regions.

The other round table gave somewhat more attention to the bearing of the organization of security on the type of industry which might be developed in China. The view was taken that there was an obvious conflict between the needs of defense and those of welfare and social progress. While some further development of heavy industry in China might be desirable in any circumstances, the importance attached to it in current plans was clearly a reflection of a sense of insecurity. As a Chinese member put it, his country had to have heavy industry in order to become a force for peace and security in the Far East. Only by the firm establishment of the greatest possible degree of international security could the conflict between defense and welfare be resolved.

One member asserted that the ideology of *China's Destiny* was disquieting and that over a period of seventeen years there have been many declarations of democratic intentions which have not expressed themselves in policy. This drew the reply from a Chinese member that the task of achieving democracy should not be regarded as a light one in a country suffering from 7½ years of war. He added "in all earnestness

### *Security in the Pacific*

and sincerity" that in the pursuit of the objective of a united and democratic China, a solution to the "communist problem" would be found.

Certain American members expressed the view that democratic policies and achievements were relevant to the responsibilities of the United States and other countries in providing investment aid to China.

### *Investment Conditions and Prospects*

Members emphasized that private investors in enterprises in China would be especially concerned with the prospective returns, and present and prospective risks and that these were clearly connected, not only with the stability of the political regime, but also with the protection to foreign investors given by Chinese commercial law, and the restrictions imposed by such law. It was equally important that there should be no political tags to loans which China might receive.

A Chinese member gave the assurance that laws giving satisfactory protection to foreign investments in China would be evolved. After all, investment like love-making required two parties, and would be not only fruitful, but also conducive to mutual satisfaction. The necessary conventions of economic wedlock would be faithfully observed even though the details of the ceremony were still to be arranged.

The question was raised whether capital was likely to be available from the Soviet Union, especially if, as was argued by a member, Chinese savings should prove less than was estimated, and adequate supplies could not be obtained from other capital markets. No satisfactory answer was forthcoming as to whether capital would be available from the Soviet Union, but the view was advanced that Russia would not afford such assistance to any regime which might prove unfriendly.

The reference to the inadequacy of savings drew attention to the importance of Chinese labor as a factor in the development of capital works, but this was not regarded as removing the need for substantial capital from abroad. If this was not forthcoming in the amounts required, development plans would still be proceeded with, but these would have to be more restricted in scope and their completion would be delayed. Moreover, in such circumstances standards of living in China would be prejudiced.

### *Plans for India*

An Indian member then outlined the proposals of the Bombay Plan for India and plans prepared or in preparation by the Indian Government. These assumed a mixed economy similar in broad outline to that

### *Economic Recovery and Progress in Pacific Countries*

envisaged for China and with the same objectives of raising living standards and developing a balanced economy. Such a balanced economy must not be looked upon as a threat to world economic expansion, for a main purpose in aiming at such an economy was to ensure adequate supplies of food so that the experiences of the recent famine would never be repeated. Far from raising a threat, the Indian program would facilitate world economic expansion and, indeed, would be dependent upon such expansion. It would increase India's foreign trade, and necessitate a considerable importation of capital goods, raw materials, and consumers goods.

The Bombay Plan envisaged an expenditure of US\$30 billion over 15 years distributed as follows:

	<i>Billions</i>
Industry	\$13.6
Agriculture	3.6
Communications	3.0
Education	1.5
Health	1.4
Housing	6.6
Other	0.6

Sterling balances would provide \$3 billion, hoarded gold \$1 billion, foreign loans \$2.5 billion and Indian savings \$23.5 billion. Normal pre-war savings provided only \$14 billion and the balance of \$9.5 billion would have to be found through forced savings obtained by taxation, control of consumption and other means. He stated that whatever the political situation, plans would be put through, but the rate of progress would be accelerated by Indian independence. "India means business."

A member in one round table argued that standards of living would not be improved under the plan on the grounds that insufficient attention was paid to social considerations, especially in rural communities. Pressure of time prevented opportunity for the discussion of this criticism.

### *Reconstruction in Southeast Asia*

Policies and programs for the countries of Southeast Asia were not described in detail, largely because, owing to preoccupation with the war and problems of relief and rehabilitation, such have not yet been worked out; but there was interesting evidence of the possibilities of mutual aid through an increasing degree of economic integration. As surplus rice producers, Burma and Indo-China might again in the future

## *Security in the Pacific*

contribute to the needs of deficit areas. The latter also had some prospect of supplying cement to other parts of Southeast Asia for roads and buildings. Supplies of iron and steel might well be available in the region through the development of an iron and steel industry in the Philippines based on Philippine ore and lime, and coking coal from Indo-China.

### *Industrialization and Social Conditions*

While there was a consensus that a greater or less degree of industrialization was necessary to economic progress and improved material standards in all of the countries discussed, the opinion appeared to be unanimous that economic development in its narrow interpretation was not sufficient. A member expressed grave doubts whether industrialization would, in fact, be conducive to greater happiness and real improvement in living standards. It might result in greater concentration in the cities where the inhabitants would suffer from overcrowding, bad housing, unsatisfactory sanitation, and impaired health. These results would be very likely to follow if the tempo of industrialization was rapid. This member had come to the conference with an open mind for ideas and was leaving with a head full of nightmares. It was suggested that the dangers would be reduced if industry were decentralized as far as possible, and based on rural communities. The groups were seized of the necessity, however, for preparing in advance against the evils described, and ensuring that housing and sanitation schemes, the development of medical services, educational and other facilities and amenities should be an integral part of any developmental program.

### INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND TRADE POLICIES

The round tables now turned to a discussion of the related questions of international investment and trade policies, the promotion of an expanding world economy, and the relation of economic development to organs of collective security and international collaboration. Many of the important issues had already been raised in discussing the problems of the separate countries, for it was soon established that successful national plans for reconstruction and development were conditional upon the expansion of world trade and production, and that such expansion was especially dependent upon international investment and trade policies.

Reduced to their elements, the main lines of argument may be stated as follows: Standards of living in the various countries of the Pacific can only be raised by the development of resources through improved tech-

## *Economic Recovery and Progress in Pacific Countries*

niques and better equipment. This must apply to every sector of the Pacific economies — agriculture, transport, communications, public utilities and manufacture. While the development of agriculture is important, no substantial improvement in living standards can occur unless there are marked advances in other economic sectors. Such advances were somewhat loosely described as industrialization. A basic reason for low living standards is rural overpopulation and a lack of balance between agriculture and industry. This must be overcome by providing employment opportunities in industry. In the process, this will increase per capita efficiency in agriculture by increasing the size of holdings.

### *Foreign Loans Imperative*

For these developments, a great deal of capital equipment is necessary. National savings in Pacific countries are too small to provide this and capital must be borrowed from abroad. Unless such borrowing is possible, developments on any scale may be financed by inflationary methods which will force down living standards because prices will rise more than the income of the poorer sections of the people. The rest of the world will benefit from borrowing because it will lead to increased demand for capital goods of all sorts, raw materials, and later, consumers goods. But repayment must be in goods and in any case new or expanded industries must find markets abroad. So the full contributions to world progress of development programs in the Pacific, of the exploitation of resources and of a wide variety of skills demands the avoidance of trade barriers.

### *The Need for Stabilization Policies*

What is required, however, is a world economy which is expanding all the time, and not subject, as in the past, to severe cycles of boom and depression. To avoid this, international collaboration must be arranged. This consideration led to a somewhat technical discussion of so-called counter-cyclical measures. The main proposals centered round the use of international financial institutions such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the British export credit scheme and the United States Export-Import Bank, to lend more generously and on cheaper terms when world conditions threatened to deteriorate. Such a policy would be of especial benefit in stabilizing production and employment in the main lending countries by improving the demand for capital equipment and materials, and in the borrowing countries by enabling them to promote employment in the construction of public works and

### *Security in the Pacific*

buildings. Such financial methods might be supported by other international devices. For example, an international commodity corporation might be used to build up buffer stocks when prices threatened to fall and dispose of them when they rose.

It was generally accepted that responsibility must not be concentrated on international institutions but that every country should apply stabilization schemes carefully devised so as not to throw the burden of adjustment on other countries. From the point of stability, borrowing countries should prefer equities to indirect, fixed interest investments, because the latter lead to a greater strain on the balance of payments when prices fall, and force a greater contraction in imports.

### *The Supply of Capital*

The question was then examined whether capital would, in fact, be forthcoming in sufficient quantities and if so under what conditions. To this no confident answer was given.

The problem of blocked sterling balances provoked some discussion as being of obvious importance, especially to India. The origin of the blocked sterling balances, on which India hoped to draw to finance her imports of capital goods, was explained by a British member. The total sum involved, including balances owed to other countries as well as India, might amount at the end of the war to 3 billion pounds (12 billion dollars), and while every penny of this would be paid, the rate at which the balances could be released would necessarily depend on how quickly the United Kingdom could build up her export trade; and this in turn would depend on the recovery of world trade as a whole. In the period immediately following the war all proceeds from exports would be needed for the purchase of food and other essentials for the British people and raw materials for British industry. It ought not to be long however before some capital goods could be supplied against drafts on the sterling balances and the quantities thus supplied would increase as Britain's export trade revived. Some difference of emphasis appeared in a statement by an Indian member, who felt that the size of the balances was in part a consequence of policies to which India would not have agreed had she enjoyed a status of independence, and that the inflation which had been allowed to develop in India as a result of the rise in these balances had produced unnecessary hardship. He recognized, however, that the balances could be released only over a period, which might extend to 15 or 20 years; but the rate of release should be a matter for negotiation, and in this negotiation due weight should be

### *Economic Recovery and Progress in Pacific Countries*

given to India's urgent need for capital equipment. In the view of an American member, however, the problem was not one to be left entirely to bilateral negotiation. The sterling balances were, he pointed out, a reflection of the magnitude of the war effort made by the United Kingdom in the interest of the United Nations, and the burden they involve should be shared by all of the more prosperous members of the United Nations including, in particular, the United States.

On the question of the world's probable postwar needs and supply of capital an American member reported an estimate that the minimum demand on the United States during the transition period would amount to some 15 billion dollars. Were industrial development to proceed at the rates outlined earlier in the round tables, the amount required would be much greater. Even on the most conservative estimate the need for international lending would be greater than at any time in the past. If an effective system of international security could be developed and if major political differences in borrowing countries could be composed, large amounts of private capital would be available, but at the present time there was no sign of any rush of private investors to subscribe to foreign loans. Such mechanisms as the proposed International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were therefore urgently needed, together with governmental institutions capable of granting short and long-term foreign credits. For some years an excess of United States exports (including capital goods) over imports was necessary and desirable as a means of making available the equipment needed for an expanding world economy. To permit the later repayment of such loans, however, there must be a great increase in imports, including in particular imports of Far Eastern products, into the lending countries. Given full employment in the United States and other countries increased imports of raw materials would go far to meet this need.

### *Considerations Relating to Investments*

With this analysis members found themselves in full agreement. The stimulating detailed discussion that followed centered round half a dozen main points: First, the contribution which the development of air transport might make to an expanding world economy, and the desirability of international action to promote such development.

Second, the responsibilities that fall on the world's great capital markets. The American market, a British member suggested, was over-conservative: it is the function of an international investor to display

### *Security in the Pacific*

a spirit of adventure and to assume reasonable risks, while not neglecting the lessons of past mistakes and the need for a certain technique.

Third, the objections raised by several members to tied loans — loans that must be spent in the country in whose currency they are made. American members pointed out that tied loans such as had been made in the past by the Export-Import Bank, and might be made in the future on a large scale by private lenders in association with that Bank, had the advantage of adding to the total supply of dollars and releasing other dollar holdings for use elsewhere, while a Netherlands member noted that in the period of shortages immediately following the war, tied loans might be inevitable since credits without priorities might be useless. British and other members feared however that loans of this type might have serious consequences if persisted in over a long period. They might deny borrowers access to those markets in which certain types of capital equipment could be bought most cheaply. If used as a device for capturing traditional British export markets they might force Britain to adopt the same device even at the expense of sacrifices in her living standards. It was noted with approval that in the proposed Bank for Reconstruction and Development, not only are tied loans ruled out but special provision is made for meeting the increased demand for dollars which may result indirectly from the expenditure of loans made in other currencies.

A fourth point, made by a Netherlands member, was the desirability of hastening the rehabilitation of such countries as France and the Netherlands which may be expected, once they are on their feet again, to resume their former role of exporters of capital.

Fifth, there was a lively discussion of the problems created by the wartime development of synthetic rubber, textile fibers and fast drying oils. A British member said that should American synthetic rubber production be subsidized after the war either directly or indirectly — as by the sale of war plants at low prices—or should it be given tariff protection, the consequences to millions of people engaged directly or indirectly in the production of natural rubber would be disastrous. A more optimistic view was expressed by an American member who believed that with full employment in the United States the demand for rubber would be great enough to absorb all that the plantations could produce, at any rate for some years after the war, together with the output of a sizable synthetic rubber industry. The net results of protecting the synthetic rubber industry might merely be higher prices to that familiar victim, the consumer.



## *Economic Recovery and Progress in Pacific Countries*

### *Trade Policy*

Some consideration was given to the problems created by the development of new exports industries in Far Eastern countries. There seemed to be general agreement that there is no special case for tariffs or discrimination against goods from low wage countries. In so far as the import of cheap goods is disadvantageous, the effects are the same whether cheapness is due to low wages or to efficient methods combined with high wages. Moreover, an expansion of trade will benefit all countries. More imports mean more exports.

A warning was issued against the too ready acceptance of this view. Competition from newly developed industries in India and the Pacific will damage some industries and countries, and cause a heavy cost through the idleness of industrial plants. So the burden of adjustment is likely to be thrown on the older industrial countries.

It was pointed out, however, that if efforts to promote an expanding world demand were successful, the necessary adjustments would be very much easier. Nevertheless, older countries must accept such adjustments as the unavoidable cost of progress, and prepare against them by plans which facilitate the transfer of production to other directions.

It seemed to be generally accepted that although barriers to world trade must be removed, existing controls should be lifted gradually and by stages agreed upon internationally. At the end of the war there will be an unparalleled distortion of production. Time must be given to enable adjustments to be made. Where necessary, international assistance should be given to assist in the required adjustments.

Here again, as at so many points in the discussion, two central themes emerged: first, the crucial importance, if the world's needs for markets and for capital are to be met, of full employment in the great industrial countries; and second, the responsibility that each country bears toward all others in framing its trade policies. Economically, it was clear, we are all members one of another. National policies which affect the living standards of other peoples can no longer be regarded as a purely domestic matter.

From this observation an American member, supported at once from all quarters of his round table, drew the conclusion that the nations of the world should agree upon basic "rules of the game" in the field of commercial policy and should set up a permanent international organization through which they could work in continuous session on the complicated matters of tariffs, import quotas, export controls, export subsidies and the like. Even if the basic rules were agreed, ordinary bilateral

### *Security in the Pacific*

negotiations were too slow and cumbersome to settle the numerous disputes and new problems which constantly arise, and continuous consideration through a permanent organization was therefore essential. Reference was made to the work already done and the techniques developed in this and related fields by the Economic, Financial and Transit Department of the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization; to the need for international cooperation in the timing of lending and development programs; and to the possibility of coordinating all such efforts through the general international organization outlined in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

In trade, as in other aspects of international economic relations, it was agreed there were no good old days to go back to; but the fluid state of the world's economic structure at the end of the war will offer a unique opportunity to initiate a sound long-term program of economic development and trade expansion. Should this opportunity be missed we can expect a speedy revival of the worst forms of economic nationalism, with results which may give for a time an illusion of security, but will not give even an illusion of prosperity. No time should be lost in developing machinery through which all countries can cooperate in solving their common economic problem and in clearing the way for an expansion of world trade.

Both round tables ended on the same theme. Expanding world production and demand were regarded as important to improve the conditions of life of the masses of the people, not only in the Pacific, but also throughout the world. Equally they were regarded as essential to future security, since without them economic stresses and rivalries would exacerbate international relations. This raised the whole question for early decision by the United Nations of the sort of international agencies still to be established which would be best suited to promote economic cooperation, the extent to which regional organizations, functional in character, would be appropriate to the needs of the Pacific region, the relationship of functional organizations to a world security organization, and the manner in which their activities should be coordinated.

## CHAPTER IV

### CULTURAL AND RACE RELATIONS

#### *(Round Table Discussions)*

The mutual impact of cultures and the effect of so-called "racial" attitudes on international relations were among the first topics explored by the Institute at the time of its foundation. They have remained objects of study and discussion ever since. On the present occasion, war-time contacts in the Pacific afforded the opportunity for a fresh survey of the problems earlier disclosed. It was possible also to examine new measures adopted in the emergency to promote better mutual understanding between the peoples of East and West.

#### CHANGES IN NATIONAL POLICY

One of the round tables started with a general review of recent situations. Notice was taken of the sharpening of prejudices and discriminations in some countries as typical emotional reactions to the experience of war. For example, the reference papers before the conference mentioned anti-Indian outbreaks in Burma and anti-Japanese outbreaks in the United States. But they also revealed that in many instances common suffering had brought native and immigrant groups closer together than they had been in the past.

National policies, as embodied in constitutional provisions, in laws and in regulations, it was found, did not completely express the degree to which prejudicial attitudes and social discriminations were affecting minority groups. Institutional practices and social custom still were determining the economic status of such groups even where overt national or racial discriminations did not exist. At the round table that essayed this survey, Indian members drew attention to the interplay of political and social motives in the relations between occidentals and orientals but were reminded by other members that sharp class and caste differentiations had existed in India long before British domination and were to be found in free as well as in dependent countries. Discussion of the special character of occidental-oriental social relations as by-products of "imperialism" was deferred for fuller consideration by the round tables on Dependent Areas.

The British members were not alone in denying the existence of race prejudice as an important factor in colonial policy. No country represented at the round table, according to its nationals, permitted such prejudice to color either its constitution or its laws. Yet, that discrimina-

### *Security in the Pacific*

tions against members of particular racial or cultural groups did exist, could not be denied. Although not represented at the meeting, the Soviet Union was described by a member as practicing the most advanced official views of racial equality. The remarkable fact about the Russian system was that it did not, apparently, superimpose a non-discriminatory national policy upon continuing traditions of regional separatism, but that migrants tended to be absorbed in any part of the Soviet territory without violence to their feelings, tastes, or convictions. Thus a Kazak community could continue to follow its Mohammedan faith and old customs; but if one of its members should desire to learn Russian and live in Russia he could do that also without giving up his religious practices, and he could go to a Russian military school and be commissioned an officer without regard to his stock or religious affiliation. Discrimination on racial or religious grounds are punishable in Russian law. A possible explanation for this phenomenon was seen in the fact that all inhabitants of the immense Soviet territories are equally sovereign.

It was observed in this connection that in France and the United Kingdom, likewise, segregation on racial grounds does not normally exist. But there is a difference between the treatment of colonial visitors to the respective metropolitan countries, it was said, and the treatment of indigenous persons of similar social status in the colonies themselves. This, it was argued, proved that not race but the colonial relationship is responsible for "race" discrimination. Inadequate provision for public education, refusal of admission to the higher branches of civil service, differential wage standards, and the like, express an underlying sense of superiority on the part of members of the dominant group and contempt for the dependent peoples. This analysis was countered with the explanation that differentiations in the rights and obligations of various groups of nationals in the colonies exist for administrative convenience and are not part of a discriminative official policy. But in any case, Netherlands and British members observed, these differentiations had been fading away before the war and may be expected to disappear altogether.

It was pointed out that "race" discriminations prevail quite as much in the United States as in any of the dependent countries of the Pacific. They had become so acute as to give rise to strong demands for remedial action. Thus the Fair Employment Practices Committee had been established as a government agency with authority to make legal decisions against discriminatory practices. The United States War Department had instructed officers of military government in overseas areas to take cognizance of the racial self-respect of the peoples they would have to deal with. Mention was also made of recent and pending legislation in

## *Cultural and Race Relations*

the United States to modify and eventually eliminate discriminatory immigration laws. It was freely admitted, however, that both in the United States and in Canada local legislation and, even more effectively, social institutions and customs tended to negate over-all national policies of non-discrimination.

An Australian member claimed that there was no substantial race discrimination in his country. Discriminatory practices in the administration of the Australian immigration law was based on economic and "sociological" grounds and not on race distinctions as such. In illustration, he mentioned the application of immigration restrictions to South-Europeans and the admission of certain categories of oriental immigrants who would not normally come into competition with Australian wage-earners. Yet, this member admitted that the Dominion would have to re-examine its immigration policy after the war, in order that the relevant laws and regulations should more fully express the racially non-discriminatory nature of the essential restrictions.

A Chinese member further attacked the case for an explanation of "race" discriminations in terms of colonial relations by pointing to the existence among oriental groups of prejudices and discriminations very similar to those between white and non-white people, and in this connection drew attention to the distressing experiences of Chinese residents in Thailand. A Thai member replied with a defense similar to that used earlier by an Australian member: the discriminations complained about are not racial at all but arise from economic considerations. With this explanation the Chinese present at the round table were not entirely satisfied. They said that the discriminations experienced by their nationals in Thailand and in other countries of the *Nan Yang* were not limited to matters of economic competition. For example, the social segregation between Europeans, Malays, and Chinese in Malaya had produced a "lack of psychological cohesion" which was mainly responsible for the military defeats and the rapid fall of Singapore.

The discussion thus shifted to a more theoretical theme: the relative importance of national policy as embodied in laws and of private social behavior. Chinese and Indian members of the round table, more especially, were emphatic in the denunciation of official pronouncements at variance with the actual conduct of the dominant group.

### CONTACTS BETWEEN TROOPS

Members were interested to learn what effects the presence of large armed forces of another "race" had on "race" relations in the Pacific

### *Security in the Pacific*

theaters of war. One of the round tables attempted to secure a comprehensive picture of this situation, the other was content with the elicitation of telling illustrations.

A Chinese member referred to the dispersion of the American troops stationed in his country as a preventive of such clashes as the presence of large numbers of aliens in any one community might have produced. Moreover, there was the barrier of language which restricted the occasions of personal contact though at times it also produced embarrassment. This Chinese observer was in favor of more language teaching among the foreign troops and considered the "state of passive incomprehension" which now kept them apart from the Chinese as undesirable. He referred incidentally to the visits of American soldiers to English-speaking Chinese homes: encouraged to speak of their own home life, some of these Americans had been released from nostalgia, and their interest in China had been greatly increased.

In Australia, the virtual absence of racial or language difference had not prevented the occurrence of stresses and incidents between American and Australian troops and civilians. They were similar to those experienced in the first world war, but now much larger numbers were involved. One Australian member mentioned the difference in the rate of pay received by Australian and American soldiers as the main source of trouble. The latter were able to use money to buy popularity, especially with girls. With many Australians the American invasion of the matrimonial market—there were now some ten thousand Australian-American war brides—was a sore point. Another source of difficulty was the establishment of canteens which separated Australians and Americans. The Australian member also stressed the value for mutual understanding and sympathy of taking American soldiers into the homes of native residents. Greater familiarity with America and American ways has not, he added, weakened the loyalty of Australians to the British Commonwealth.

A New Zealander concurred with the main points made by his Australian colleague but thought that the presence of large numbers of United States troops in New Zealand would have more lasting effects there.

An Indian member distinguished between the attitude of Indians toward professional British soldiers and toward those serving only for the duration of the war. With the latter, he declared, relations were good: their peace-time jobs provided common interests between them and their Indian hosts. Relations with Australian troops also were good, and

## *Cultural and Race Relations*

so were those with the Americans stationed in India. The Indians wished to fraternize with them, and there had been no unfavorable incidents. In contrast, the promotion of friendly contacts between the Indian population and the British troops permanently stationed in India had met with difficulty, as the Government had not adopted a helpful attitude. It had also discouraged meetings between Indians and troops of Allied countries, evidently in the belief that they would have undesirable political effects. Therefore, lacking organized opportunity, contacts had been unofficial. He favored the opening of centers in Delhi and perhaps other Indian cities where foreign officers and men might receive a suitable introduction to Indian culture. Prominent Indians would help to devise and organize educational activities of this sort.

An American member related incidents in Europe — as, for example, with the stationing of American troops in France — which were very similar to those described for countries in the Pacific. To prevent avoidable misunderstandings the War Department had issued handbooks to the troops to prepare them for the circumstances they would meet in the countries to which they were sent. He also bore witness to the value for mutual understanding of access to home life. But where cultural differences were very great it was important to subject the troops to some education before they embarked. A member from the Netherlands agreed that the effect of interracial contact on attitudes tended to be unfavorable where there was a wide gulf between the habits and circumstances of the inhabitants and of the Allied troops.

Another American speaker emphasized that where alien troops appeared in large numbers trouble was more likely to arise. In any large body of men there will usually be some individuals who enjoy stirring up trouble. The provincial attitude of United States troops was notorious and was more evident in a place with a very different way of life from that to which they are accustomed. This attitude was accentuated when they moved about in large numbers. There was, however, a noticeable difference in the behavior of troops — British as well as American — in this war as compared with wars in the past. They are not professional soldiers and feel the need of contact with civilians. To make that contact contributive to mutual understanding meant the organization of opportunities for small groups to meet native citizens on a footing of equality, and that was not always easy.

A British member who had commanded a mixed force of American and British troops agreed with this prescription. In their relations with civilians, he said, the soldiers were handicapped by a tendency to com-

## *Security in the Pacific*

pare conditions unfavorably with those in their respective home towns. In their relations with each other, harm was done by the provision of separate canteens. This officer, in reply to the complaint of an Indian speaker, previously mentioned, said he had received no instructions at any time to impede meetings between Indian and British troops but that opportunities for their contacts in any case would be scanty. Another British member referred to the scope and value of the educational material prepared for the armed forces by the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the courses of instruction provided by it for Allied army personnel. He assured the Indian member that any plan to provide facilities for contacts between Indians and men in the services would receive a favorable response from the Army Command.

### EFFECTS OF WAR-TIME POLICIES

In many countries, the sharp political divisions created by the war are reflected in changed attitudes toward minorities. Of special interest to members, in this connection, was the contrast in the treatment of Japanese nationals and of Japanese-Americans as between continental United States and Canada on the one hand and Hawaii on the other. Although more immediately imperilled by any treachery or disloyalty than the mainland, the Hawaiian Islands faced the war situation with a history of successful adjustment between oriental and occidental residents. As a result the Japanese were trusted and not subjected to internment. Their young men were allowed to join the Armed Forces and produced ten thousand volunteers out of a total of twenty-three thousand of military age. On the Pacific Coast of the United States, with its long history of discrimination and segregation, the outbreak of war with Japan became the occasion for violent attacks upon, and a revival of deep-seated fears of, Japanese and Japanese-American residents. The contrast, American members reported, and the realization of a dangerous departure from American tradition on the Pacific Coast, had resulted in a sobering second thought. There had recently been a distinct improvement of popular attitudes toward loyal Japanese-Americans, and although incidents would have to be expected in connection with the return or resettlement of the Japanese-American residents removed from the Coast states under military order, the dispersion itself would help to allay fears. A Canadian member took a less sanguine view as to the permanency of the noted improvement in attitudes. Such improvement others ascribed more especially to the devoted services rendered by orientals in the Allied cause, not least by the Chinese, Filipino, and Japanese-American troops in the armed forces.



## *Cultural and Race Relations*

### IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION POLICY

Restrictions on immigration and refusal of the right to become citizens are old grievances at IPR conferences. On the present occasion, Indian members were the chief spokesmen for a policy of non-discrimination in this matter. They did not dispute the right of the British Dominions, of the United States, or of any other country, to restrict immigration; but they pointed to the fact that nationals of fascist countries had been admitted in considerable numbers before the war to produce large enemy-alien populations, while loyal subjects of the British Empire had been excluded. One Indian speaker referred in particular to the plight of some 1,200 Indians in British Columbia who, deprived of the franchise but unable to return to their own country, were refused employment on contracts given out by the Public Works Department. In both Canada and the United States, he added, Indians would be content with the admission of token numbers under a non-discriminatory immigration law, provided they also enjoyed the same right as other nationals to become citizens. Selection for admission and subsequently for naturalization should be on grounds of individual suitability and not on grounds of race.

The usual explanations were made by United States, Canadian, and Australian members, to the effect that the statutes in every case expressly avoid discrimination against members of a particular race or nationality. This did not, however, terminate the discussion but led to a consideration of the grounds on which policies were based which actually were discriminatory in their effects. An Australian member declared that the "White Australia" policy was determined by the desire of the Australians to maintain a homogeneous society. At the other round table, an Australian member explained that public sentiment was just as opposed to the formation of culturally distinct European communities as it was opposed to an oriental immigration which would have this result.

Chinese members repeatedly stressed the dissatisfaction of both the Chinese national government and of the overseas groups with the restrictions placed on Chinese immigration in the countries of Southeast Asia. They regarded their right to settlement and an unhindered pursuit of livelihood there in a somewhat different light from the right of admission to countries with a dominantly occidental population. In the latter, a mere token admission, as now granted in the United States, would satisfy them. But in the Asiatic countries which their nationals had substantially helped to develop, they had acquired, they felt, more substantial rights. Since most of the areas of recent Chinese

## *Security in the Pacific*

immigration were still under occupation by the enemy and all colonial policies, more especially, were in flux, detailed discussion of this subject was not pressed.

### JAPANESE PROPAGANDA

The use of "interracial" grievances by Japanese propagandists was examined by both round tables. It was agreed that the enemy had exploited this kind of propaganda material cleverly, not only since the beginning of the war but for some years before. The effectiveness of their attempt to create a united anti-occidental front was, however, disputed. In the first place, their own administrative practices in the occupied areas—their enslavement of men and rape of women—had weakened, and in some instances destroyed, the arguments which correlate oppression with white domination. Secondly, the Japanese did not dare to make good use of the argument that subject peoples have the right to revolt, nor could they stress their right to political independence. Instead, it was said, they had already embarked upon preparations for a postwar propaganda, taking effect after the Japanese defeat, with the general theme that the emancipation of Asia from white rule is a hundred years' task, hardly begun, from which there can be no retreat.

Several speakers with first-hand knowledge of this Japanese propaganda agreed that it would be difficult if not impossible to counter it effectively with words alone. Nevertheless, it was possible to deflate Japanese propaganda by pointing out that their proposals did not agree with their military action or administrative policies; that these were obviously in contradiction with the avowed intention to create an Asiatic co-prosperity sphere. One of the round tables seemed to be in full agreement that the United Nations should as soon as possible issue a joint declaration of policy repudiating every kind of racial discrimination, not only in political plans for the Pacific region but also in economic relations and the development of education. Although nothing more than a declaration of principle, such a statement, it was thought, might go far to reassure Asiatics of the intentions of the Allied Powers.

### EDUCATIONAL MEASURES

While a declaration of intentions issued at this time might be useful in countering Japanese propaganda and in helping to create a desire for cooperation in the areas about to be recovered, the members were

### *Cultural and Race Relations*

unanimous in insisting on far-reaching programs of popular education as a means of eliminating discriminatory practices.

The term "racial prejudice" itself, though used in the agenda and in the discussion, was subjected to criticism as embodying too many different elements to be of use in the clarification of the problems envisaged. An ethnologist, at one of the round tables, briefly reviewed the current scientific conception of the social frictions which popularly go under that term. "Racial" prejudice, based on visible bodily differences such as skin color, is not for that reason distinct from other widespread types of prejudice all of which arise essentially from differences in culture and status. These prejudices, often deep-seated, can be eliminated. The means are education and the provisions of personal contacts that lead to "informed tolerance."

One member was skeptical as to the efficacy of education; others agreed to the extent of declaring that the educational by-products of personal experience are more effective in changing attitudes than is, for example, scientific information. An Indian view that the elimination of political domination would greatly reduce social prejudice was, as has already been stated, challenged by others who, though recognizing an attitude of superiority as a "besetting sin of the Anglo-Saxon people," nevertheless saw in political domination only one of many of the occasions for its manifestation. Political and economic domination, members of the Anglo-Saxon groups admitted, often accentuate discriminations which have their roots in cultural and racial difference. British members spoke of the Western Powers as "in full retreat" from these attitudes in so far as they may have colored their relations with orientals in the past. A former colonial official pointed out that in the Pacific dependencies the increased residence of European women had in recent prewar years made for a greater separation of the colonials from members of the native and alien oriental groups, with a resultant loss of opportunities for mutual acquaintance. The larger disparity in modes of living which had come with the establishment of European households, was in itself a barrier to interracial understanding.

There was virtual agreement, then, that measures intended to improve intercultural and interracial relations must be on several levels: first, as rapid as possible an abolition of laws and administrative regulations which unnecessarily accentuate segregation and give rise to attitudes of haughtiness and of resentment; second, the improvement of formal education, especially of facilities for the study of language and culture;

### *Security in the Pacific*

third, the creation of more and better opportunities for members of different groups to meet together and follow common pursuits on a basis of personal equality.

As regards the second need, Chinese and occidental members alike regarded as essential in the immediate future a great increase in the study of oriental languages in Western countries. In this connection reference was made to new advances, especially in the United States, in methods of language teaching designed to provide students in the shortest possible time with an elementary speaking and reading knowledge of Chinese, Malay, and other oriental languages. Anticipating the possibility that after the war much larger numbers of occidentals than in the past would be sent to Eastern Asia without having had an opportunity to acquire a fuller knowledge of the language, culture, or history of the country to which they were assigned, Chinese members emphasized the value of what has become known as "area studies," that is, the association of a minimum of teaching about lands and peoples with the requisite minimum of language teaching. Other speakers questioned the value of current specialized military language and area study in the United States, which seemed to them too ephemeral. There was, however, some support for the view that even such sketchy introduction to knowledge had helped to stimulate an interest in the study of oriental cultures which promised to carry over into peace times. All agreed that language study alone would not have that effect.

Expanded facilities for the reception of oriental students in occidental institutions was the reverse of the picture, as the members saw it. Their presence would incidentally provide occidental students with the opportunity of meeting representatives of other cultures and of other races. In this connection it was regretted that the educational value of such contacts had hitherto been limited to the educationally most advanced groups whereas prejudices were most rampant in those population groups that never reached the level of secondary or higher education.

One member suggested that compulsory courses in sound racial theory could be introduced in primary schools so as to counteract at an early age the social prejudices which most children in the occident acquire in their homes. Such a positive measure was preferable to legislation specifically directed against the dissemination of race prejudice. The same member and others thought, however, that anti-semitism had grown so alarmingly of late in many Western countries that penal methods of combating it had become an urgent necessity. The other

### *Cultural and Race Relations*

round table linked a more general proposal for "an educational program calculated to promote fuller and better racial understanding" with the concrete suggestion for a concerted effort—along the lines of the Fair Employment Practice Commission in the United States—to establish equality in economic competition. Without such tangible efforts to break the chain of cause and effect in the unfavorable mutual attitudes between different ethnic groups, no formal educational program, it was thought, would go far.

An American student of intercultural relations raised the question whether the conclusion of the war and the commencement of large reconstruction projects in most of the countries of the Pacific did not afford a new and helpful form of contact between East and West, namely a greatly increased settlement of occidental technicians and skilled workers in Asiatic countries. Persons not belonging to the dominant class in the country of their origin might be expected to be more willing to live and work alongside similarly trained orientals on a level of racial equality. This idea was strongly supported by a British member on the basis of successful war-time experience in bringing large numbers of Indians and West Indians to work in British factories and live in English homes. In short, the movement should be mutual—with larger opportunities for oriental workers to receive practical training in the occident as well as the fullest use of Western skilled manual workers, where trained native workers could not yet be obtained, in the earlier stages of Eastern industrialization.

More modest were the proposals of Filipino and Korean members for government assistance—such as that already given in the case of China—in the interchange of books, periodicals, and other cultural publicity material. An Indian member added the suggestion that similar exchanges between oriental countries might with advantage be intensified.

Lastly, it was recommended that the IPR itself continue and expand its program of research into problems of intercultural relations—and this specifically in two directions: the study of prejudice and discrimination as forms of social pathology, and the experimental study of administrative and educational means of spreading the "informed tolerance" which already was common in the personal relations of the favored few.

## CHAPTER V

### THE FUTURE OF DEPENDENT AREAS

#### *(Round Table Discussions)*

##### ASPIRATIONS AND POLICIES

To avoid a futile theoretical discussion of the rights and wrongs of colonial empires, both round tables started with a survey of aspirations to nationhood among the subject peoples of the Pacific and of the policies of the ruling nations with regard to such aspirations. Often the statements made by individual members were brief summaries of more elaborate presentations made in the Conference data papers or in other recent studies of the Institute.

##### *Indo-China*

An Annamite member frankly admitted that, since only those Indo-Chinese who were abroad, most of them resident in France, could at present express themselves, their views might not be altogether representative of those held in the home country. However, a month ago a convention of Indo-Chinese had been held at Avignon; its final resolution had demanded full democratic rights, with all this implies. The members of that convention desired that at future conferences called to define the new status of the Indo-Chinese Union the people of Indo-China itself would be fully represented. The majority of the Annamites in France ask only for larger liberties; a minority are of the opinion that steps should rapidly be taken to secure for each ethnic group complete autonomy within the Federation of French Indo-China. The Cambodians, less numerous than the Annamites, it was reported, share this desire but also insist on the maintenance of their separate national structure. Moreover, they demand the return of territories seized by Thailand in 1941.

French members at both round tables explained the policies by which their government intended to meet these demands and the changed situation in general. General de Gaulle was quoted as having, on October 25, 1944, made a statement reaffirming the principle set out on December 8, 1941, in a declaration of the French Committee of National Liberation:

"French policy consists in that it will lead all Indo-Chinese peoples to a development that should permit them first to administer themselves and later to govern themselves under their own responsibility. Already full customs independence has been recognized as a basic principle of

### *The Future of Dependent Areas*

Indo-Chinese economics so as to make Indo-China a prosperous and active member of the United Nations within the French Commonwealth."

The distinction between "administration" and "government" in this statement, it was explained, really meant that between local and national government. The future policy was to redivide the existing five provinces and reduce them to four. The largest of these would bring under one administration most of the Annamites, numbering some eighteen million in a total population of twenty-three million. Most of the Cambodians would make up the second unit, and most of the Laos people the third. The fourth area, mainly mountainous, would be administered in behalf of the more primitive peoples, such as the Moi. Thus, while united in an Indo-Chinese Federation, the smaller groups, afraid of encroachment or dominance by the more numerous Annamites, would be able to retain their cultural identity and their chance of eventual national separation. The institutional structure of each province would be fitted to the stage of development of its people, but each would be encouraged to move toward self-government.

French opinion supports the Cambodian demand for the return of the territories recently ceded under compulsion to Thailand. The Conference was told that it stresses general security as a necessary condition if newly liberated peoples are to be able to maintain their liberty. In the economic sphere, French members expected to find the gravest postwar problem in the over-concentration of population in the rice-growing areas. The main lines of solution were to open up more land to intensive cultivation by means of irrigation, and to diversify production. The tariff autonomy already granted would then permit wider contacts of the country with the rest of the world. A British member of wide colonial experience expressed approval in principle of the policy of decentralization for Indo-China, both in its political and in its economic life.

### *Netherlands East Indies*

Indonesian members of the round tables reported that only few of the groups composing the nationalist movement before 1941 had demanded complete separation from the Netherlands. Most of them were content with the assurance of greater political autonomy which they saw in the Queen's statement on December 6, 1942: "No political unity can exist unsupported by the voluntary acceptance of the majority of the people." The composition of the *Volksraad*, or People's Council, it was stated, had already changed from a majority of Dutch to a majority of Indo-

### *Security in the Pacific*

nesian members. The conference to be called at the close of the war to create the new Netherlands Commonwealth would therefore ensure an equal partnership for the Indies in the commonwealth.

An Indian member raised the question whether the overt demand for complete separation, confined to a minority, could be assumed to represent in correct proportion the actual sentiment existing among Indonesians. This led to a discussion of the difficulty of assessing the desire for political freedom with reference to articulate political activity; but no method suggested itself for arriving at more precise estimates, in quantity and value, of political demands.

Many members had read the findings of the so-called Visman Commission, based on investigations made in 1941; they seemed to be convinced that the policy of a gradual growth of autonomous political powers within the framework of the tripartite Netherlands Commonwealth was a logical continuation of developments in the Indies during recent decades and would go far to meet the popular demands. Netherlands members were challenged, however, to justify the racial discrimination that appeared to go through the whole structure of government and administration in the Indies. They again insisted that the admittedly sharp distinctions drawn in legislation for Indonesians, for alien Asiatics and for Europeans (including Japanese) were necessitated by their totally different customary law and social concepts, and that no "race discrimination" was involved. As the several population groups were advancing to a more nearly common social pattern, these differentiations in law and administration would gradually come to an end. In illustration, attention was drawn to a recently inaugurated unitary civil service which was soon to take the place of the separate Dutch and Indonesian services of the prewar years.

A contrary view was suggested though not fully developed in the course of the discussion. A British member asked: could a system truly be regarded as self-government in an oriental country if it expressed a purely Western type of democracy without any concession to oriental modes of thinking? And was the introduction of such a system really practicable unless the ground had been carefully prepared for it? Furthermore, it would make a great deal of difference, he suggested, whether representation was to be on grounds of the numerical strength of different groups or on grounds of their economic position. If the former, self-rule would, in fact, be established where, as in the Netherlands Indies, the native population is in a large majority, but not in British Malaya.



## *The Future of Dependent Areas*

### *Malaya*

Indeed, British members hesitated to paint any large advances toward self-government in Malaya and Borneo as likely to be realized in the near future. With a Chinese population about equal to that of Malays and a great superiority of the Chinese population in wealth and modern enterprise, neither a mere numerical representation nor one weighted by relative economic strength would conduce to democracy or to an adequate protection of native interests. Another difficulty was the transient nature of much of the population, including a large Indian contingent. At the same time it was realized that the existing political structure was too cumbersome to serve the needs of postwar reconstruction and an effective prosecution of social ends.

In reply to a question, a British member dissociated the government from a plan of political reconstruction tentatively suggested not long ago by a committee of British private citizens and declared that no definite plan had yet been formulated in responsible quarters. The existence of three major types of government, broken up into twelve distinct governmental units, and the separate treaties with the Malay Sultans had created a complexity of administration which, other matters aside, worked against an early achievement of autonomy. Centralization in the making of major policies and decentralization in most other things were held up at one of the round tables as the objectives of political reform. Alternative possibilities were presented at the other: either to stand by the treaties, which the British could not lightly disregard, and give the Malays a paramount position, or to create a sense of Pan-Malayan citizenship—by educational and other means—which would unite all the different elements in one federation. To this step, it was added, the Sultans would strongly object and in this would have a fairly united Malay sentiment behind them. There was, therefore, some measure of agreement with the proposal that the Straits Settlements, as the economically most advanced part of Malaya, might be dealt with separately—a proposal to which one member added the suggestion that Singapore might receive a special international status. Chinese and Indian members laid stress on the improvement of the educational system and on a more equitable admission of non-Malay Asiatics to the civil service. All were agreed that, despite the many difficulties envisaged, the government of Malaya might well broaden the basis of representation in the Legislative Council and in the local bodies. Despite the uncertain market for some of its major products, especially rubber, Malaya could, it was thought, confidently look forward to an economically prosperous future.

## *Security in the Pacific*

### *Hong Kong*

On several occasions during the conference attempts to draw out Chinese and British members on their ideas for the future of this colony and the leased territories connected with it failed of their purpose. In the round tables on Pacific dependencies it was said that such discussion would be premature until much larger questions concerning international relations in the Western Pacific had first been settled. A Chinese member remarked that the return of Hong Kong, with its almost entirely Chinese population, to China would contribute greatly to good Chinese-British relations. A British member countered that the Chinese population of the colony was due to British enterprise and investment; but this opened the vista of discussion of the causes and probable future of Hong Kong's commercial importance which neither side sought at this time. There was no disagreement when Chinese members stressed Hong Kong's potential strategic and economic importance to China, since they also admitted the colony's international importance as an entrepôt of world trade.

### *India*

The time available for the discussion of the future of India, as a dependent territory seeking self-rule, seemed quite inadequate within the frame of the more general discussion. Yet, members entered with zest into an exposition of the main strands in the admittedly complex situation. An Indian member presented three issues which, in his opinion, were of central importance in breaking the present deadlock. *First*: three posts in the Viceroy's Council, those for finance, home affairs, and war, were still held by British incumbents. Instead of moving toward full Indianization of the Council when these posts recently fell vacant, the Government had again appointed British officials. (A British member declared that in the Viceroy's place he personally would have appointed Indians, but he doubted whether such move would have had much political effect.) *Second*: Indianization of the Indian Army, particularly as to the higher branches of service, had long been asked for, but movement in this direction was slow. No policy of a speedier Indianization, looking toward a completely Indian Army after the war, had been announced. (A British reply was that so radical a change could not well be undertaken in war time.) *Third*: Congress members who were members of the Working Committee should have been released from prison since Gandhi had made it clear that he would not revive his aggressive policy of 1942. (A

### *The Future of Dependent Areas*

British reply was that Lord Wavell could not under war conditions risk a disturbance that might interrupt communications and India's magnificent contribution to the war effort.)

At the other round table, India's aspirations also were outlined in terms of immediate conditions rather than of larger considerations. The first point made by an Indian member was identical with that stated above; so was the third. An additional point made by both Hindu and Moslem members was that the opposition between the Congress and the Moslem League need not delay independence: the two groups were willing to work out their own differences. The Indian National Congress, in a resolution passed on August 8, 1942, had conceded the Moslem demand by agreeing to self-determination, the right to secession, and that residuary powers would reside in the constituent units. These agreements, when implemented and worked out in detail, a Moslem member declared, would lead to a satisfactory solution. More recently again, Mr. Gandhi, though not permitted to confer with the imprisoned Congress members and therefore speaking only as an individual, had declared his willingness to make concessions to Pakistan, or Moslem separatism. Indeed, at both round tables the tendency shown by the British since the unsuccessful Cripps Mission to remain inactive in the matter of greatest political importance, while continuing to enjoy full authority in India, appeared to be the chief immediate grievance of the Indian members. Questions were addressed to the British members about the present stand of their government on the Cripps proposals, on whether the division of India into several wholly separate states seemed desirable to it, on whether it did or did not regard itself as an active participant in the working out of a solution for the major Indian problem.

Since the British members spoke as individuals, with different degrees of authoritative knowledge, and not as representatives of their government, their replies to these and similar questions did not completely coincide. But in the main the following agreements as to British policy emerged: First, the desire of practically all politically conscious Indians for independence is accepted unambiguously and without demur. Second, there is a definite British policy or, rather, there are two policies: the long-term policy of complete freedom for India, the short-term transitional policy contained in the Cripps offer of 1942. The latter policy, it was said, is not presented as a sudden innovation or as a deathbed repentance but as the outgrowth of a long historical and institutional development. It is to the effect that, as soon as hostilities

### *Security in the Pacific*

cease, an Indian constitution-making body shall hammer out an Indian constitution which the British Government will then implement. In this way, India would become a free and independent member of the British Commonwealth. In the case of other Dominions, the legal right of secession was implicit; in the case of India the right to leave the Commonwealth was explicitly provided for in the terms of the Cripps offer. The rejection of that offer, it was said, had been received in Britain with a shock of dismay. The door had been opened to India through which to walk to almost immediate independence; that door had been shut by India and not by Britain.

With this inconclusive return to the beginning of the present controversy, the round tables left the subject of India and turned to the next example of contrasted aspirations of subject peoples and government policies in regard to them.

#### *Burma*

Only one of the round tables had the advantage of a Burman participant. The politically vocal groups in his country desired a constitutional assembly, he stated, with the aim of arriving at a position in the British Commonwealth similar to that offered to India. Already far advanced on the way toward self-rule, the Burmans wished to be responsible for foreign affairs, defense, and currency, the control of which at present still rested with the Governor. British members agreed with him that Burma's road toward complete self-government was not difficult. But this optimistic view, it appeared from the discussion at the other round table, sprang from the assumption that the Burmans would claim dominion rule only for the more or less homogeneous populations of the economically more advanced parts of the country. The non-Burman peoples, it was explained, made up about four million of the total population of seventeen million and were occupying about one-third of the total area. The British program for these culturally less advanced tribal peoples is to federate them in gradually enlarging groups, then to introduce democratic institutions, all this under the protection of the British Government but without a specific political status and not as part, in the near future, of the incipient Burman Dominion.

Burma was used also as an illustration of the principle that "the granting of independence to a small nation before it has power to maintain itself is somewhat of a risk." Complete achievement of dominion status must be affected by the degree of general security prevailing in

## *The Future of Dependent Areas*

Southeast Asia. In this connection it was said that the return to Burma of the territories annexed to Thailand during the Japanese occupation will be demanded. A Thai member of the Conference stated that the Free Thai movement already had repudiated the annexation.

### *Thailand*

Although internationally recognized as a free country, Thailand's status came up repeatedly at the round tables, both as a possible danger to the tranquility of the region and as proof that political independence unless accompanied by economic freedom and a fairly advanced state of technology, cannot satisfy the aspiration of a people to freedom. The first task for the Thai, as seen by one round table, was the liberation of their own country from both external and internal dictatorship. Already, in July 1944, the Thai people had overthrown the militarist government and re-introduced a liberal regime; implied in this action, a Thai member stated, was the repudiation, not only of the unilateral decisions concerning the sovereignty of disputed border lands but also of the recent harsh measures taken against Chinese. Both issues were seen to involve historical grievances which time did not permit fully to explore.

An American member called attention to the fact that both Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and President Roosevelt had made statements assuring the future independence and territorial integrity of Thailand. The lack of a parallel declaration on the part of Great Britain, he said, was causing uneasiness in the minds of Americans conversant with the problems of Southeast Asia. A British member rejoined that the case of Thailand was covered by the repeated statements of high British authorities that Britain desired no territories of other peoples. That no special statement had been made about the British intentions with regard to Thailand he explained with the fact that Great Britain was at war with that country, whereas the United States had refused to accept its declaration of war on the ground that the government which took over in 1938 was illegitimate.

### *The Philippines*

The Philippines entered into the survey of dependencies as a country on the threshold of complete self-rule. The Philippine Government had returned to the islands with more of the attributes of sovereignty than it had possessed before the outbreak of the war; it was directly

### *Security in the Pacific*

represented on the Pacific War Council, a signatory of the United Nations Declaration, and a participant in all the newly created agencies of joint international action. The question was raised whether Philippine political independence was not more a matter of form than of real self-determination. Anglo-Egyptian relations were brought up for comparison. One answer was that the ties between the Philippines and the United States which still existed were regarded in both countries as temporary, that the agreements and understandings which seemed to limit complete self-rule on the part of the former had in every instance been initiated by the Philippines. Another reply was that the exact nature of future Philippine-United States relations must to some extent depend on the realization of an international security structure in the Pacific. Specifically, Filipino and American members were apparently in agreement that international security guarantees are preferable to bilateral arrangements; and that the responsibility of the United States for the safety of the Philippines would be lessened if it became part of a multilateral group arrangement. Neither country had accepted any obligation that would prevent it from entering an international security organization.

#### *United States Territories and Possessions*

In order to complete the picture, one of the round tables briefly referred also to other American dependencies in the Pacific. It was informed that Hawaii's aspiration to full statehood was probably somewhat advanced by the territory's new role during the war, although a recent bill before Congress attempted to bring it under the peace-time control of the Navy. Hawaii's assimilation to mainland conditions had been speeded by a greater diversity of land uses, the introduction of larger numbers of white American workers, and an incipient diversification of business and industry, with a corresponding decentralization of economic control. In Alaska also the trend was toward a larger and more diversified economic enterprise, but without as yet any demand for change in political status. The future of Samoa, Guam, and other island possessions was held to be subject mainly to changes in the security structure of the Pacific.

#### *Korea*

The uncertainty of the general situation in the Western Pacific after the war clogged every discussion of the future of Korea. This matter had already come up at the round tables on the future of Japan. In

### *The Future of Dependent Areas*

addition, there was some disagreement as to the capacity of the Koreans for self-rule. Korean members were very confident in this respect, pointing out that their nationals were homogeneous in language, untroubled by religious divisions, economically less dependent on foreign trade than most countries, and despite the Japanese domination fully able to run their own affairs. In answer to doubts expressed by Chinese and British members, the Koreans averred that in administrative matters the Koreans had done all the work while the Japanese held only the higher positions which offered the largest remuneration. Some doubt was expressed also as regards the attitude of the Soviet Union toward Korean independence. China, the United States, and Great Britain could be expected to fulfill the pledge given to Korea in the Cairo Declaration. A Chinese member expressed the view that the Soviet Union's interest in Korea was similar to that of China, as a neighbor desirous to see peace and prosperity in the peninsula and willing, in concert with the other powers, to take part in some organized form of friendly international assistance.

### *Oceania*

In a totally different category from that of most of the territories so far considered were the many colonial and mandated island groups of the Pacific. Not only were their inhabitants—Polynesians, Melanesians, and Micronesians—in most instances technically less advanced than those of the Mongoloid and Malay dependencies, but most of the groups were too small to carry on an independent national existence. For these reasons, considerable interest was shown, on the one hand, in the political future of the Japanese mandates and island possessions and, on the other, in the plans and policies lying back of the Canberra Agreement of January 1944 between Australia and New Zealand about the island groups of the South Pacific. The former topic, already taken up at the round tables on the future of Japan, again was referred to those on international security, as concerned with the main issue. The Canberra Agreement was explained as motivated by the doctrine of trusteeship. The two Dominion governments had decided to establish a South Seas Regional Commission in which the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, as metropolitan powers in the region, were to be invited to participate with them. The main functions of the commission would be, first, to recommend arrangements for the participation of representatives of the indigenous peoples in administrative measures designed to advance self-government in forms suited, in each

## *Security in the Pacific*

case, to the circumstances of the particular area; second, to recommend measures for the improvement of standards of welfare and, specifically, for the development of coordinated medical, research, and educational services. In short, the Commission was to be advisory, though on the basis of its periodic progress reports an enlargement of its functions might later be agreed upon by the respective governments. The first of the aims mentioned would be advanced more especially by the association of the indigenous peoples with the secretariat and research activities of the Commission.

### TRENDS IN COLONIAL STATUS

The survey of aspirations and policies in Pacific dependencies at both round tables provided the material for more general considerations of the central theme: the progress of dependent peoples toward greater self-determination. An analysis of the specific statements made and issues raised in both rooms led to a recognition of similarities in the situations faced and in the attitudes displayed toward them. The capacity of subject peoples for self-government thus was seen to involve previous experience. This varied greatly from community to community. It was seen to involve also the degree of security enjoyed—not only military but also economic: in some circumstances, for example, risks of lowered administrative efficiency could safely be taken during a period of transition from alien rule to self-rule; in others the withdrawal of protection might expose the people to aggressive designs.

One of the round tables attempted to summarize in general terms the principal attitudes of the more advanced subject peoples in the region. First of all, was the attitude of distrust. Unless invited to take part as equals, they suspect discussion of their future by others. They were willing to consider programs of immediate action that fall somewhat short of the ultimate goal but were suspicious of programs or promises post-dated to some uncertain future. They were said to consider themselves capable of attaining at least as much national unity as they observed in free countries, and to suspect ulterior motives behind too much emphasis on their disunity. This was brought out more especially by Indian members, both Hindu and Moslem. They complained that some new issue of disunity was raised by the British whenever Indians seemed to be approaching a settlement of their major disagreements. Subject peoples are distrustful, too, of the mandate system and fear that "security" may after this war become a catchword



### *The Future of Dependent Areas*

used to defer independence. They hesitate to take at face value any proposals routed through an international organization: they fear that the big powers may make the actual decisions—unfavorable to the subject peoples—in private conference and then secure the sanction of international authority for them through the international organization.

Arguments intended to allay such fears were offered by members from the ruling countries. They declared that their countries had no desire to extend their possessions and that they were in favor of the future self-government of all their subjects. But they could not hastily abandon responsibilities which, usually, were the products of long historical developments. To do so would not only expose their own subjects to great risks but would also increase the instability and insecurity of the world as a whole.

In the course of the discussion, terms were redefined and new terms introduced to avoid misunderstandings. Thus a United Kingdom member averred that without abandoning the sense of "trusteeship"—itself a term which for some still had a tinge of novelty—Great Britain was now pursuing a policy which looked forward to "partnership" with her dependent peoples, aware that this policy was sapping the roots of economic imperialism. He deprecated the continued use of such terms as "possessions" and "owning power." Another speaker claimed that India had all the functions of government ascribed to the Philippines, and complete fiscal autonomy as well, and should therefore not be placed in the "colonial" category.

China and the United States, as the principal countries without substantial "colonial" interests in the region (the Soviet Union not being represented at the round table), were reminded that some of the situations which were regarded as colonial in the case of European dependencies in the Pacific existed also in their own expanded continental territories—though under different names. Nevertheless, Chinese and especially American speakers made it clear that their countrymen in general opposed the long-term maintenance of the colonial system and would be disillusioned if they were to learn that the main function of an international system after the war would be that of conserving empires.

Although they agreed that the status of India was not that of a "colony," American members pointed out that public opinion did not make fine distinctions, and that solution of "the Indian problem" was a task which, for Americans, made other outstanding "colonial" questions of subsidiary importance. In answer to complaints that American

### *Security in the Pacific*

interest in the subject peoples of the Pacific was rather Platonic, another United States member ventured to state, as probably coming close to the official view, that his country, as a participant in an international organization, would desire to take part in the work of regional international agencies and would back its interest in the liberation of subject peoples with financial aid. This trend in policy would be greatly aided by signs of British initiative in the transformation of the colonial system.

The question was raised whether the introduction of democratic methods and the development of autonomy in dependent areas was possible as long as "indirect rule" was the accepted policy in most of the larger Pacific dependencies. A mere transference of political authority from the metropolitan power to the autocratic rule of sultanates, for example, would hardly signify real progress toward independence. A Netherlands member admitted the existence of such a danger but thought that each step in the creation of greater autonomy could be accompanied by a corresponding replacement of local hereditary rule with democratic institutions.

This exchange led back to the discussion of the capacity of subject peoples for self-rule. Chinese suspicions, it was said by one of the Chinese members, were aroused whenever one state said of another that its people were unable to govern themselves; for this was the formula which Japan had used so long with regard to China. Another Chinese member referred to the tendency in Western countries of looking upon subject peoples as objects of antiquarian interest. It was dangerous to assume, he said, that these peoples would still be concerned with the same ideas as they were before the war. They were not merely passive during this time of great changes. He therefore urged that international bodies dealing with dependent peoples should include representatives of such peoples, and that in some cases these should be in a majority. He concurred with others that the risks involved in prompt action—in setting up agencies working toward the establishment of democratic institutions—were not as great as the dangers inherent in delay. A Filipino member, on another occasion, referring to the forty-five years of experience in Philippine-American relations, thought that there was perhaps an undue concentration on political matters in the minds of those who were working for the independence of subject peoples. As long as the colonial power is primarily interested in securing its own economic advantage by means of special preferences and privileges, its program cannot make for

### *The Future of Dependent Areas*

responsible self-rule. Education of the subject people in democracy and the provision of economic conditions ensuring future well-being, he suggested, must go together.

Some of the European members who had not attended previous conferences of the IPR were rather shocked by the outspokenness with which the colonial system as such was attacked. American members referred to the increased political activity of organized labor in their own country as one source of this rather general attitude. Not only was there the traditional hostility to colonialism but also considerable experience of modern practices in the field of labor relations which, some thought, could be transferred to the relations between subject and ruling peoples: they might be expected to form a judgment based on the impartial investigation of grievances. A British member expressed the resentment which others also seemed to feel of the frequent appeals to American public opinion—as though the public opinion in other countries were not equally important. There are some, he said, who would like to check up on the treatment of colored people in the United States, and some would favor an impartial investigation of the claims made as to the remarkably liberal treatment of non-Russians in the Soviet Union.

At an earlier meeting, a Canadian member had laid down the proposition that no people is morally good enough to rule another; that such rule led to the corruption of both ruled and rulers. This was now taken up in an American proposal that the United Nations should issue a declaration denouncing the doctrine of master races and stressing the equality of all people. A similar suggestion had on another occasion been made by an Indian member who thought that the best way of getting rid of the disappointments and suspicions which still so largely prevail in the colonial world was for the United Nations to adopt a declaration of freedom as the inherent right of all peoples. Such a declaration would have even greater influence if it were accompanied by the setting up of machinery to assist newly freed peoples in becoming accustomed to the management of their own affairs. This should be done under international rather than national auspices, with whatever expert assistance or advice might be needed in each instance.

After discussion of these suggestions, the chairman of one of the round tables appointed a small committee to draft a preliminary statement, for it seemed that a declaration of rights to be effective would have to be specific and to give recognition to the inevitable difficulties of their application. The statement, in the form of a memorandum to sup-

### *Security in the Pacific*

plement the conference agenda, welcomed the international concern shown in problems of human rights by the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, the Philadelphia Recommendation of the International Labour Conference, and the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. It rejected the claims of "master races" to an inherent superiority entitling them to rule or guard over other races or peoples. It proclaimed the fundamental equality of all peoples and pledged the United Nations to unceasing efforts to enable all peoples to enjoy the benefits of that equality. It announced the principle of universal international accountability for colonial and dependent peoples and for all peoples or groups within any country who do not possess full social, economic, and political rights. It favored the establishment of regional councils under the general responsibility of a world organization, as envisaged in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

These rather general suggestions were not, of course, either adopted or rejected. Members of the round table, instead, tried to supplement their abstract discussion with attempts to visualize how they would in practice affect the situation in various dependencies of the Pacific. Some members thought that the proposals worked out two years ago at the Institute's Mont Tremblant Conference were more specific.<sup>1</sup> Others stressed the gulf which still separated the apparent policies of the Allied Powers from the fulfilment of promises to which they were already pledged. Canadian, Chinese, American and British members contributed suggestions ranging from a special concern with the training of colonial administrators for the execution of new policies to methods of implementing world concern with the problems of all subject minorities and not only those of colonial peoples.

At the other round table, too, the special problems of minorities came up repeatedly. They were seen, however, as constituting claims on international assistance somewhat different from those of subject native groups. The grievances of Chinese and Indian minorities in the dependencies of Southeast Asia already had been aired but were now further examined in relation to the immigrant communities' political orientation. It was recognized that existing animosities against these communities often arose from the fact that culturally and economically they remained identified with their homeland and took their earnings out of the country. It was anticipated that the restoration of stability in China would attract many Chinese home. At the same time, the

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<sup>1</sup> *War and Peace in the Pacific*, New York, 1943, p. 57.

## *The Future of Dependent Areas*

increase of political rights in the Asiatic colonies might have the effect of hastening the assimilation of those Chinese who remained.

### INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Both round tables wound up their discussions with a fuller exploration of the principles distinguishing the suggested new forms of regional collaboration in behalf of subject peoples from previous forms of international collaboration. A British member reminded one of the round tables of the distinction between "international accountability" and "internationalization of control." Under the former doctrine some pooling of resources and full collaboration between colonial and non-colonial powers was, he held, possible; but it did not impair the basic sovereignty of the colonial power. Internationalization, on the other hand, tended to divorce authority from responsibility. Members from Australia and New Zealand agreed with this distinction and voiced the acceptance by their respective countries of international accountability in concrete terms: their willingness to make reports on the administration of their colonial territories, to have these visited by members of the international authority and reports of its findings to be published. Chinese and Canadian members also agreed unreservedly with the general proposal.

Both before and after submission of the memorandum referred to, members continued to proceed from questions of principle to questions about specific forms of operation. To some of the members the proposed scope of international collaboration seemed too cautious, too suggestive of a desire to restore the colonial system of prewar times. A Netherlands member pointed out that, with the new constitution for the Netherlands Commonwealth, the functions of the international body in regard to the Netherlands Indies would obviously, as in the case of other free countries, relate solely to questions of social welfare and other non-political matters. A French member cautioned against any intervention of the proposed commission in the political life of the dependencies. In Indo-China, for example, he thought, it might produce very undesirable disruptive effects by undermining the authority of the French administration.

With these differences on fundamental aspects of the problem, attempts at both round tables further to elaborate the framework of the proposed regional international organization could not go very far. Some agreements were recorded, however, on its composition. The view found wide acceptance that the deliberative body should consist

in the main of an international expert body, somewhat analogous to that of the Permanent Mandates Commission, with members from colonial and non-colonial nations sitting as individuals. The main function of this body would be that of reviewing the administration of their trust by the trustee states. This body would be independent, removed from direct association with the administrative organs of the colonial governments, and quasi-judicial in character. Trustee states should be required to render periodic reports to its satisfaction. It should have the right and duty to secure independent reports by sending its own agents to dependent territories, to consider complaints made of failure of a trustee state to carry out its obligations under the charter, and to publish its findings. It should have an adequate staff, both general and technical, to carry out these functions and to advise both the commission itself and the administration concerned. This staff should form part of the secretariat of the general international organization. Apart from its quasi-judicial function, the commission also would have the right to make specific recommendations to trustee states—both as to measures concerned with the advance of dependent peoples to self-government and as to measures designed to promote the welfare and development of a given territory.

There was little disagreement that the commission must be of international scope and operate as an independent body, though linked to a world organization of wider scope. Such a commission would find it expedient, however, it was thought, to delegate some of its functions to regional bodies—possibly in several sub-areas of the Pacific region rather than for that region as a whole. The exact nature of this decentralization could be determined later when the main lines of international organization had been agreed upon.

One of the round tables noted that the first explicit official declaration in favor of some form of regional organization was that made by the British Colonial Secretary in the House of Commons on July 13, 1943. This was followed by the joint statement of the Australian and New Zealand Governments at Wellington in November 1944 which definitely accepted the principle of accountability. The feeling of the members was that acceptance of this far-reaching principle by the governments in the Pacific region might now be expected.

To secure agreement on the joint provision of certain administrative services might be more difficult, though most of the members considered it desirable, at least in such cases as the health services in Oceania. Some thought that after pooling their experience and after formulating com-

### *The Future of Dependent Areas*

mon policies, the administrations of the larger dependencies would get farther by applying these in parallel programs of action, rather than by joint services. Reference was made to the existing Anglo-American Caribbean Commission which, despite a clumsy administrative set-up, had yielded good results, and to the details of the Australian-New Zealand scheme for a South Seas Regional Commission. It was thought that regional bodies of this sort would be of greatest practical value if their membership were drawn from but thenceforth no longer part of governments responsible for territories which presented similar problems of policy and administration.

At one of the round tables on international security a Canadian member was subsequently given the opportunity further to define the meaning of "accountability" for dependent territories in terms of international law.

The doctrine of accountability, he said, had been accepted by most colonial governments in general terms. But this is not enough. The interest of the community of states in colonial areas as such must be recognized in some precise way. This does not imply criticism of the administrative record of colonial powers; the desirability of such recognition is just as great if we admit that they have done, and are doing, excellent work.

The principle of accountability should be associated with that of justiciability. It is already recognized in the League of Nations Covenant in the provision made for the mandate system, and can be extended voluntarily to dependencies not held under mandate. It should be possible to provide means by which disputes involving questions of law can be referred to the permanent court envisaged in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

There would have to be safeguards, of course, to prevent a frivolous use of this procedure. One satisfactory procedure would be to have complaints first considered by a committee of experts; after thorough examination and by a majority vote, the committee could then refer any question of law involved to the permanent court—as, for example, the question whether in the given case the Colonial Power had failed to fulfill a treaty obligation. By this means dependent populations would receive judicial protection.

Other members preferred to have accountability rest on a moral rather than a legal basis. They did not dispute the desirability of having grievances ventilated so that, if necessary, the moral sanction of the world at large could be invoked. Some found it difficult to

### *Security in the Pacific*

understand just what kind of questions would be referred to the permanent court and feared that questions might be submitted to the court which primarily involved administrative judgment. For instance, if under some treaty a colonial power were bound to provide education for a colonial people, it was not proper for a court to say that the school-leaving age should be raised from the age of twelve years to that of fourteen. Other members pointed to the difficulty of applying the principle of judicial protection where, as in the French colonies, the people, though not self-governing, elect representatives to the parliament of the metropolitan power and thus have the opportunity of airing their grievances in a properly constituted legislative body.

To the reporter of the round table in which this discussion took place it appeared that, after taking note of the points raised, there was considerable support for the principle of judicial accountability but some doubt as to how it would operate. Some members were uncertain whether the suggestion did not perhaps have other implications which would require careful examination. The case for its adoption would be greatly strengthened if it could be shown that it would not in practice reduce the responsibility of the governing power.



## CHAPTER VI

### COLLECTIVE SECURITY

*(Statement and Round Table Discussions)*

#### INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT:

*By decision of the Programme Committee the discussions on Collective Security were preceded by a statement by Dr. P. E. Corbett on the reasons for the failure of attempts at collective security after the first World War. The conference then separated into four round tables, a report of whose discussions follows the opening statement.*

There is something in the nature of a general agreement on the reasons why the peace organization of the twenties failed to avert the second world war. Dealing first with the League of Nations the common statement points out (a) the lack of direct executive power in the organs of the League, (b) the lack of a legislative power which would have made the League capable of bringing about peaceful changes in the relations of states, (c) the lack of compulsory jurisdiction in the permanent court which would have made the legal settlement of disputes the normal procedure between states and (d) the want of economic agencies of something more than a mere research and advisory capacity—in a word, the want of economic agencies with some practical means of so influencing the economic policy of states that the destructive restrictions of the inter-war period would have been impossible, (e) finally—and this in the eyes of many was the most fatal League deficiency—the absence of the United States from its councils.

It will be already apparent from this commonly accepted statement of the weaknesses of the League what the dominant criticism of the other attempts at the prevention of war is. In the first place, the Nine-Power and the Four-Power Treaties concerning the Pacific provided for nothing more at best than consultation in the event of breach of agreement. The Treaty of Paris of 1928, which purported to outlaw war, was a statement by the parties that war would no longer be employed as an instrument of national policy. The Pact contained nothing in the way even of consultative arrangements. It declared the principle that disputes should not be settled by other than peaceful means but it did not set up anything in the nature of juridical or arbitral tribunals. The fate of the Treaty of Paris is worth keeping in mind, as an example of the futility of declaring principles without any provision for their realization in policy. Let us keep it in our memories in the forthcoming discussion.

### *Security in the Pacific*

The diagnosis of the League's defects which I have given you is the common diagnosis. Not everyone accepts it. There are some indeed who take a quite contrary view and still argue that the half-hearted attempt of the draftsmen of the Covenant to organize economic and military sanctions for the enforcement of international obligations was already too much of an advance into the realm of compulsion. People who take this view maintain that no scheme for the maintenance of peace in the future should rely at all upon force as an instrument to secure the compliance of sovereign states. But this view is now, I think, definitely a minority view. If there is one major matter in which the Dumbarton Oaks plan differs from the Covenant, it is in its insistence on the necessity of being prepared to use force in any serious organization for preventing aggression.

But the analysis which I have given you fails in my mind to go to the real bottom of things. It deals with symptoms and consequences rather than with causes. There was a time when I myself accepted the analysis as adequate; but that time is now long past. I have been forced to the regretful conclusion that the real reason why the League was not an effective political integration capable of carrying into effect the common purposes of a world community was that it was a super-structure without foundations. The indispensable foundation for a truly effective world organization capable of maintaining peace is a desire on the part of the people of the world to see that degree of political integration achieved. Now if you put this question in general to groups of people, they will invariably tell you that of course they want peace, and of course they want effective world organization, and of course they want a juster distribution of the world's wealth; but in the vast majority of cases they will not be realizing the implications of what they are saying. If you go on and point out to them, as you honestly must, that the results that they ask for demand handing over to authorities outside their own political community the power to decide such questions as the composition and use of their national military, naval and air forces, and to fix the limits of national tariffs and other restrictions on international trade, their attitude changes from one of confident affirmation to doubt or negation. I see no evidence that the peoples of the world are yet willing to give up the advantages or the illusions associated with national sovereignty. Because I see no such evidence, I believe that the governments represented at Dumbarton Oaks were not false to their peoples in stopping short, as they did stop short, of creating a supra-national organization which could really be counted upon to keep peace

### *Collective Security*

not only between the small powers but between the Great Powers. True, the draftsmen at Dumbarton Oaks might have provided a greater lead than they did; and there are some who will say that their failure to give that greater lead was a betrayal of their own peoples. But my own belief is that if they had adopted the plans necessary to prevent war in any permanent fashion they would not yet have been followed by their peoples.

The proposed Organization of the United Nations shows at least three of the weaknesses of the League of Nations. It will have no direct executive power, no legislative power for the achievement of peaceful change, no provision as yet for compulsory jurisdiction over disputes. It assumes one advantage that the League had not, namely, the participation of the United States. It is commonly thought to assure power in support of its obligations. This, I'm afraid, is a trifle over-optimistic. If, as now seems morally certain, the Great Powers each retain a veto, their supposed obligation to use force when necessary for the maintenance of peace will always depend wholly on their willingness to do so at the moment.

The Dumbarton Oaks plan is in some respects a retrogression on the Covenant, though in others it may prove a definite advance. But the organization which it forecasts is quite clearly of the League and not of the federal type; and it is my belief that only organization of the League type is possible in a world of states all of which still insist on their sovereignty.

It would have been open to us if we had been meeting two and a half years ago to entertain proposals for very far-reaching and very powerfully organized supranational agencies. The shape of things at that time had not hardened to the extent that it has now hardened. In the interval events have occurred and decisions been taken which impose limits upon our creative imagination. I would suggest that in our discussion of this all-important subject we impose upon ourselves individually and as a conference the discipline of reality. But the discipline of reality does not mean merely a truce on utopias. It also means abstention from empty formulae which create an illusion of progress not really accomplished. If we are to operate and gradually improve the very imperfect institutions which are all that can yet be established, we must understand their limitations at least as well as we know their potentialities. Above all we must say nothing of them that will give to the people an exaggerated idea of what they can do. Bearing these things in mind, we may be able to make positive and helpful contributions to the de-

### *Security in the Pacific*

liberations which must still take place before the Dumbarton Oaks scheme can be put into practice. If we do not impose this discipline upon ourselves we may well waste our time in remote academic wrangling.

The essential implication of what I have said is that the process of gradually building up such a political organization of men as will really be able to make war an anachronism is basically a process of political education. That is going to be a long business, but it is not necessarily a hopeless one. I believe that most of us would agree that the only sure method of political education is in the responsible operation of political institutions. It is because I am convinced of this that I urge that we must accept the Dumbarton Oaks plan, with all its patent weaknesses, as establishing for the present the framework within which international organization must take place. We may suggest alterations in that text. Such suggestions will inevitably be made and pressed with vigor at the forthcoming drafting conference of the United Nations. But it would be a rare thing in diplomatic history if these forthcoming conferences were able to advance appreciably beyond the boundaries marked at Dumbarton Oaks. The tendency will rather be to tone down the more vigorous clauses in the text and to compromise finally on a plan that will be even further removed from effective world government than that embodied in the present text. But I hope very much that the inevitable small power criticism will not result in the rejection of the plan. For, imperfect as it is, the plan is much better than nothing, and we can, by getting into the organization and working the proposed institutions, stimulate that educational process that is the essential condition of further progress.

Let me take one very practical instance of what I mean. The whole character of the United Nations organization would be altered if the Great Powers could adopt the rule that each of them would lose its veto in any dispute in which it is a party. Now I have been greatly interested in the possibility that that step might be taken before the United Nations meet. But all the evidence that I have been able to get points in quite the other direction. I should be delighted if the veto were given up by all states party to a dispute. But I do not believe that this is going to happen. Now, it may prove to be the sense of this IPR conference that the veto should be abolished. But to assume that this is going to be done, and to go on from there to make suggestions of international organization which would operate by majority decision even against the will of a Great Power would be to build castles in the air, and this is not the time for castles in the air.

## *Collective Security*

Bearing the essential limitations in mind, we can, I believe, make useful proposals whereby the principles of the general organization may be carried out in the Pacific area which is our domain. But if we lose ourselves in the debate of principles which run counter to firm decisions already taken, we shall give no help at all in the increasingly urgent business of getting international institutions into operation.

What I urge is *not* a sacrifice of our ideals. It is merely that we should not waste our idealism in frontal attacks that are for the moment doomed to defeat. With skill and patience let us seek the places where advance is possible now, keeping well in hand the reserves that we shall need for the long pull towards an ultimate world commonwealth.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The final paragraph was added by the author as a summing-up of his thesis.

*Security in the Pacific*  
(Round Table Discussions)

“DUMBARTON OAKS OR BETTER!”

In spite of certain obscurities in the text, the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement was generally accepted as the foundation upon which an international security system must now be built. As a document already agreed upon by officials and under consideration by the great powers among the United Nations, it was thought unlikely that radical changes in the text could be achieved, although clarification of meaning and substantial improvements could be attempted. The slogan adopted by one round table, “Dumbarton Oaks or Better!” very well expresses the spirit in which the problem of collective security was attacked.

It was in this spirit that many members, in all round tables, advanced criticisms of the agreement. In this spirit also, one member emphasized the need to approach the problem of establishing a workable security system with faith that it could in fact be established. Lack of faith in the League of Nations had been one of the causes of its failure. Moreover every effort should be made to establish a system in which the rule of law would operate in the maximum degree. Other speakers referred to the need for a world security system having a moral basis. They thought that the system would not work effectively unless it had the support of peoples as well as governments. For this reason it was desirable that the agreement should be made more ‘appealing’ to ordinary men and women. It should not read as if it were the work of ‘tired civil servants,’ but should have a dramatic quality and contain a statement of principles in a form as impressive as the United States Bill of Rights or the Atlantic Charter. This would help to secure wide popular approval and not mere negative acquiescence. Some speakers advanced the view that greater freedom in the circulation of international news was one of the indispensable conditions in providing a *continuing* moral basis for an established system of collective security. It was necessary that public opinion should be well-informed on what was happening throughout the world. Greater freedom of international news was regarded, however, as only a part of the vast and urgent task of public education. Indications of disunity among the United Nations during the sittings of the conference served to underscore the lesson that public opinion needs continuous help to understand the connection between the long term objectives that every nation subscribes to, and the measures *immediately* necessary to attain them. The world has had too many illustrations of Bacon’s famous saying that it is a common error, among all those

## *Collective Security*

who have power, "to will contradictories . . . to think to attain the end, yet not to induce the means."

### DUMBARTON OAKS UNDER CRITICISM

Most round table members, accepting Dumbarton Oaks as a workable, but not a perfect instrument, directed their criticisms to revising what were regarded as its most serious imperfections. The most important of these were the right of veto and the inadequacy of the role assigned to small and middle powers.

#### *Right of Veto*

In respect of the power of veto, it was reported that representatives of Britain, China and the United States had been willing to exclude the role of a great power in recording a decision to take enforcement action against that power itself, but the U.S.S.R. had insisted in applying to all cases the rule that no decision could be taken by the Council, unless all the permanent members of the Security Council concurred.

An Indian member led one round table in affirming that the moral basis of the whole plan would be impaired if the Russian position were eventually accepted; for it would be an indication at the very outset, that the five major powers mistrust each other. Moreover, it would assert for a major power a right to be judge in its own case which was denied to other powers.

Similar grounds of criticism seemed to be very generally held in all round tables. Nevertheless it was widely recognized also, that in a starkly realistic view, the difference between the two positions was not as substantial as might appear. An American member advanced the view that the *absence* of veto power among the big nations assumed either that world harmony is so advanced that any one of them could have complete confidence in any one or a combination of the others, or conversely, that the others had the power to impose their views upon the one, a situation which would be virtually that of war. The actual situation he added reflects neither of these extremes. The situation at this particular moment is that the big nations while hoping that a world security organization can be effective and while working strenuously toward that end, are not willing to entrust their entire future on it. In effect, the position of the U.S.S.R. seemed to be (1) that in view of the power concentrations at the end of the war, the United Nations as such could not hope to coerce one of the major powers without resort to war; (2) that accordingly the possibility of peace depends always

### *Security in the Pacific*

on accord among all the major powers. If that disappears, action by the United Nations as such is neither practicable nor desirable. In that view, very much the same result would be reached in the event of a clash between the great powers no matter what the rules said about voting power. In any event, as a Netherlands member observed, the Dumbarton Oaks military arrangements rest wholly on the assumption that no military preparations will ever be necessary by one great power against another. Otherwise a military staff committee could simply not work at all.

In the attempt to devise a compromise which might be acceptable, it was suggested that a distinction should be made between various stages or aspects of the right of veto. A veto could be exercised to prevent the Council from (a) taking cognizance of a matter, (b) making recommendation or (c) imposing sanctions. Another member suggested that to these three aspects should be added a fourth, viz., power to refer a matter to the permanent court. Assuming that the great powers would not surrender their right of veto regarding the imposition of sanctions, might it not be possible to secure their consent to the surrender of the right of veto in the other three respects above mentioned? This would be a substantial improvement, because there could then be full discussion of a dispute, recommendations could be made, or the matter be referred to the court. Only sanctions would be avoided. The strength of the moral sanction would be greatly increased. It was also suggested that it would be a considerable improvement in the text of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement if the Council were given clear power to decide what disputes are really 'domestic' and what 'international.'

#### *Role of Small and Middle Powers.*

Members as a whole acknowledged that the great powers must play a leading part in any security organization. Theirs was the largest responsibility and there were certain things which only they could do. Nevertheless there was a wide measure of uneasiness and dissatisfaction with the position of the small powers under the agreement. Expressions of opinion on the matter were numerous, and overlapped a great deal, so that it is not easy to bring them together in a summary statement. In large measure they reflected the difficulties inherent in the problem itself.

The main grounds of criticism were that in substance and effect the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, both by their content and their omissions, leave the maintenance of peace to the arbitrary decision of the great



## *Collective Security*

powers. The remaining powers may be committed to policies and to the use of their forces in ways which they have little share in determining. Their influence is likely to be disproportionate to either their individual or collective responsibilities. Australian and New Zealand members suggested the possibility that anxiety on these grounds was among the conditions leading to the Canberra Agreement and the declarations made at an Anzac Conference at Wellington in November 1944, in favor of strengthening the powers of the Assembly. Statements by nationals of other smaller powers showed that such anxiety was not confined to the Southern Dominions.

Canadian and Australian members, in particular, claimed that 'middle powers' were entitled to special consideration because their economic and military strength was so much greater than that of the smallest powers. It was recognized that power and responsibility should go together and on this ground it was argued that middle powers might well be given a greater chance of securing seats on the Security Council—for instance, by allowing them to be elected more frequently than small powers. Was it not unrealistic to expect that a power like Canada, which might not be a member of the Council when a decision was reached, must automatically accept the decision and perhaps have to contribute large military and economic resources to carry it out? Would it not be better, a member asked, if states not members of the Council were not bound by the latter's decision unless and until the decision was ratified by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly?

Other members also expressed dissatisfaction with the present position, although they did not explicitly accept the distinctions between middle and small powers and drew attention to the difficulties of classification into these categories. As an alternative to voting by the Assembly on the use of force, it was proposed that a power not a member of the Council should be made a temporary member of the Council or allowed to participate in Council discussions whenever it had to take substantial action to give effect to the Council's decision. Reference was made to the provision in the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement (Chapter VI, D, 4)<sup>2</sup> permitting such consultation when the interests of a small power were *specially* affected, but it was pointed out that there was no provision for such consultation when small powers' interests were affected only *generally*. Again, doubts were raised as to the practicability of insisting on a two-thirds vote of the Assembly before the states not members of the

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<sup>2</sup> See below, p. 140.

### *Security in the Pacific*

Council were bound to act. The importance of speedy action was stressed, and it was pointed out that an impossible situation would arise if one body (the Council) imposed sanctions and another body (the Assembly) decided not to impose sanctions—although some members felt that such a contradictory situation was in practice unlikely to arise.

Qualifications for election to membership of the Council might include the performance by a country of its international duties, the magnitude of its contribution to the international organization and the size of its armed forces. Capacity to exercise regional responsibilities, strategic location, and size of population were also advanced as criteria.

It became quite clear as the discussions proceeded that if attempts were made to satisfy all the criteria advanced, the Council would have to be increased to a size which would destroy its ability to operate. There seemed to be most agreement on the desirability of certain regional and power-responsibility standards in the selection of non-permanent members of the Security Council.

#### *More Effective Participation by Smaller Powers*

Fears by the smaller powers that they could not play their due part would be removed or reduced if more attention were paid to bodies other than the Security Council. Small powers could play a most important part not only in the Assembly, but also, for instance, in the Economic and Social Council, and in outside functional agencies which would be subject to the general supervision of this Council (Chapter IX, C)<sup>3</sup> Different criteria might be adopted for membership in different bodies. In these bodies small powers could exercise their full influence in preventing the growth of conditions which, if allowed to continue, might threaten a breach of the peace and thus call for the intervention of the Security Council. Some members who had argued the case for greater influence by small powers admitted that this was an important point, but the opportunity thus afforded to small powers was not accepted by them as sufficient. On the other hand, members who welcomed in principle wider scope for small powers in the world organization, on the ground that this would strengthen the organization's moral prestige, made it clear that they would not wish to press for such wider opportunities if the power of the Council to act where necessary was thereby weakened.

The considerations advanced by Canadian and Australian members

<sup>3</sup> See below, p. 144.

### *Collective Security*

for greater attention to the claims of the middle powers did not pass unquestioned. An American member argued, for example, that the question was largely one of the application of military power, and that although Australia and Canada might not be represented on the Council directly, their military power is so closely related to that of the United Kingdom, which is itself a permanent member, that in reality Australia and Canada might not be denied a voice on the Council.

### *Other Aspects of Representation*

Discussion of the position of the smaller and middle powers prompted observations on certain broader questions affected by the problem of representation, more especially as the relative strength of different powers in the immediate postwar period was not necessarily a sure guide to their future status and influence. Moreover, the relative importance of different regions in their influence on world affairs might change. While in the 19th century the most important events took place in Europe and their effect spread to Asia, today more and more events in Asia are beginning to influence the rest of the world. It was observed that the League of Nations did not provide for the growth of certain Asiatic powers and the general and rapid changes in that part of the world. This raised the question how far the legal structure proposed at Dumbarton Oaks would provide a framework within which growing countries such as Russia and China might experience a feeling of freedom and expansion rather than one of restriction and confinement. A Chinese member gave point to the discussion by drawing attention to the larger representation given to Europe and the Americas than to Asia owing to the manner in which existing national boundaries are drawn. This prompted reference to the recent Russian declaration granting a new status in international relations to the constituent Republics of the Soviet Union, and raised the query whether this arrangement might not give more representation to Asiatic groups in the international organization. It was accepted that the future status of existing dependent areas in the Pacific, in relation to the security organization, might have a bearing on the geographic balance of representation. Discussion on this point was inconclusive; but it was felt that in any event, an international organization aiming at world security must allow for the gradual growth towards freedom and complete self-government of the now dependent peoples, in order that they may as soon as possible exercise their functions as future participants in that organization.

## *Security in the Pacific*

### *Territorial Integrity and Peaceful Change*

From time to time various suggestions were made for the amendment of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, in addition to those already referred to or implied in the discussions. It was proposed that there should be an explicit guarantee of the territorial integrity and political independence of every member state, balanced however by provisions to facilitate the orderly change of situations which might endanger the peace of the world. This brought a reminder from an American member of difficulties caused in the United States through the inclusion of a guarantee of the territorial integrity of member states in the League Covenant. Such a clause might deter the United States from acceptance of a world organization, especially as this would probably be set up before the conditions of peace were known.

### *Definition of Aggression*

A Chinese member urged the importance of incorporating a clear definition of aggression in any security plan. This called forth the observation that the difficulty lies, not in recognizing full-blown aggression such as the Nazi attack upon Poland, but in discerning aggressive tendencies in their early stages, such as were expressed in the cumulative steps by which Hitler established his power. The problem is to identify and check aggression when it is "something so small that you cannot marshal public opinion against it."

The possibility of aggression by propaganda, infiltration, and encouragement to disaffected groups, for example, by Japan in Korea or other regions in the Far East gave point to these considerations. It was recorded that the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement puts no restriction upon the right of a state to grant or withhold recognition of a government in another state. If propaganda or any other similar activity becomes a menace to the general peace, then it is a matter for the Security Council. The test is whether or not it is a matter which might lead to a breach of the peace. A member who previously had supported amendment of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement to include definitions of "aggression," suggested adoption of the following definition of one kind of aggression, viz., "Provision of support either to armed bands formed in a State's own territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or to armed bands formed in another State attempting to overthrow by violence the legally constituted or long recognized government there."

## Collective Security

### *Separate Treaties and the Security Organization*

Two further proposals, less debatable and somewhat more specific, emerged from the discussions. The first was that in order to avoid uncertainty as to the relative standing of separate treaties of "guarantee" of territory between two or more nations and the security organization, it would seem useful to insert a new clause in the Dumbarton Oaks draft to provide that the latter should prevail over any other agreements inconsistent with it. The second recommended that, as under the League Covenant, member states should be required to report all treaties with the security organization which should then give them world-wide publicity.

## SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC

### *The Place of Regional Organization*

The Dumbarton Oaks text explicitly provides for regional arrangements or agencies which, however, must be consistent with the purposes and principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations. The text proposes that the Security Council should encourage the settlement of local disputes by regional action, and might even utilize any regional agency for enforcement action under its authority. Hence some of the round tables devoted a great deal of attention to the question whether a regional security organization should be established for the Pacific.

*In general, the approach was more cautious than that of the Mont Tremblant round tables in 1942, and some interesting differences in outlook were revealed.*<sup>4</sup> *The Mont Tremblant round tables gave support to the establishment of a Regional Council for the Pacific which would "not be just a small international advisory body but a substantial organization with heavy responsibilities which might well on further elaboration involve a number of subsidiary bodies assigned to particular sections of the program."*<sup>5</sup> *The Regional Council would aim at resolving disputes at their source through the establishment of a system of conciliation and arbitration; but it would have an armed force, which would be part of a global force under the authority of whatever world-wide security organization was to be established. This should be under local command empowered to act within the limits assigned to it. The Regional Council was to be a deliberative body, some types of questions being decided by a bare majority, others by a two-third vote.*

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. *War and Peace in the Pacific*, pp. 82-85.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* p. 83.

### *Security in the Pacific*

The Hot Springs discussions did not repudiate regional or sub-regional groupings. Indeed, sub-regional arrangements as proposed in the Canberra Agreement were given very general support, while it was accepted that for specific purposes powers might be delegated to regional agencies; but there was a strong consensus that the role of any regional authority or authorities should be more modest than that assigned at Mont Tremblant.

### *Security a World Problem*

The main considerations influencing the round tables were the necessity for ensuring that action against an aggressor should be prompt and effective and that economic, social and other functions should be performed in the most efficient manner. The view was strongly maintained that in a world where even an apparently remote and isolated happening may engulf all the nations in war, the handling of any dispute or situation which is likely to endanger the maintenance of peace should be entrusted to a world body. In particular, since in the last resort effective measures of enforcement must depend on the existence of accord between the Great Powers, all the Great Powers should be associated from the start in every decision to be taken. In this sense, security should not and cannot be segmented.

Military representatives added the weight of expert opinion to the necessity for planning security on a world scale, since modern development in the art of war made regional security arrangements less effective than formerly. One member called attention to Senator Vandenberg's recent speech advocating a military alliance directed solely against Germany and Japan. This was a global approach which in his opinion deserved support. He added that the recent civil aviation conference at Chicago was a good illustration of the proper relation between world and regional bodies. The instrument drafted at Chicago provided for a world aviation council which, however, has power to devolve authority to subordinate regional councils when and if it so desires.

### *Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies*

In the light of these considerations, is there any place at all for the kind of regional agencies envisaged by the Dumbarton Oaks plan? Here, a distinction was made between sub-regional arrangements and a regional organization covering the whole Pacific. In approaching the question, one round table distinguished between responsibility for the policy to be followed in dealing with any situation threatening

### *Collective Security*

the maintenance of peace, and provision for the organization and (if necessary) the use of the military forces required to maintain or restore peace. This distinction was loosely expressed as one between "security" and "defense." Security, the general view seemed to be, was indivisible; but "defense" could (and indeed probably should) be organized by geographical areas. There was general support for the opinion that agencies covering such areas could very well function as the executive arm of the Security Council, subject always to the reiterated proviso that they were properly integrated into, and functioned in subordination to, the Security Council.

The Canberra Agreement was accepted as an example of such a sub-regional arrangement, and it was suggested that similar arrangements might be made in other areas of the Pacific, as for example in Southeast Asia. An Indian member affirmed that by virtue of its geographical situation and resources, India could and should be the center of such a sub-regional security area. The desirability of any proposed sub-regional grouping might be tested by the strength and directness of the interests of the States concerned in the security of the area, and the probable effectiveness of concerted action in meeting its defense needs.

#### *Doubts Concerning a Pan-Pacific Security Organization*

Little support was forthcoming for the establishment of a Pan-Pacific security organization interposed between a world organization and any sub-regional groups such as that proposed by Australia and New Zealand. An agency of this kind would endanger the speed and directness of action essential to the successful operation of any system of collective security. A Canadian member drew attention to the difficulties which his country would face in cooperating fully in regional arrangements because of its geographical relationship to several regions. One Chinese member, who agreed that duplication of functions between a Pacific Council or Commission and a world Security Council of a kind which created confusion and delay should be avoided, thought that it should still be possible to delegate distinctive functions which would not have this result. In that event the Chinese people as the one wholly Pacific people among the major powers, would be able to play a more effective part. The general feeling, however, was that any proposal for a Pan-Pacific organization created something like a dilemma. If it were to be given "political" functions in the handling of security questions, it would duplicate, or possibly rival, the world Council. If on the other hand it were limited to the purely executive or administrative function

## *Security in the Pacific*

of carrying out defense arrangements, it could not do so as effectively as sub-regional agencies operating more directly within the actual area of tension.

### *A Question of Precedence*

Accepting the desirability of sub-regional groupings, but in general viewing with disfavor the establishment of a Pan-Pacific organization, the round tables turned to a question of precedence. Should sub-regional organizations await the establishment of a world security organization, or might they chronologically precede it? Here differences of opinion emerged in the two round tables which gave attention to the matter. To begin by multiplying regional arrangements would give the impression of relapse from United Nations cooperation into separate-power groupings. On balance, however, the weight of opinion leaned to the view that while the central organization must come first in logic and analysis, sub-regional arrangements such as the Anzac Pact might properly be made before the world organization was completed, provided always that they operated within the general framework. It was vital, nevertheless, to press on directly with the establishment of something like the Dumbarton Oaks plan. This would crystallize the conviction of world public opinion that peace cannot be maintained without world unity and world organization.

### *Functional Organization for Purposes Other Than Security*

Much importance was attached to the organization of international collaboration for such purposes as the improvement of labor standards, health and nutrition and the promotion of social, political and economic development in dependent territories. The economic round tables had already given some attention to such functional agencies in their relationship to world economic expansion and stability. Hence the main emphasis was now placed on their significance from the point of view of world security, and on their relationship to the security organization. It was generally accepted that activities of this kind could frequently be organized on either a regional or a sub-regional basis. Regional agencies for these purposes would not normally be linked with regional organizations for defense. They would be linked to the world body through the Economic and Social Council, and not through the Security Council. There was no need for areas to be the same for all purposes. For instance, Australia and New Zealand have by no means suggested the same area for the Anzac zone of defense on the one hand and the South Seas



## *Collective Security*

Regional Commission (for functional collaboration) on the other. It was noted that the Canberra Agreement provided for collaboration in the Southwest and South Pacific sub-region to further the welfare of dependent peoples in that area. A member from the United States supplied a helpful analogy, drawn from the different districting of his country for military, judicial, banking, developmental and constitutional purposes.

### COMPOSITION AND USE OF ARMED FORCES. CONTROL OF BASES

Chapter VIII, Section B<sup>6</sup> of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement calls for a series of agreements whereby members of the security organization will agree to provide the security organization with certain specified numbers and types of armed forces together with other forms of military assistance and facilities, and to hold these forces immediately available upon the direction of the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council. These forces, while at the disposal of the Security Council, will nevertheless remain as part of the separate national forces from which they are drawn. Although the discussion on this question proceeded in general, sometimes abstract terms, members had in mind the problems of concrete application in the Pacific as they might affect their own countries.

### *The Case for an Internationalized Force*

An Australian member argued most forcefully for a modification in this part of the Dumbarton Oaks draft to provide for an international force—presumably simply an air force at first—to be contributed to the security organization by member countries but to be completely internationalized and entirely under the jurisdiction of the world organization. Such a force would not of itself be a threat to the integrity of any nation. He argued that the idea was practicable, for air forces are not so deeply imbedded in tradition as to raise great difficulty in detaching portions from the national forces for service under the international body. The war, moreover, has demonstrated the success attending combined operations and set a precedent for the type of international military arm suggested. This force, the Australian member continued, would not have to be large, for it would be of a highly mobile nature and its activities, at least for some time to come, would be largely in the nature of a police force. A Chinese member stated that the establishment of an international air force was one of the principles

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<sup>6</sup> See below, pp. 141-143.

## *Security in the Pacific*

supported by his country, and members of other national groups also gave support.

### *Military Opinion*

Military members of the round table held that the Dumbarton Oaks plan provided all that was necessary by way of an alert and mobile force and objected to the establishment and maintenance of an international force under the direct control of the Security Organization on a number of grounds. As is shown below, not all of the arguments of the specialists were accepted by the membership as a whole. The arguments of the military members may be summarized as follows:

1. Before a plan is made, one must know against whom it is directed. Can an international military staff be asked to prepare plans directed against possible aggression by great powers? Can an American be asked to draft a plan for the destruction of Pearl Harbor?

2. During the war the Allied nations are exchanging all their military secrets. Can we expect that they will be willing after the war to make their latest inventions available to an internationalized force?

3. Soldiers cannot be expected to fight except for something they strongly believe in or against something they strongly fear. Can the necessary esprit de corps be instilled into an internationalized force which has no national roots and fights under no nation's flag? Might not such a force attract merely adventurers and mercenaries?

4. Difficulties will arise in an international force over differences in outlook, language, equipment and training. An internationalized force might even be a substantial cause of international friction.

5. A problem would arise in the basing of an international force. To the present, air power, which was given first preference in proposals to establish an international force, is mobile only in a tactical sense, not in a strategic sense.

### *The Problem of Bases*

In respect of bases, it was further argued, it may be of no use to have a base unless one knows the purpose for which it is to be used—the country against which forces are to operate from such a base. Owing to modern technical developments, wide freedom of action and utmost mobility must be retained. A base which is of use now may be of little or no use in other circumstances. Garrisoning in the old-fashioned sense may no longer be necessary. Mobility, range, speed are the vital factors.

## *Collective Security*

It is convenient to interpolate at this point that military opinion in the round tables did not appear to be so greatly concerned as lay opinion on the matter of bases. Fleets and armies were learning to move vast distances and over great oceans by themselves. The importance of bases should not be exaggerated and we should remember that when they are placed too far out they might become a military embarrassment rather than a military asset. Moreover, bases were expensive and the cost would be reduced by the extent to which an effective world security organization could be built up. Some bases would, of course, be needed, and it might be necessary for the State which maintained them to exercise complete control of the areas surrounding them.

An American member reminded the round table that the United States Government might continue to have security commitments in the Philippines and that it would therefore be concerned with the availability of bases, not only in the Philippines, but also in islands between the Philippines and the Pacific Coast of America. Most of these islands are deficient in economic resources and their maintenance will involve enormous expense. It might be necessary for the United States to exercise full sovereignty over these islands. There was no doubt, however, that if the general doctrine of accountability prevailed, the United States would fully accept its requirements.

A United Kingdom member said that the transfer of the mandated Japanese bases to the United States could hardly be regarded as a matter of imperialism but of common sense and world security, as well as in the interests of the local people. But such a matter was tied up with the future of the mandates system. There could be no objection if the transfer were with the consent of the people and made by international agreement and if the principle of accountability were adopted.

### *Divergencies Between Military and Lay Opinion*

The views of the military experts did not pass unchallenged. It was argued that the sharing of military inventions and the location of forces presented exactly the same difficulties whether the security organization's force derived from various national authorities or its own. Operations would in either case be joint ones in which the latest technical equipment would have to be shared, and the problem of strategic deployment would be faced under either alternative. With respect to the possible lack of esprit de corps among the individuals comprising an internationalized force, several expressed the view that the ideals and practical objectives of a world-wide security organization would provide incentives

### *Security in the Pacific*

fully as appealing as those under which soldiers now give their lives throughout the world.

It was not without significance that in recent public opinion polls in which persons were asked whether they favored the establishment of an international police force, 74 percent in Great Britain voted affirmatively, 74 percent in the United States and 78 percent in Canada.

The general impression left by the discussion was that while round tables appreciated the importance of the argument advanced by the military experts, a majority adhered to the view that to provide a world security organization with its own air force would imbue the conception of international action with a reality and a personality which might otherwise be lacking. Certain members of one round table asked their military colleagues what, in view of their arguments, would be the duties of the Military Staff Committee set up under the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement, and what was the value of the special agreements under which members of the Organization undertook to make available to the Security Council, armed forces, facilities and assistance? Was all planning impossible and were such agreements useless?

Service members gave the following answers to these questions. One pointed out that on a close reading of Chapter VIII, B, 5, of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement, members of the Organization undertook to make forces available to the Security Council "in accordance with a special agreement or agreements concluded among themselves," i.e., it is not a question merely of a special agreement by each separate state with the world organization as a whole. Such agreements among themselves have to be approved by the Security Council, which can thus ensure that they do not operate detrimentally to world security as a whole. On this reading, regional defense arrangements such as those envisaged by the Anzac Pact or the United States-Canada Permanent Joint Defense Board are quite legitimate. This is a practicable method by which national forces can be used for supra-national purposes. Another service member expressed his view of the practical military problem as follows: any state entering the security system must (a) provide for its internal security (police, etc.), (b) make provision for its own defense and (c) organize strategic reserves which can be placed at the disposal of the Security Council (and perhaps of certain allies grouped together for defense). The first of these requirements is, of course, determined by each state for itself. But each state has also a duty towards the Security Council in respect of (b) and (c). Attention was also drawn to the references in the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement to the possible

## *Collective Security*

regulation of armaments. (Chapter VIII, B, 9.)<sup>7</sup> The point was made that the burden of world security would be reduced by the extent to which member states could be induced to limit the size of their national forces.

### *Sub-Regional Military Staff Committees*

A member from France suggested that in order to facilitate speed of military action, there should be established, in respect of various parts of the Pacific, sub-committees of the Military Staff Committee, differing in composition according to the military needs of the area concerned. He proposed, as a basis for consideration:

(1) a navy-and-air staff of the Northern Pacific, with United States preponderance;

(2) an army-and-air staff of the Northwest Pacific, with U.S.S.R. preponderance;

(3) an army-and-air staff of the West Pacific, with Chinese preponderance;

(4) an army-navy-and-air staff of the Southwest Pacific, with preponderance of the British Commonwealth and the United States, and participation by the Netherlands and France.

This suggestion was to be treated as a special regular application of the proposal in the Dumbarton Oaks plan that the Military Staff Committee should associate with it any member state not permanently represented on the Committee, whenever the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities required that that state should participate in the work of the committee.

### *No Military Difficulties in Preventing Aggression*

There was no doubt in the minds of round table members that *from a military point of view at least* the prevention of a new trend toward aggression will present no difficulties. "We'll have plenty of warning of any Japanese rearmament program. It's a matter of ordinary, normal military intelligence. Similarly in the case of nations already armed we shall know when they intend to move toward aggression, for even under modern conditions military action requires a period of preparation for aggression. Therefore, and again from a military point of view, we will have the opportunity to take countermeasures in a cool, calm and collected manner; we shall have time to deploy forces in the proper

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<sup>7</sup> See below, p. 142.

## *Security in the Pacific*

way and to make our strategic dispositions. All this, however, is true *provided* that the Security Council makes its decision and passes it on to the Military Staff Committee in time—and that is a political, not a military problem.

“The main virtue in the proposed Dumbarton Oaks set-up from the military point of view is that it provides you with the means to take the initiative against an aggressor. This is the great point about the new machinery, for heretofore aggressors have obtained the initiative.”

### ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

It was stressed that economic sanctions should be as readily available as military sanctions. Under the provisions of Chapter VIII, B, 3, the Security Council could direct members to apply immediately severe economic measures, such as interruption of rail, sea and air services. States confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of measures decided upon by the Security Council can, under Chapter VIII, B, 11, consult the Council with a view to securing assistance in solving these problems. As one member of the round table pointed out, trade is a two-way proposition, and stoppage of trade in one direction by state A may have embarrassing results in the other direction as well. State A may need special financial or other assistance. Other members stressed the technical nature of economic sanctions, which, to be effective, must be general. Much information must be collected in advance, i.e., before sanctions are actually imposed. To be fully effective, it should be known that military sanctions will follow if economic sanctions prove insufficient to produce the desired results.

### POSSIBLE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PACIFIC AREA

Since the view was accepted that the prevention of aggression did not present a serious military problem, the issue became a political one. What sort of stresses might weaken the will to cooperate with the world security organization and require the use of armed forces or other sanctions? No deliberation was necessary to establish the necessity for the great powers, and especially the “Big 3” to resolve their differences and cooperate towards the goals of freedom from fear and freedom from want. Otherwise no security system could work. The positive desire for peace, the common attitude towards defeated enemies, the great economy which could be effected if collective security reduced the need for armament, the effects of this in ameliorating the tension engendered by competition in armament, and the day-by-day practice of cooperation in

## *Collective Security*

support of the principle of world security would be the surest guarantees against conflict. The promotion of an expanding world economy was a necessary condition and the gradual emancipation of colonies and dependencies was important.

Nevertheless, it seemed necessary to the round tables to give some attention to possible causes of difference or conflict in the Pacific area if only because to be forewarned is to be fore-armed.

### *Policy Over Japan*

A possible cause of differences of interest which might emerge at an early stage was in the economic treatment of Japan and the prevention of rearmament, especially as this might affect the economic interests of different countries in different ways.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, commercial and economic rivalries generally were regarded as among the most important potential causes of friction. Here the conclusions reinforced those of the round tables on economic problems: (a) that in policies of world economic expansion lies the world's hope of freedom from want envisaged by the Atlantic Charter; (b) that the United States more than any other country holds the key. The development of the economically less advanced territories of the Pacific area, and of India, would offer special scope for the right kind of policy.

The importance of a strong and democratic China as a stabilizing force was emphasized by Chinese members, and this depended on foreign assistance to develop its economy. In the interests of security, as well as for other reasons, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals should be strengthened by positive international action to promote investment and greater freedom of trade to foster the proper distribution of raw materials.

It should be noted, moreover, that the war has destroyed the myth of the white man's superiority in the Far East. So security may be disrupted in the future, not only by the rise of an aggressive power but also by restive movements among Far Eastern people. Hence the peoples in the Pacific should be assisted to raise their living standards as well as to develop their political institutions towards the goal of self-government and democracy. Policy towards dependent peoples was clearly relevant to these issues.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Aspects of policy towards Japan were discussed at some length but the discussions overlapped those at the round tables on Japan and it has been thought appropriate to give consideration to them in the report on Japan. See pp. 32-36.

<sup>9</sup> One round table dealt at some length with the doctrine of "accountability" for dependent territories. These and other questions relating to dependent peoples and territories are reported on under Topic V, pp. 80-98.—Editor.

## *Security in the Pacific*

### *Civil Conflict in the Pacific*

Europe's experience of intervention by major powers on opposing sides in the civil war in Spain was sufficiently fresh to bring home the relevance of internal conflicts in the Pacific area to the problem of security. One member classified possible civil conflicts into four categories: (1) civil conflicts within a great power; (2) civil conflicts within a dependency; (3) civil conflicts within a small country; (4) civil conflicts within a dependency which is on the point of becoming a sovereign state. The first requirement, of course, was a good and skilful government so that riots and revolution would not occur, but this could not always be relied upon.

In the case of dependencies, a colonial power had everything to gain from international accountability with procedures to make advice effective. If then it had to use force it would have the sympathy of the world and not its suspicion and mistrust. It would be anomalous, however, if dependencies which attained self-government ceased in the process to be internationally accountable both for permanently resident members and new immigrant groups.

Chinese members assured round tables that political differences in China could be resolved without resort to civil war. This assurance was strengthened by nationals of other countries, recently returned from China, who considered that Kuomintang and Communist forces were so evenly matched that both sides would be anxious to avoid a trial by force.

The consensus appeared to be against external interference in the settlement of internal conflicts. Moreover, while the Dumbarton Oaks plan could hardly be expected to cover all hypothetical cases, its influence might be strengthened by the formulation of an International Bill of Rights which would define responsibilities in each country towards its citizens and especially towards minorities.

### *Territorial Questions*

Some round tables browsed over the Pacific in search of possible boundary disputes. They discovered some which might require negotiation, but none so acute as not to be amenable to peaceful solution. The question was linked, in the case of relations between China and the Soviet Union, with the political status of border regions. These were discussed in terms of legality rather than in anticipation of any important differences between the two countries.

One member observed that in the frontier regions of Mongolia and Tibet, China had dependencies, with their attendant problems.



### *Collective Security*

Outer Mongolia, it was noted, had been under its own rule for some years and the Mongolian Republic was in fact older than the Chinese Republic. From a legal point of view the Soviet Union had no basis whatsoever for intervening in Chinese-Mongolian relations, unless China tried to obtain control of Outer Mongolia by force, in which case the U.S.S.R.-Outer Mongolia Treaty might apply. In the case of a peaceful settlement between China and Outer Mongolia, the U.S.S.R. would not be directly concerned, insofar as the Soviet Union has always recognized China's sovereignty over Outer Mongolia. The present situation might well continue unchanged after the war, but, legal claims apart, any settlement that China might reach with Outer Mongolia would have to be negotiated as between free peoples. It was asked whether Outer Mongolia is likely to apply for autonomous membership in the security organization after the war and, if so, what would be China's attitude. Two Chinese members, speaking from a personal point of view, replied that they saw no objections to the independent membership of Outer Mongolia, provided the people really wanted independence without being pressed from outside and provided that the people in that region were capable of growth and self-government. For China, it is largely a question of maintaining these regions free from foreign control and in general it was security that China chiefly desired.

Sinkiang, it was observed, had always been a Chinese province and had never been occupied by another power since its conquest by China. The majority of the people in Sinkiang were not Chinese and a large proportion of the population were Moslems; but except for non-Chinese the Moslems were first Confucianists and then Moslems. There would be no occasion for dispute between China and the U.S.S.R. over the Manchurian border which had already been defined. The facts of the Simla Conference were recalled and some members stated that relations between China, Tibet and India had not been fully clarified.

Discussion then turned to possible boundary disputes in Southeast Asia. The unresolved border issue between Burma and Thailand was stated to involve no menace to international security. Relations between the two countries had been normal for a hundred years. There was no real desire for further territory. The danger had come with the westward advance of Japan. In this opinion relations between Burma and Thailand would remain peaceful, and the strategic position of Burma would not affect these good relations. Unless there arose another aggressive power with designs on India, no difficulty need be anticipated over boundary questions. A Free Thai representative informed members

### *Security in the Pacific*

that the Free Thai movement, inside and outside Thailand, had repudiated the gift to Thailand by Japan of former Burmese provinces. As regards relationships between Thailand and Indo-China, French members stated that France would not agree to the annexation by Thailand of the Indo-Chinese provinces. France realized that Japan had been responsible for this annexation, and hoped that the matter could be settled by a gentlemen's agreement between the two countries concerned. A Free Thai member reported that possession of the provinces in question had been an issue for many years, and said that many people in Thailand undoubtedly felt that at least some part of the territory belongs to Thailand. He was confident that an amicable settlement could be reached. Thailand would welcome establishment of an international frontier commission to settle boundaries. French members appeared to hold that the matter had been settled by the Treaty of 1907. An Indian member supported the holding of a plebiscite which might thus establish a principle for any future disputes in the area of a similar kind.

#### *Frontiers and Peaceful Change*

It may be noted that the whole question of frontiers is related to the provision of machinery to facilitate peaceful change. On this question an American member, referring to Secretary of State Stettinius' position, indicated that American opinion was opposed to anything which might seem to freeze frontiers. Instead of guaranteeing frontiers, it preferred to guarantee the sort of machinery, whether by way of boundary commissions or courts, which could adequately deal with problems of this type.

#### PUBLIC OPINION ON SECURITY

The paramount importance of promoting and maintaining the will to cooperate among the United Nations, especially the Great Powers, and of an effective public opinion in support of collective security as providing the necessary foundations was reflected in the attention given by two of the round tables to the state of public opinion in the separate countries.

There was general recognition that in this connection public opinion in the United States was of especial significance. While there was some uneasiness as to how far continuing full participation in collective security and international cooperation by the United States, and the support of American public opinion for such policies, might be relied

## *Collective Security*

on, recent American commitments were regarded as indicative of an encouraging trend.

Public opinion polls showed a rapid rise in American opinion positively favorable to wholehearted cooperation in the right kind of world organization. The Atlantic Charter, the Moscow and Teheran declarations, commitments at Cairo, the Fulbright Resolution, the Mackinac meeting, the Connally Resolution, Senator Vandenberg's recent speech, President Roosevelt's campaign speech in which he suggested that the United States members of the Security Council should vote on the use of force without reference to Congress, the results of the election itself, the Bretton Woods, Dumbarton Oaks and other conferences were all cited as revealing the broad current of American opinion and policy.<sup>10</sup>

Several non-Americans, who in spite of being non-Americans seemed to come from Missouri, asked whether the influence of eleven million returning veterans, many of whom might be disillusioned by the war, would not swing opinion back to its position in the 1920's. Under present circumstances, no United States member could give a confident answer to this question. As an item on the credit side, however, it was said that many Americans already demobilized are founding new veterans organizations which in every case are committed to full participation in a world program to keep the peace. The Army and Navy orientation courses, using competent material based often on Institute of Pacific Relations and Foreign Policy Association publications, and staffed in part by former members of such organizations, were reported to be doing good work in this direction.

In answer to a question as to the nature of the participation which Americans desired in the world security system, it was replied that they were interested not in United States leadership as such but in action on the part of the American Government which would speed up the operation of the Dumbarton Oaks plan and after that in a leadership which would be shared as it is today with our major allies in the war.

It should not be assumed from the foregoing reflection of optimism that the round tables were composed of a group of American Pollyannas. It was recognized that even in the United States the best of all possible worlds had not yet been achieved. There existed, for instance, the McCormick-Patterson chain of newspapers and isolationist blocs in sev-

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<sup>10</sup> For an analysis of United States opinion on international affairs, see American Council Data Paper No. 8, *American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, by Harry H. Field.

### *Security in the Pacific*

eral parts of the country. Already there were indications of disillusionment over certain types of events such as those in Poland and Greece. Some liberal newspapers, a non-American representative remarked, had been serving the most reactionary interests by spreading discouragement over the conservative characteristics of some of the latest State Department appointees. A British member referred to these influences as the "Cuckoo School" of idealists who were startled by anything short of utopia. There were many of them in his own country, he added.

In spite of these reservations the picture of American opinion which came out of the discussions was definitely weighted on the side of international participation.

In particular it was gratifying to note that opinion in the United States was beginning to realize the increasing importance of Asia and the part which the United States was bound to play in the Pacific. Expressions of opinion from nationals of other countries in general left no room for ambiguity that the weight of world public opinion would support the slogan "Dumbarton Oaks or Better."

## CHAPTER VII

### SOME CONCLUDING STATEMENTS

The last two plenary sessions of the conference, as on previous occasions, were devoted to a review of what seemed some of the constructive achievements of the round table discussions. Several of the speakers emphasized the sense of responsibility shown by most of the members. This was exemplified, they said, by the sincere efforts made to define the problems in such terms that, in spite of present disagreement on solutions, at least parallel studies in the different countries could be made which would result in a narrowing of differences of view. An officer of the conference pointed out that, more than at previous conferences, members had considered their sectional problems in relation to world problems. All seemed to sense that their solutions must somehow be linked to a new world structure of international collaboration. If the small progress made in the working out of detailed proposals had disappointed some, the explanation was that the formation of basic policies in the various member countries was still in flux. Public opinion was not yet fully formed. The same speaker, probably in refutation of criticism which he had heard, explained that a seeming over-emphasis on economic factors at some of the round tables arose from the belief that policies to assure freedom from want and fear are inseparable from policies to promote security: an expanding economy will reduce those internal stresses which in the past have often been glossed over by diverting public attention to external conflict. The concern with security against future war had led the conference to stress the necessity for a strong central organ rather than minor organs of regional cooperation. The underlying unity of the world scene had been the key note of the conference. Everywhere public opinion had of late been moving toward internationalism and toward the subordination of national to international interests. But there was also a corresponding caution among those of the older generation who remembered how rapidly in the United States the spiritual fervor had evaporated which had supported the international policies of President Wilson.

#### *A Netherlands Member*

The emergence of two main themes from the conference discussions was further elaborated by a former high official of the Netherlands-Indian Government. On the one hand there was discernible a new

### *Security in the Pacific*

international order, with the Soviet Union and the United States in it, which no longer would be confined in its main interests to Europe. This new community of nations, the discussions had shown, was nowhere needed more than in the Pacific. Yet there was also in this region, as a circumstance peculiar to it, the growth of new national autonomies. As yet in various stages of social and political development or of consolidation, these autonomies should not be mistaken for full-grown states. Existing or proposed legal status did not express the political reality. The international interest shown in the advance to self-government of the dependent peoples was helpful; but it was equally desirable that world opinion should recognize the special responsibility which rested on the metropolitan powers to bring their colonial peoples into the new world alignment. It was they who had brought civilization to these countries, were now bound to them by ties of growing partnership, knew how to develop them along the shortest lines to political and economic self-government. Therefore, the wish of these powers to maintain a commonwealth with them was reasonable, justifiable, and compatible with the advancement of self-government. "The metropolitan countries, standing with one foot in the world of the growing national autonomies and with the other in the international world, carry a grand, unselfish duty on their shoulders."

In the matter of security, too, he pointed out, the Pacific region had problems of its own. "One giant on the spot can raise havoc among the many small countries in this area, while the distant metropolitan countries are not able to exert their maximum influence here. The financial burden of heavy armaments would crush these growing communities." Hence, as the previous speaker had already intimated, even from the standpoint of strategic security, economic development in this region was of the greatest importance. But in that respect, too, he continued, everything depends on the nature of the new international order. It is essential that the raw-material producing nations be protected against economic crises, which strike them harder than countries with diversified economies. Industrialization, "wisely led," as well as stabilization of world prices, was needed to create greater economic security. But industrialization requires rising standards of living so as to increase the total market of world industry.

#### *An Indian Member*

Asking the conference for a few minutes to forget the technical aspects of their agenda, an Indian member invited it to examine the evil roots

### *Some Concluding Statements*

from which all the problems were flowering which they had discussed in the last few days.

"It has been pointed out again and again that the world is shrinking, that people are coming together more. In space and time certainly the world is shrinking. But the tragedy is that as the world grows smaller, human beings get further apart. Ideas keep them divided, and fear prevents them from coming out into the open to find common solutions for their problems. That is why conferences and meetings never do what they are capable of doing. . . . Members are afraid to say things that might separate them still further."

Among the ugly things that had come up in the discussions, the speaker continued, were the prejudices that separate race from race. Unless the fundamental relationships between peoples were faced, even the proposals for intercultural education advanced at one of the round tables could not be seriously entertained. For, there was still the underlying assumption that one side possesses all the culture, and the other has to have it imposed upon it. Only a genuine acceptance of the idea that all peoples have a contribution to make to world culture will overcome the false notion that it is the duty of Fascist Italy to civilize a backward Ethiopia or that of Great Britain to civilize a large part of the world. But each contribution must be a voluntary gift. International cooperation can do no more than provide the opportunity, without use of either force or promise, for each people to contribute what it can to the welfare of the world.

The "peace-loving" nations only too often were "power-possessed" nations, thinking that God had laid upon them the mission to grab ever greater power and set themselves up as the guarantors and monopolists of world security. But that security must come from within, from the collective hearts of all people. And the job of such a conference as this was that of creating an atmosphere in which such security might grow. To this end all false assumptions must be discarded: were the Allied Nations really winning the war because they had greater moral backing than their enemies, or was it not because of the superior force of their armies and their larger resources? Their victory, the speaker contended, had nothing to do with moral issues. For, what guarantee is there that tomorrow these nations, now allied, will not look for more and more power and impose more and more wars upon the rest of the world? And how could there be security in a given region if the new plan for international organization provides merely new ways of imposing Western standards of security on Eastern peoples, splitting in this process their

### *Security in the Pacific*

social and economic life and making the security structure unsuccessful from the start? This member concluded by reminding the members of the contrast between the comforts they were enjoying with the tragedy of the war waged outside. Perhaps the "big words" that fell so easily from their lips in the present surroundings would not sound quite so well amid the poverty and suffering of India.

#### *A French Member*

To the leader of the French group, some of whose members had suffered severely from the oppression of the German occupation, the most striking feature of the conference was its freedom of speech—a freedom not merely in the formal sense but inviting the most vigorous expression of views. In reply to the previous speaker, he claimed that this freedom might perhaps be claimed as a gift of the white man to the whole world—eventually also to India. There was a direct relation, he thought, between this frank exchange of opinion between peoples and the problem of the dependencies to which the conference had given so much thought. The old colonial spirit must be replaced by a new relationship between the white and colored races, a relationship based on the equality of men. Even with an international security system there would still be fear. To conquer it was the main task. It seemed to him that the Dumbarton Oaks proposal offered a good starting point. It did not compromise any essential principle even though it was only a first step toward the achievement of real security.

#### *A Chinese Member*

One of the Chinese members gave his impression of what he thought were the principal agreements of the conference on problems of economic security. For those whose thinking normally was in terms of national economy, it had become clearer that there was an international economy. They had the sense of an integrated world system. Most of them would agree that there was no such thing as a Pacific economy, but in the economic sphere there were problems of special common interest to the peoples of the Pacific. One of these problems arose from the fact that the Pacific area was one of the largest raw-material producing areas in the world, and that because of this the business cycle affected it with special severity. Another common interest in the Pacific was the need of practically every country and dependency in the area for economic reconstruction after the present war. They had in common a considerable need, in that connection, for technical and financial assistance from



### *Some Concluding Statements*

without. Even India, in spite of her large sterling balance, would require additional foreign capital. In short, the whole Pacific would be a debtor region. Third, with incipient programs of industrialization in many of the countries and dependencies, the Pacific would be a region of growing production. Although much of this would be for domestic consumption, there would soon also be an increasing surplus for export; and since the region would not be able to compete with the older established industrial countries in the supply of the higher grades of manufactures, there would be possibilities of a greatly enhanced trade between the countries of the Pacific and those of the West. This also would create a greater unity of economic interest in the Pacific.

From another standpoint, the expected developments would also give the Western economic interests a greater unity in facing the Pacific. Their common stake after the war would include the development of the Pacific region as a market for their commodities and as a field for investment. There might thus be seen a danger of drift into an Eastern and a Western economic bloc; but this was counteracted, he thought, by the ever-growing tendency toward world unity in the attack on common economic problems. A collision between Western and Eastern interests would occur only if the needed capital for investment in the new Eastern industries were not forthcoming. Some industrialization would take place, in any case; if without foreign aid then the capital would be accumulated by savings, perhaps by a deliberate curb on the rising standards of living. This would lead to stricter government controls on imports and have far-reaching international repercussions.

#### *A British Member*

A British member with wide colonial experience in the Pacific began by expressing his conviction that international discussion, unless conducted in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance and of objectivity, might impair international understanding, sympathy, and respect, rather than advance these objectives. Lack of objectivity had, he thought, marked some of the discussions. There had been too many targets to shoot at. Not all those who participated in the round-table discussions had been well enough informed. There had been too many slogans and platitudes. For example, the statement that "no people is morally good enough to rule over another" fails to do justice to the now widely accepted doctrine which combines power with responsibility. Similarly, the statement that "the American people are not fighting in this war to preserve the British empire" was gratuitous; everybody knew that they

### *Security in the Pacific*

were in the war because Japan attacked them. And although this was the immediate cause of the war, it was well known that America was also fighting for other great causes. The British could say of themselves that they had entered the war for a principle; and it was not true that there was no morality in the war. The British and American peoples were sharing the same ideals in this war, and their faculty for distinguishing the issues had been sharpened by the actuality of war experience.

Liquidation of the British Empire was clearly not one of their war aims, even though the British were fighting for something much higher than self-preservation. "It might be," he added, "if we could be persuaded that the existence of the British Empire was even remotely one of the causes of the war." Cupidity excited by the British possessions might have been such a cause, but that was something different. The heroic part which troops from every part of the Empire had played and their contributions to the common victories were proof enough that the colonies, rich and poor, large and small, were thinking of themselves as fighting with and not for the British Empire.

Great Britain did not claim a faultless record or that the progress of emancipation of subject peoples to which it was committed had gone fast enough; but it was the first empire in the history of the last five thousand years of civilization to pursue a policy of self-liquidation.

"We shall be glad, within the limits of practicability, to share our powers in proportion as we can share our responsibilities; but we shall not permit ourselves to be hustled out of evolution into revolution."

He made another claim:

"Every stirring, every desire for the enlargement of freedom in the British Empire is the direct result of British teaching and British traditions. The spirit of Milton and of Burke's speeches on America has inspired India's desire for freedom and still inspires the British people's attitude toward problems which can be neither removed nor simplified by purely intellectual formulae."

The speaker went on to explain that the British people had been in the forefront of every liberal movement since that for the emancipation of slaves, and expected to live up to their tradition and reputation. It was nonsensical to describe Great Britain as though it were a predatory and reactionary power. At the same time, his countrymen were expecting from America further contributions of that generosity which a British historian had praised a generation ago and which still, to quote his words, was "of infinite value to civilization." Cooperation between

### *Some Concluding Statements*

Great Britain and the United States was essential, not only in the Pacific but in the world at large.

The speaker concluded by making some practical suggestions for the conduct of the next Institute conference. He thought that less time might be given to the exploration of political differences and more to the definition of terms, such as "self-determination" and "independence." There might be more consideration of the effect which an adequate implementation of a security system would have on national and international finance and, hence, on standards of living. Fuller study might be given to such questions as the following. How may unnecessary forms of economic competition between the countries of the Pacific best be removed? To what extent are the peoples of the Pacific affected by what happens in other parts of the world? What is the effect of full employment on world security? How can inter-allied agreements and agencies that have worked well in war time be adapted to the needs of peace?

#### *A Filipino Member*

As a teacher of business in the University of the Philippines and an economist in the government of his country, a young Filipino took a view of "the expansion of the West" rather different from that of other representatives of Asiatic peoples. The two or three hundred years of technological change introduced in the old Oriental societies had, to his mind, on the whole made for an economically more efficient civilization. But this process was incomplete. There still was the necessity to bring the political and social efficiency of the Eastern half of the world to the level of the expanding technological civilization. The movement of emancipation in the East had for its goal the achievement of equality with the West, primarily in economic matters but inevitably also culturally and politically. The first step in this direction, he thought, was that of lifting the economically depressed peoples from their present low standard of living to a higher one. Only in this setting and with full cognizance of all the change it implied could his own country expect to achieve its own true independence—a goal that may still be a century or two away.

At this conference, members from the Philippines had been well aware that their country was not yet able to play a strong positive part in the attainment of security in the Pacific. And being still largely under enemy occupation and requiring all available talents to help in the prosecution of the war of liberation, his country regretted not to

### *Some Concluding Statements*

have been able to make a larger technical and scientific contribution to this conference.

#### *An Australian Member*

A leader of Australian public opinion referred to the growing importance of the problems common to the countries of the Pacific, as distinct from those peculiar to each of them, as the source of a new kind of international conferring. It was no longer a question for the representatives of any one of these countries of showing concern only for the particular responsibilities of their own. After twenty years, since the Treaty of Versailles and its immediate aftermath, all the countries here represented were facing the same dilemma: the record of the world's first attempt at international action was saying in a thousand voices, "you'd be a fool ever to put your hope in a thing like that again"; but there was heard also in these last few years an insistent voice, saying: "you can't manage to achieve your own security, you've got to do it on a cooperative basis throughout the world."

This was the dilemma which had characterized some of their discussions. Members of the conference had come to recognize that in the present situation the nations must try to build a structure of international action; but at the same time there was at the back of their minds an insistent warning not to put all their faith in that structure, so that if it should fail there would be something soft to fall on. The highlights of the conference had been concerned with the choice of a site for this structure and with its construction. There was evidence of a desire to make it strong but also of a desire to leave plenty of exits. Thus, the central problem was not yet resolved.

"We have assumed at this conference that it is possible to build a structure which in any circumstances will meet both demands. I do not believe that this is possible. I do believe that for all of us the time will come when we shall be forced to examine whether this international structure which we are now considering is consistent with the larger hope. . . . And the decision will not be an easy one to make."

#### *A Canadian Member*

Speaking with a long and intimate knowledge of India and Burma, a Canadian member said that the Conference ending with this session had been very encouraging and significant. A few years ago such a conference would have been inconceivable. It had been shown that a group of private citizens coming together from many parts of the world could

## *Security in the Pacific*

seriously discuss affairs of state. Such a conference was an instrument of exceptional value for political and economic education. A high level of competence had been shown, and the discussions had been carried on with a commendable degree of courtesy. Yet, most of the members probably would agree that, taken as a whole, the discussions had not been a quite adequate comment on the kind of world situation they were facing today. The conflict of national sovereignty with the need for international cooperation, long seen as incipient, had reached a new crisis. How to introduce the writ of law into the anarchy of international relations was the central problem.

The conference had wisely concerned itself with the practical proposals of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Back of it lay the recent promise of freedom from fear and freedom from want for all the peoples of the world. His own suggestion was that the effort of the nations to secure freedom from want should be extended as far as possible to those peoples that over long periods have suffered most. But to attain freedom from fear was far more difficult. Most people were afraid of departing from their accustomed ways. He did not think that one could be too optimistic over the experiment in organized international relations upon which the world was entering, for it involved a substitution of social thinking for selfish thinking. Members of the conference evidently were divided as to whether faith in the united effort of the nations was justified or whether the chief function of Dumbarton Oaks was to quiet the stirring idealists by trying to paint a pretty picture. "Do we merely wish," he asked, "to keep them quiet with a façade that is satisfactory from their point of view, while we go about our business, the same as that in which we have been engaged in the past and which we know fairly well? If we launch this new experiment of international organization of world government without any real feeling in our hearts regarding its outcome—I do not believe that we can honestly hope for any great degree of success."

World opinion, he concluded, was fluid—some might say, hopelessly confused. It was difficult to think clearly and definitely about the future. If such discussions could be continued without mutual recrimination and with a predisposition to recognize the good in these schemes of world organization, the right road was taken to make genuine progress toward a cooperative world.

## *Some Concluding Statements*

### *An American Member*

At the risk of stating the obvious, an American member reminded the conference that most of the questions discussed hinged on the use of political power. There were three things that could be done with it. Power could be overcome; but few would believe that at the end of this war the power possessed by the United Nations could be overcome by any other controlling force. Power could be abolished. Peoples large and small, strong and weak, might take part in the affairs of the world on an exactly equal footing; but few would think that such a state of affairs was at all likely to arise at the end of the war. There was, then, the third possibility, the *use* of power. It could be used for either individual or collective advantage. The gist of the discussions at this conference seemed to him the recognition that, with all its faults, the Dumbarton Oaks proposal suggests a way in which the power that exists in the world can be used to common and not merely selfish advantage.

But it would be a mistake for states or governments to determine their course of action solely with reference to power. There were also human feelings in the world that must be considered—not only individual feelings but also group feelings. Thus, one of the important tasks that lay ahead was to reconcile the views of the smaller powers with those of the larger ones. This task, again, involved two lines of endeavor, a political and an educational one. The unity of the world and not only of the four Great Powers must be assured and maintained.

### *A Canadian Member*

The chairman, in bringing the conference to a close, drew attention to the remarkable degree of coordination which had been achieved in the military activity of the United Nations in the Pacific. Security after the war could not, he held, be achieved without a similar coordination in the fields of political, economic, and "interracial" relations. Advances in all three directions were indispensable to real security. In so far as it was attempting to make some small contributions to this coordination, the Institute was justifying its existence.

## APPENDIX I

### PROPOSALS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

There should be established an international organization under the title of The United Nations, the Charter of which should contain provisions necessary to give effect to the proposals which follow.

#### CHAPTER I. PURPOSES

The purposes of the Organization should be:

1. To maintain international peace and security; and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means adjustment or settlement of international disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in the solution of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems; and
4. To afford a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the achievement of these common ends.

#### CHAPTER II. PRINCIPLES

In pursuit of the purposes mentioned in Chapter I the Organization and its members should act in accordance with the following principles:

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states.
2. All members of the Organization undertake, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership in the Organization, to fulfill the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter.
3. All members of the Organization shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered.
4. All members of the Organization shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization.
5. All members of the Organization shall give every assistance to the Organization in any action undertaken by it in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
6. All members of the Organization shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which preventive or enforcement action is being undertaken by the Organization.

The Organization should ensure that states not members of the Organization act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

#### CHAPTER III. MEMBERSHIP

1. Membership of the Organization should be open to all peace-loving states.

## *Security in the Pacific*

### CHAPTER IV. PRINCIPAL ORGANS

1. The Organization should have as its principal organs:
  - a. A General Assembly;
  - b. A Security Council;
  - c. An international court of justice; and
  - d. A Secretariat.
2. The Organization should have such subsidiary agencies as may be found necessary.

### CHAPTER V. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

#### *Section A. Composition*

All members of the Organization should be members of the General Assembly and should have a number of representatives to be specified in the Charter.

#### *Section B. Functions and Powers*

1. The General Assembly should have the right to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; to discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any member or members of the Organization or by the Security Council; and to make recommendations with regard to any such principles or questions. Any such questions on which action is necessary should be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion. The General Assembly should not on its own initiative make recommendations on any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which is being dealt with by the Security Council.

2. The General Assembly should be empowered to admit new members to the Organization upon recommendation of the Security Council.

3. The General Assembly should, upon recommendation of the Security Council, be empowered to suspend from the exercise of any rights or privileges of membership any member of the Organization against which preventive or enforcement action shall have been taken by the Security Council. The exercise of the rights and privileges thus suspended may be restored by decision of the Security Council. The General Assembly should be empowered, upon recommendation of the Security Council, to expel from the Organization any member of the Organization which persistently violates the principles contained in the Charter.

4. The General Assembly should elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council and the members of the Economic and Social Council provided for in Chapter IX. It should be empowered to elect, upon recommendation of the Security Council, the Secretary-General of the Organization. It should perform such functions in relation to the election of the judges of the international court of justice as may be conferred upon it by the statute of the court.

5. The General Assembly should apportion the expenses among the members of the Organization and should be empowered to approve the budgets of the Organization.

6. The General Assembly should initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in political, economic and social fields and of adjusting situations likely to impair the general welfare.



## *Proposals for a General International Organization*

7. The General Assembly should make recommendations for the coordination of the policies of international economic, social, and other specialized agencies brought into relation with the Organization in accordance with agreements between such agencies and the Organization.

8. The General Assembly should receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council and reports from other bodies of the Organization.

### *Section C. Voting*

1. Each member of the Organization should have one vote in the General Assembly.

2. Important decisions of the General Assembly, including recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security; election of members of the Security Council; election of members of the Economic and Social Council; admission of members, suspension of the exercise of the rights and privileges of members, and expulsion of members; and budgetary questions, should be made by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. On other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, the decisions of the General Assembly should be made by a simple majority vote.

### *Section D. Procedure*

1. The General Assembly should meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require.

2. The General Assembly should adopt its own rules of procedure and elect its President for each session.

3. The General Assembly should be empowered to set up such bodies and agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions.

## CHAPTER VI. THE SECURITY COUNCIL

### *Section A. Composition*

The Security Council should consist of one representative of each of eleven members of the Organization. Representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Republic of China, and, in due course, France, should have permanent seats. The General Assembly should elect six states to fill the non-permanent seats. These six states should be elected for a term of two years, three retiring each year. They should not be immediately eligible for reelection. In the first election of the non-permanent members three should be chosen by the General Assembly for one-year terms and three for two-year terms.

### *Section B. Principal Functions and Powers*

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the Organization, members of the Organization should by the Charter confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and should agree that in carrying out these duties under this responsibility it should act on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council should act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization.

3. The specific powers conferred on the Security Council in order to carry out

## *Security in the Pacific*

these duties are laid down in Chapter VIII.

4. All members of the Organization should obligate themselves to accept the decisions of the Security Council and to carry them out in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

5. In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments, the Security Council, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Chapter VIII, Section B, paragraph 9, should have the responsibility for formulating plans for the establishment of a system of regulation of armaments for submission to the members of the Organization.

### *Section C. Voting*

(Note—The question of voting procedure in the Security Council is still under consideration.)

### *Section D. Procedure*

1. The Security Council should be so organized as to be able to function continuously and each state member of the Security Council should be permanently represented at the headquarters of the Organization. It may hold meetings at such other places as in its judgment may best facilitate its work. There should be periodic meetings at which each state member of the Security Council could if it so desired be represented by a member of the government or some other special representative.

2. The Security Council should be empowered to set up such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions including regional subcommittees of the Military Staff Committee.

3. The Security Council should adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

4. Any member of the Organization should participate in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the Security Council considers that the interests of that member of the Organization are specially affected.

5. Any member of the Organization not having a seat on the Security Council and any state not a member of the Organization, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, should be invited to participate in the discussion relating to the dispute.

## CHAPTER VII. AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1. There should be an international court of justice which should constitute the principal judicial organ of the Organization.

2. The court should be constituted and should function in accordance with a statute which should be annexed to and be a part of the Charter of the Organization.

3. The statute of the court of international justice should be either (a) the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, continued in force with such modifications as may be desirable or (b) a new statute in the preparation of which the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice should be used as a basis.

4. All members of the Organization should *ipso facto* be parties to the statute of the international court of justice.

## *Proposals for a General International Organization*

5. Conditions under which states not members of the Organization may become parties to the statute of the international court of justice should be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council.

### CHAPTER VIII. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY INCLUDING PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF AGGRESSION

#### *Section A. Pacific Settlement of Disputes*

1. The Security Council should be empowered to investigate any dispute, or any situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

2. Any state, whether member of the Organization or not, may bring any such dispute or situation to the attention of the General Assembly or of the Security Council.

3. The parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security should obligate themselves, first of all, to seek a solution by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of their own choice. The Security Council should call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

4. If, nevertheless, parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in paragraph 3 above fail to settle it by the means indicated in that paragraph, they should obligate themselves to refer it to the Security Council. The Security Council should in each case decide whether or not the continuance of the particular dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and, accordingly, whether the Security Council should deal with the dispute, and, if so, whether it should take action under paragraph 5.

5. The Security Council should be empowered, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in paragraph 3 above, to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

6. Justiciable disputes should normally be referred to the international court of justice. The Security Council should be empowered to refer to the court, for advice, legal questions connected with other disputes.

7. The provisions of paragraph 1 to 6 of Section A should not apply to situations or disputes arising out of matters which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned.

#### *Section B. Determination of Threats to the Peace or Acts of Aggression and Action With Respect Thereto.*

1. Should the Security Council deem that a failure to settle a dispute in accordance with procedures indicated in paragraph 3 of Section A, or in accordance with its recommendations made under paragraph 5 of Section A, constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, it should take any measures necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization.

2. In general the Security Council should determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and should make recommendations or decide upon the measures to be taken to maintain or restore peace and security.

## *Security in the Pacific*

3. The Security Council should be empowered to determine what diplomatic, economic, or other measures not involving the use of armed force should be employed to give effect to its decisions, and to call upon members of the Organization to apply such measures. Such measures may include complete or partial interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic and economic relations.

4. Should the Security Council consider such measures to be inadequate, it should be empowered to take such action by air, naval or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade and other operations by air, sea or land forces of members of the Organization.

5. In order that all members of the Organization should contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, they should undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements concluded among themselves, armed forces, facilities and assistance necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Such agreement or agreements should govern the numbers and types of forces and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. The special agreement or agreements should be negotiated as soon as possible and should in each case be subject to approval by the Security Council and to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their constitutional processes.

6. In order to enable urgent military measures to be taken by the Organization there should be held immediately available by the members of the Organization national air force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action should be determined by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in paragraph 5 above.

7. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security should be taken by all the members of the Organization in cooperation or by some of them as the Security Council may determine. This undertaking should be carried out by the members of the Organization by their own action and through action of the appropriate specialized organizations and agencies of which they are members.

8. Plans for the application of armed force should be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in paragraph 9 below.

9. There should be established a Military Staff Committee the functions of which should be to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, to the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, to the regulation of armaments, and to possible disarmament. It should be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. The Committee should be composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any member of the Organization not permanently represented on the Committee should be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires that

## *Proposals for a General International Organization*

such a state should participate in its work. Questions of command of forces should be worked out subsequently.

10. The members of the Organization should join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

11. Any state, whether a member of the Organization or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of measures which have been decided upon by the Security Council should have the right to consult the Security Council in regard to a solution of those problems.

### *Section C. Regional Arrangements*

1. Nothing in the Charter should preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the Organization. The Security Council should encourage settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies, either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

2. The Security Council should, where appropriate, utilize such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority, but no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.

3. The Security Council should at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

## ECONOMIC CHAPTER IX. ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL AND SOCIAL COOPERATION

### *Section A. Purpose and Relationships*

1. With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, the Organization should facilitate solutions of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Responsibility for the discharge of this function should be vested in the General Assembly, and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in an Economic and Social Council.

2. The various specialized economic, social and other organizations and agencies would have responsibilities in their respective fields as defined in their statutes. Each such organization or agency should be brought into relationship with the Organization on terms to be determined by agreement between the Economic and Social Council and the appropriate authorities of the specialized organization or agency, subject to approval by the General Assembly.

### *Section B. Composition and Voting*

The Economic and Social Council should consist of representatives of eighteen members of the Organization. The states to be represented for this purpose should be elected by the General Assembly for terms of three years. Each such state should have one representative, who should have one vote. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council should be taken by simple majority vote of those present and voting.

## *Security in the Pacific*

### *Section C. Functions and Powers of the Economic and Social Council*

1. The Economic and Social Council should be empowered:
  - a. to carry out, within the scope of its functions, recommendations of the General Assembly;
  - b. to make recommendations, on its own initiative, with respect to international economic, social and other humanitarian matters;
  - c. to receive and consider reports from the economic, social and other organizations or agencies brought into relationship with the Organization, and to coordinate their activities through consultations with, and recommendations to, such organizations or agencies;
  - d. to examine the administrative budgets of such specialized organizations or agencies with a view to making recommendations to the organizations or agencies concerned;
  - e. to enable the Secretary-General to provide information to the Security Council;
  - f. to assist the Security Council upon its request; and
  - g. to perform such other functions within the general scope of its competence as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.

### *Section D. Organization and Procedure*

1. The Economic and Social Council should set up an economic commission, a social commission, and such other commissions as may be required. These commissions should consist of experts. There should be a permanent staff which should constitute a part of the Secretariat of the Organization.
2. The Economic and Social Council should make suitable arrangements for representatives of the specialized organizations or agencies to participate without vote in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by it.
3. The Economic and Social Council should adopt its own rules of procedure and the method of selecting its President.

## CHAPTER X. THE SECRETARIAT

1. There should be a Secretariat comprising a Secretary-General and such staff as may be required. The Secretary-General should be the chief administrative officer of the Organization. He should be elected by the General Assembly, on recommendation of the Security Council, for such term and under such conditions as are specified in the Charter.
2. The Secretary-General should act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, and of the Economic and Social Council and should make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.
3. The Secretary-General should have the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten international peace and security.

## CHAPTER XI. AMENDMENTS

Amendments should come into force for all members of the Organization, when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by the members of the Organization having permanent membership on the Security Council and by a majority of the other members of the Organization.

## *Proposals for a General International Organization*

### CHAPTER XII. TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

1. Pending the coming into force of the special agreement or agreements referred to in Chapter VIII, Section B, paragraph 5, and in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, the states parties to that Declaration should consult with one another and as occasion arises with other members of the Organization with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. No provision of the Charter should preclude action taken or authorized in relation to enemy states as a result of the present war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.

#### *NOTE*

In addition to the question of voting procedure in the Security Council referred to in Chapter VI, several other questions are still under consideration.

APPENDIX II  
PAPERS PRESENTED TO THE NINTH I.P.R. CONFERENCE  
(mimeographed unless otherwise described)

A. CONFERENCE DATA PAPERS

*Australia*

1. THE AUSTRALIAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, by L. F. Giblin.
2. REQUIREMENTS OF AN EXPANDING ECONOMY FOR AUSTRALIA, by a Member of the Australian Institute of International Affairs.
3. PART I—AUSTRALIA'S ATTITUDE TO THE POST-WAR GOVERNMENT OF THE PACIFIC DEPENDENCIES, by P. D. Phillips.  
PART II—AUSTRALIA AS A PACIFIC POWER, by W. MacMahon Ball.  
PART III—A SECURITY SYSTEM FOR THE PACIFIC, by a Member of the Australian Institute of International Affairs.  
PART IV—SOME EFFECTS OF JAPANESE OCCUPATION ON SOUTH-EAST ASIA, by Geoffrey Sawyer.
4. AUSTRALIAN INTERESTS IN POST WAR AIR TRANSPORT, by a Member of the Australian Institute of International Affairs.
5. PART I—AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURE IN THE POST-WAR WORLD, by a Member of the Australian Institute of International Affairs.  
PART II—AUSTRALIA AND LATIN AMERICA—COMPETITION ON A COMMON PLATFORM, by G. Schneider.
6. AUSTRALIA'S POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PACIFIC, by G. L. Wood and Walter Hill.

*Canada*

1. CANADA'S TRADE WITH TRANS-PACIFIC COUNTRIES, by Arthur L. Neal.
2. CANADA AND THE PACIFIC AFTER THE WAR, by A. R. M. Lower.
3. CANADA'S POST-WAR STATUS, by L. B. Jack.
4. CANADA AND AIR TRANSPORT IN THE PACIFIC AREA AFTER THE WAR, by Donald C. MacDonald.

*China*

1. CHINA AND FOREIGN CAPITAL, by W. Y. Lin.
2. PLANS FOR CHINA'S INDUSTRIALIZATION, by Ching-Chao Wu.
3. CHINA AND SOUTHEASTERN ASIA, by S. C. Chen.
4. THE STATUS OF ALIENS AND FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN CHINA, by Wang Tieh-Yai.
5. SECURITY MINIMUM—FREEDOM FROM FEAR, by Dison Hsueh-Feng Poe.
6. THE PROBLEM OF THE FAR EAST IN A NEW WORLD ORDER, by S. R. Chow.

*France*

1. RAW MATERIALS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC, by Jean Gottmann.
2. FRENCH INDO-CHINA'S PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC REGIME, by Jean de La Roche.
3. A PROGRAM OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ACTIVITY IN INDO-CHINA, by Jean de La Roche.
4. THE STANDARD OF LIVING IN THE DELTA OF THE TONKIN (French Indo-China), by P. Gourou.
5. INDO-CHINA AND FRENCH COLONIAL POLICY, by Jean de La Roche.



## *Papers Presented to Ninth I.P.R. Conference*

### *India*

1. INDIA'S POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION AND ITS INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, by P. S. Lokanathan.
2. PART I—STABILIZATION OF INDIAN CURRENCY AND PRICES, by Dr. V. K. R. V. Rao.  
PART II—INDIA'S STERLING ASSETS, by B. R. Shenoy.
3. ASPECTS OF AGRICULTURAL REHABILITATION IN INDIA, by Mr. Balasubramanian.

### *Netherlands-Netherlands Indies*

1. PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, by Dr. F. H. Visman.
2. RELIEF, REHABILITATION AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION IN THE NETHERLANDS INDIES, by P. H. W. Sitsen.
3. MINING IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, by Alex L. Ter Braake. (Printed).

### *New Zealand*

1. RECONSTRUCTION IN NEW ZEALAND, by Horace Belshaw.
2. PART I—COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC, by J. O. Shearer and F. L. W. Wood with collaboration of R. W. McGechan.  
PART II—NEW ZEALAND AND THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, by W. T. G. Airey, A. G. Davis and J. Rutherford.
3. PART I—NEW ZEALAND'S DEPENDENCIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUTONOMY, by W. S. Lowe and W. T. G. Airey.  
PART II—THE SOUTH SEAS REGIONAL COMMISSION, by Ernest Beaglehole.

### *United Kingdom*

1. REPORT ON PACIFIC SECURITY, by a Royal Institute of International Affairs Study Group.
2. CHINA'S ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION, by E. M. Gull.
3. BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND DEVELOPMENT OF SELF GOVERNMENT IN MALAYA, by Phyllis Kaberry.
4. JAPAN IN DEFEAT, by a Royal Institute of International Affairs Study Group.

### *United States*

1. CHINA AS A POST-WAR MARKET, by Lawrence Rosinger (Printed).
2. PACIFIC NORTHWEST TRADE WITH FAR EAST PACIFIC NATIONS, by Charles J. Miller.
3. TOWARD INTERNATIONAL MONETARY STABILIZATION, by Members of Research Staff, Federal Reserve Bank, San Francisco, California.
4. CHINA'S RELIEF NEEDS, by National Planning Association (Printed).
5. THE FUTURE OF JAPAN, by William C. Johnstone.
6. GROUP INTERESTS IN POST-WAR AMERICAN PACIFIC POLICY, by John W. Masland.
7. ANGLO-AMERICAN CARIBBEAN COMMISSION, by Ralph J. Bunche.
8. AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY, by Harry H. Field.
9. AVIATION IN THE POST-WAR PACIFIC, by J. Parker Van Zandt.
10. COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC, by David N. Rowe.

## *Security in the Pacific*

### *International Secretariat*

1. JAPAN'S POST-WAR AGRICULTURE, by Andrew J. Grajdanzev.
2. ASPECTS OF WARTIME ECONOMIC CONTROL IN JAPAN (and Supplement), by T. A. Bisson.
3. BASIC PROBLEMS OF RELIEF, REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, by J. Russell Andrus.
4. PROBLEMS OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN JAPAN, by Andrew J. Grajdanzev.
5. NOTES ON CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE AND TRADE POLICY, by D. K. Lieu.
6. POST-WAR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF FRENCH INDO-CHINA, by Gaston Rueff.
7. LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES, by A. Arthur Schiller.
8. NOTES ON LABOR PROBLEMS IN BURMA AND THAILAND, by Virginia Thompson.
9. FEUDAL BACKGROUND OF JAPANESE POLITICS, by E. H. Norman.
10. ECONOMIC PLANNING IN INDIA, by Andrew J. Grajdanzev.
11. NOTES ON LABOR PROBLEMS IN INDO-CHINA, by Virginia Thompson.
12. THE POST-WAR POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE FAR EAST AND THE PACIFIC, by A. G. B. Fisher.

### *B. OTHER PAPERS*

ASIA ON THE MOVE, by Bruno Lasker (Issued under the auspices of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations by Henry Holt and Company, New York).

CIVIL AVIATION AND PEACE, by J. Parker Van Zandt (The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.).

DEMOGRAPHIC STUDIES OF SELECTED AREAS OF RAPID GROWTH (Milbank Memorial Fund, New York).

THE DUMBARTON OAKS PLAN, by Percy E. Corbett (Yale Institute of International Studies).

INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT (His Majesty's Stationery Office, London).

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION IN CHINA (Government of the Republic of China).

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS (Reprinted from The Bulletin of International News, London).

*The conference papers listed above may be obtained, at prices ranging from 10 cents to \$1.50, from the International Secretariat of the I.P.R. at 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y. A price list is obtainable on request. Supplies are limited. All of the "other" papers are published by other institutions and will not be distributed by the I.P.R.*

### APPENDIX III

#### CONFERENCE MEMBERSHIP

(Years in parentheses after names indicate attendance at previous I.P.R. conferences)

##### AUSTRALIA

- BOYER, R. J. F. (1942). Member of the Australian Broadcasting Commission since January 1940; Director of the American Division of the Commonwealth Department of Information since 1941. President, Graziers' Federal Council of Australia, 1942. *Chairman*.
- BAILEY, K. H. Professor of Public Law, University of Melbourne, since 1931. Member, Australian delegation, League of Nations Assembly, 1937. Member, Alien's Tribunal, 1941. At present acting as consultant to Federal Attorney-General, Canberra.
- BRIGDEN, J. B. Financial Counsellor, Australian Legation, Washington. Formerly: Professor of Economics in University of Tasmania; Director, Bureau of Industry, Government of Queensland; Chairman, National Insurance Commission, Canberra; Secretary, Department of Supply and Munitions, Melbourne.
- EDWARDS, REVEREND CANON WILLIAM JOHN. Headmaster, Canberra Grammar School, Canberra, A.C.T., Australia. First President, Canberra Branch, Australian Institute of International Affairs. Member of the Commonwealth Council. Delegate to the British Commonwealth Relations Conference at Lapstone, N.S.W., 1938.
- EGGLESTON, SIR FREDERIC (1927, 1929, 1936). Formerly Chairman of the Australian I.P.R. and the Australian Institute of International Affairs; for many years Australian member, Pacific Council, I.P.R. Recently, Australian Minister to China. At present, Australian Minister to the United States.
- WATT, ALAN S. Counsellor, Australian Legation, Washington, D. C.
- Australian Secretariat*
- MORRIS GREENE, Australian Legation, Washington 8, D. C.

##### CANADA

- WALLACE, MALCOLM. Principal Emeritus of University College, University of Toronto; President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. *Chairman*.
- McINNIS, EDGAR. Associate Professor of History, University of Toronto; Chairman of Public Education Committee of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs; Author: "The Unguarded Frontier," 1942; "The War Fourth Year," 1944, etc. *Vice-Chairman*.
- ANGUS, H. F. (1929, 1933, 1939). Professor of Political Science and Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B. C., and at present Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa.
- BRADY, ALEXANDER. Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto; Chairman of the Research Committee of C.I.I.A.; Author: "Canada" in Modern World Series; joint author with F. R. Scott of "Canada After the War" published by the C.I.I.A., 1944.
- CAVELL, CAPTAIN R. G. (1942). Vice-President and General Manager, Automatic Electric, Canada, Limited, Toronto; Chairman of National Executive, C.I.I.A.

## *Security in the Pacific*

- Formerly served with Indian Army and Indian Government. Has had extended business experience in China and Japan.
- COYNE, JAMES E. Executive Assistant to the Governors of the Bank of Canada, Ottawa.
- KEENLEYSIDE, H. L. (1942). Recently appointed Canadian Ambassador to Mexico; formerly assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Member, Permanent Joint Board of Defense, and Joint Economic Committees of the United States and Canada. First Secretary, Canadian Legation, Tokyo, 1926-36. Chairman, Immigration Board of Review, 1937. Member, Special Committee on Orientals in British Columbia, 1940. Author: "Canada and the United States" and "History of Japanese Education."
- LINGARD, C. C. Chief Librarian, Regina Public Library; Secretary, Regina (Sask.) Branch, C.I.I.A. Writer on Canadian and international affairs and contributor of numerous articles to *Regina Leader-Post*; *Winnipeg Free Press*; *Toronto Saturday Night*; *Canadian Historical Review* and *Pacific Affairs*.
- MAHEUX, L'ABBE ARTHUR (1942). Archivist and Professor of Canadian History, Laval University, Quebec. Vice-President of the C.I.I.A.; Author: "French Canada and Britain" published in 1942 by the C.I.I.A.; "What Keeps Us Apart?", 1944, and "Problems of Canadian Unity," 1944.
- MENZIES, ARTHUR R. Far Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.
- NORMAN, E. H. (1942). Far Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. Canadian Legation, Tokyo, 1940-42. Author: "Japan's Emergence as a Modern State," and "Soldier and Peasant in Japan."
- REID, ESCOTT (1933, 1936). First Secretary, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D. C. National Secretary, C.I.I.A., 1932-38. Acting Professor of Government, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 1937-38. Appointed to the Canadian External Affairs service, January 1939. Adviser to the Canadian Delegation to the International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, 1944.
- TAYLOR, K. W. (1933). Coordinator, Foods Administration, Ottawa; formerly Professor of Political Economy, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. Author: "Canadian-American Industry: A Study in International Investment" and numerous contributions to Canadian and English journals and reviews on various economic subjects.

### *Canadian Secretariat*

- DOUGLAS MACLENNAN, National Secretary, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 230 Bloor Street West, Toronto. *Secretary*.
- EDNA NEALE (1942). Assistant Secretary, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto.

## *CHINA*

- CHIANG, MON-LIN. Formerly: Minister of Education; Chancellor, National Peking University. Now, Member, Executive Council, National Southwest Associated University; President, Chinese Red Cross, and Chairman, China Institute of Pacific Relations. *Chairman*.
- CHANG, CARSON. Member, Peoples' Political Council.
- CHANG, CHUNG-FU (1936). Director, Department of American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

### *Conference Membership*

- CHEN, S. C. Professor of Sociology, National Southwest Associated University. Associate Director, Nankai Institute of Economics.
- CHIEN, TUAN-SHENG (1939). Professor of Political Science, National Southwest Associated University; Member, Peoples' Political Council.
- CHOW, S. R. (1939, 1942). Professor of International Law, National Wu-Han University; Member, Peoples' Political Council.
- HSIA, CHING-LIN (1929, 1931, 1942). Member, Legislative Yuan; Director, Chinese News Service, New York.
- HU, SHIH (1931, 1933, 1936). Formerly: Ambassador to the United States; Dean, College of Literature, National Peking University; Member, Peoples' Political Council; and Chairman, China Institute of Pacific Relations. Now, Visiting Professor, Harvard University.
- LEE, KAN (1936, 1942). Commercial Counsellor, Chinese Embassy, Washington, D. C.
- LI, CHOH-MING. Associate Director, Nankai Institute of Economics.
- LIU, YU-WAN (1933, 1936, 1939). Executive Secretary, China Institute of Pacific Relations.
- LOWE, C. H. (1931, 1936). Director, India Office, Ministry of Information.
- NING, ENG-CHENG (1929, 1931). Chief Auditor, The Farmers Bank of China; Vice-Chancellor, Northeastern University.
- POE, DISON HSUEH-FENG. Professor of Political Science, National Central University; Counsellor, National Supreme Defense Council.
- SHAO, YU-LING. Secretary, National Military Council.
- WU, WEN-TSAO. Professor of Sociology, Yenching University; Counsellor, Supreme National Defense Council.
- YANG, YUNCHU. Director, Department of Eastern Asia Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- YEH, GEORGE. Representative, Ministry of Information, London.
- YUAN, T. L. Librarian, National Library of Peking.
- Chinese Secretariat*
- CHENG, PAO-NAN. Director, Mid-West Bureau, Chinese News Service, Chicago.
- MRS. ENID CHEN (1942). Chinese News Service, New York.
- HELEN NELSON ENGLUND. Director, International Relations Speakers Bureau, Chicago, Illinois.
- T. C. HSU. Chinese News Service, New York.
- MRS. ROBERT T. HUANG.
- ELEANOR STRYNSKI. Chinese News Service, Chicago, Illinois.

### *FRANCE*

- NAGGIAR, PAUL EMILE. Ambassadeur de France. (Formerly Ambassador in Moscow and previously Ambassador in Nanking and Hankow.) *Chairman*.
- PELLIOT, PAUL, M. C. One of the founders of the French School of the Far East, Hanoi, 1899; besieged in the Peking Legation, 1900; head of the French Archaeological Expedition to Chinese Turkestan, 1906-09; Professor at the Collège de France, 1911; Military Attaché in Peking, 1916-19; member of the Institut de France, 1921; President of the Société Asiatique, 1935; Chairman of the Comité d'Etudes des Problèmes du Pacifique, Paris; Director of the Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, Paris, 1941. *Vice-Chairman*.

## *Security in the Pacific*

- BERNARD, FERNAND. Colonel (Colonial Corps) retired. Former President of the Commission for delimitation of the borders between Indo-China and Siam. Negotiator of the Treaty of March 23, 1907 between France and Siam. Former delegate of the French Government to the International Rubber Regulation Committee, 1934-40. Administrator of the Banque de l'Indochine.
- BURNAY, JEAN. State Counsellor, detailed to UNRRA. Previously detailed to the Siamese Government. Ex-member of the Siamese Legislation Commission. Previously Head of Legal Matters with Secretary for Justice of Fighting France in London. Has been Administrative Representative for this Department in Normandy after the invasion.
- FRANCOIS, ALFRED. Public Works Head-Engineer (Ponts et Chaussées). Representative in the Far East for French Banks Central Group.
- GOUROU, PIERRE. Professor of Geography at the University of Bordeaux; correspondent member of the "Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient," Author: "Les Paysans du Delta Tonkinois," 1936; "L'utilisation du Sol en Indochine Française" published by the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, Paris, 1940; "La Terre et l'homme en Extrême Orient," 1941.
- LANGLOIS-BERTHELOT, PHILIPPE. Chairman "Institut François du Caoutchouc" and of "Institut des Fruits et Agrumes Coloniaux." Vice-Chairman of "Institut des Huiles de Palme et Oléagineux." Member of the Direction Committee, "Centre National du Commerce Extérieur."
- MORIZON, COLONEL VICTOR. Aide to the Chief of the French Military Mission in Washington.
- ROBEQUAIN, CHARLES. Professor of Colonial Geography at the University of Paris (Sorbonne). Member of "L'Ecole Française D'Extrême Orient." Member of "L'Académie des Sciences Coloniales." Author: "L'Indochine Française," 1935; "L'Evolution Economique de l'Indochine Française" (Comité d'Etudes des Problèmes du Pacifique, 1939).
- SISOWATH, PRINCE YOUIEVONG. From the Royal family of Cambodia. Doctor of science.
- TAO-KIM-HAI, ANDRE MARIE. Docteur en droit. Reporter and publicist. Secretary of "La Patrie Annamite"; correspondent of *Paris-Dakar*. Author: "L'Indochine Française depuis Pigneau de Brehaigne," and "L'Enfance Indochinoise."
- TRAN-BA-HUY, PHILIPPE. Medical doctor, surgeon. Former assistant for Otolaryngology at Trousseau Hospital. Assistant at the Ophthalmologic Service of Saint-Antoine Hospital. Expert on Annamite affairs.
- French Secretariat*
- CAPTAIN ADRIEN H. ALCAN. Attached to French Supply Council in Washington and French Representative in the UNRRA Far East Committee and sub-committees.
- CAPTAIN MAURICE ANDLAUFR. Head, French Colonial Supply Mission, New York.
- JEAN DE LA ROCHE. Colonial Administrator. Address: 501 Madison Ave., New York 22.

## *INDIA*

- PANDIT, MRS. V. L. Ex-Minister for Public Health, Local Self-Government, United Provinces. *Chairman*.

### Conference Membership

KUNZRU, PANDIT H. N. President, Servants of India Society. Member, Council of State; Member, Executive Council, University of Allahabad; Member, Executive Council, Benares Hindu University; National Commissioner, Hindusthan Scout Association.

RAO, B. SHIVA. Correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Hindu* in New Delhi.

SIDDIQI, A. R. Member, Legislative Assembly of Bengal; Formerly Mayor of Calcutta; Formerly, President, Muslim Chamber of Commerce. Chairman, Board of Directors, Eastern Federal Union Insurance Co. Ltd. Editor, *Morning News*, Calcutta.

*Adviser to the Indian group*

P. S. LOKANATHAN. Editor, *Eastern Economist*, New Delhi. Formerly Professor of Economics, University of Madras.

### KOREA

DEYOUNG, HENRY C. Member, Korean Delegation to Disarmament Conference, 1921; Author: "Case of Korea," "The Oriental Policy of the United States," "Korean Treaties." Member, Korean Commission, Washington, D. C.

DUNN, J. KYUANG. Secretary of Public Relations, United Korean Committee in America, Washington, D. C. Korean Member, Executive Committee, Morale Section of Office of Military Government, Hawaii; Member of Faculty, Ewha College, Seoul, Korea; Editor, *Korean National Herald*, Honolulu.

NEU, ILHAN. President, New-Ilhan Co., Seoul, Korea; Founder, La Choy Products Co., Inc., Detroit; Director, Lew-Hon Trading Co., Manchuria; Author: "Korea and the Pacific War." Publisher, *Korea Economic Digest*.

### NETHERLANDS-NETHERLANDS INDIES

VISMAN, FRANS H. Member of the Board for the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curacao in New York since 1943. Netherlands Indies Civil Service, 1910-32; Governor of Menado (Celebes), Netherlands Indies, 1932-35; Commissioner for Reforms in the internal administration of the Netherlands Indies, Batavia, 1935; Member of the Council for the Netherlands Indies, Batavia, 1936-41; Chairman of the Commission for Constitutional Reforms, Batavia, 1941; Chairman, Netherlands and Netherlands-Indies Council, IPR. *Chairman*.

HONIG, PIETER (1942). Member of the Board for the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curacao in the United States. Former Director of Experimental Station, Java sugar industry at Pasuruan; Director of the Rubber Research Institute at Buitenzorg, Java, 1941-42. Member of the Provincial Legislature of East Java for 11 years. Member of the Council for Natural Sciences in the NEI. *Vice Chairman*.

CRENA DE IONGH, DANIEL. Chairman of the Board for the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curacao in the United States since October 1943. With the Netherlands Trading Society, 1914-39, President, 1934-39; Chairman, Netherlands Indies Exchange Control Board, Batavia, 1940-42; Vice-Chairman, Far Eastern Committee, UNRRA; Member, Netherlands Delegation, Bretton Woods, N. H., International Stabilization Conference; Member of the Board, Royal Colonial Institute of Amsterdam, 1934-39.

DE VOOGE, N. A. J. (1942). Adviser on Japanese Affairs, Board for the Nether-

## *Security in the Pacific*

- lands Indies, Surinam and Curacao. Netherlands Consular Service in Japan, 1930-36; Consul for the Netherlands in Kobe, 1938-42.
- DJUMENA, RADEN MOHAMMED M. SOERIANATA. First Secretary, Netherlands Embassy, Washington, D. C. Formerly with the Netherlands East Indies Department of the Interior. Former Secretary, Netherlands Legation, Djeddah, Saudi-Arabia.
- HASSELMAN, W. P. (1942). Trade Commissioner for the Netherlands Indies in New York since 1943. Manager, International Credit and Trade Society "Rotterdam" in Japan, 1933-41.
- HOVEN, JAN. With the Netherlands Trading Society since 1919, formerly manager Hongkong and Calcutta branches, at present manager, New York office; Director, Netherlands Trading Society East, Inc. (Delaware).
- JACOBSON, HERMAN (1942). With the Royal Dutch-Shell Petroleum Company, 1906-42. Head representative of the Royal Dutch-Shell group in the NEI at Batavia, 1920-33. Again in the NEI during the autumn of 1941. Member, Board of Directors, Royal Netherlands Indies Airways (KNILM) since 1929.
- KAHN, S. I. President, Malaya and Java Agencies, Inc., since 1938. Member of the "Volksraad" 1931; managing director, L. E. Tels Trading Corporation, 1931-38.
- RANNEFT, REAR ADMIRAL J. E. MEIJER. Naval attaché, Netherlands Embassy, Washington, D. C. since 1938. Service in the Netherlands Indies 1907-10, 1917-22, and 1927-32. Netherlands delegation, International Radio Conference, Lisbon 1934, Bucharest 1937, Cairo 1938.
- ROOS, COLONEL R., R.N.I.A. Military attaché, Netherlands Embassy, Washington, D. C.; Royal Netherlands Military Flying School, Jackson, Mississippi, 1942; Netherlands Representation, Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1942-44.
- Netherlands Secretariat*
- J. F. ENGERS (1942). Secretary, Netherlands-Netherlands Indies Council, I.P.R. 10 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20, N. Y. *Secretary*.
- FREDERICK LEK. JEANNE MINTZ.

## *NEW ZEALAND*

- BELSHAW, HORACE (1929, 1936). Professor of Economics, Auckland University College, Auckland; Research Secretary, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. *Chairman*.
- TURNER, BRUCE (1936, 1942). Secretary, New Zealand Legation, Washington, D. C. Former Secretary, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs.

## *PHILIPPINES*

- ZAFRA, URBANO A. (1942). Economic Adviser to the President of the Philippines; Member, War Cabinet; Member, Filipino Rehabilitation Commission; Chairman, Technical Committee of the President of the Philippines; Alternate Member, Council of UNRRA; United Nations Food and Agriculture Interim Commission; Acting Chairman, Philippine Delegation to the International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, 1944; Washington Representative, Philippine Sugar Association, 1933-40; Delegate, International Sugar Conference, London, 1937. *Chairman*.
- VIRATA, LEONIDES S. Assistant to the Auditor-General and Secretary of Finance; Member, Economist, Technical Committee of the President of the Philippines;



### Conference Membership

Instructor in Business Administration and Fellow, University of the Philippines.  
*Vice-Chairman.*

ARNALDO, SOLOMON V. Chief of Research and Reference, Department of Information and Public Relations; Acting Philippine Representative, United Nations Information Board; Member, Executive Committee, International Education Assembly; Assistant Professor in English and Fellow, University of the Philippines. *Secretary.*

#### *Philippine Secretariat*

DOLORES ABELLERA. Department of Finance.

### THAILAND

PRAMOJ, M. R. SENI (1942). Free Thai Minister to the United States. *Chairman.*

BHAKDI, L. D. Secretary of the Thai Legation, Washington, D. C.

SANASEN, M. Former official of League of Nations Treasury, 1925-40. Secretary of Thai Legation, Washington, D. C.

### UNITED KINGDOM

McFADYEAN, SIR ANDREW (1933). His Majesty's Treasury, 1910-19. Director of the British North Borneo (Chartered) Company. Secretary of the British Delegation, Reparation Commission, 1920-22. General Secretary to the Reparation Commission, 1922-24 and to the Dawes Committee, 1923-24. Commissioner of Controlled Revenues, Berlin, 1924-30. *Chairman.*

ANDREWS, WILFRID. Company Director, Farmer and Fruit Grower. Member, Finance Committee, Royal Institute of International Affairs. President of Rotary International Association of Great Britain, 1930-31. Member, Organizing Committee, Conventions of Rotary International at Ostend (1926), Seattle (1932), and San Francisco (1937). *Acting National Secretary.*

BALDWIN, AIR MARSHAL SIR JOHN. K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. Director of Personnel Services, Air Ministry, 1935-36; Commandant R.A.F. College, Cranwell, 1936-39; Air Officer Commanding No. 21 (Training) Group, 1939; Commanded No. 3 Group, Bomber Command; Deputy A.O.C. in C., India, 1942-43; Air Commander Third Tactical Air Force (Burma Front), 1943-44.

BUTLER, SIR PAUL, K.C.M.G. Member of H.M. Foreign Service. Has held Consular posts in Tokyo, Seoul (Korea), Osaka, Kobe, Formosa, Manila and Mukden. From 1938-41 was H.M. Consul-General at San Francisco; Director-General of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Ministry of Information at New Delhi, 1942-43. Adviser at the Foreign Office, 1944.

CLARKE, COMMODORE A. W., D.S.O., R.N. On active list of Royal Navy since 1914. Has held executive and staff appointments both ashore and afloat during that period, including command of H.M. ships both in peace and war. Chief of Staff to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Malta in 1943 and later seconded for duty with the army in the field. At the present time Chief of Staff to the Head of the British Naval Staff associated with the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization in Washington, D. C.

CREECH-JONES, A., M.P. (1942). Labour Member of Parliament since 1935. Parliamentary Private Secretary to The Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin. Chairman of the Labour Party Advisory Committee on Imperial Affairs and of the Fabian Colonial Bureau. Member, Colonial Office Education Advisory Committee and Vice-

## *Security in the Pacific*

- Chairman, Commission on Higher Education in West Africa, 1943-44. Member, T.U.C. Advisory Committee on Colonial Labour. Former National Secretary, Transport and General Workers Union.
- FARMER, VICTOR. Director of Imperial Chemical Industries (China) Ltd. Served in the British Army in Salonica and with the Caucasus Forces, 1915-19. With Brunner Mond & Co., and its successor Imperial Chemical Industries, in China since 1920.
- GAMMANS, CAPTAIN L. D., M.P. (1942). Conservative Member of Parliament since 1941. Entered the British Colonial Service, 1920, and served in Malaya, 1920-34. British Embassy, Tokyo, 1926-28. Director, Land Settlement Association, 1934-39. Attached to the Ministry of Information, 1939-41. Member, British Parliamentary Delegation to the West Indies, 1944.
- GYAW, THE HON. SIR HTOON AUNG. Finance Minister in Burma until 1942; now Counsellor to the Governor of Burma.
- KESWICK, JOHN (1931). Director of the firm of Jardine Matheson & Co., Far Eastern Merchants. At present attached to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten's Staff, South East Asia Command and recently returned from China.
- MCDONALD, COLIN. Journalist, Commentator and Lecturer. Special Correspondent of *The Times* in China for 5 years (1938-43). Attached to the Bowes-Lyon Mission, San Francisco, 1943, and at present attached to the British Embassy, Washington, D. C.
- MACDOUGALL, RAIBEART, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., I.C.S. Indian Civil Service since 1915. Secretary to the Governor of Burma, Local Government Department, 1931-34. Appointed Commissioner of the Sagaing Division of Upper Burma, 1934. Now Counsellor to the Governor of Burma.
- MARDEN, GEORGE ERNST, M.C. Chairman, Wheelock Marden & Co., Ltd., Eastern Asia Navigation Co. Ltd., Shanghai Tug & Lighter Co. Ltd. (all foregoing now of London). Metal Industries of China, Ltd., Paper Industries, Ltd., International Assurance Co. Ltd., G. E. Marden & Co., Ltd., Yangtze Finance Ltd., Director, Shanghai Dockyards, Ltd., Shanghai Worsted Mills Ltd., New China Textile Mills Ltd., Resident in Shanghai 1920-42. Chinese Customs Service till 1925. Repatriated 1942 from Shanghai after its capture by Japanese. Joint Managing Director, Fairey Aviation Co., Ltd., 1943.
- POWELL, IFOR B. Made a special study of the Philippines while Riggs Fellow of the University of Michigan, 1925-26 and Rockefeller Travelling Fellow, 1926-29. Has lived and travelled widely in the Far East and the U.S.A. Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth, 1929-30. Senior History Master, Barry Boys County School, Wales, 1930-41. Temporarily seconded in 1941 to the Ministry of Labour and National Service.
- PUCKLE, SIR FREDERICK, K.C.I.E., C.B.I. Advisor to the British Embassy, Washington. Formerly Secretary, Government of India, Department of Information. Served in the European War, 1915-19. Deputy Commissioner, and various other posts, in the Punjab, since 1919.
- SANSOM, SIR GEORGE, K.C.M.G. (1942). Advisor on Far Eastern Affairs, British Embassy, Washington. Consular Service in Japan from 1904-24; Commercial Counsellor, 1924-41. Adviser to Ministry of Economic Warfare, Far Eastern Mission, Singapore and later member of Far Eastern War Council, Singapore,

## Conference Membership

- 1941-42. Attached to United Command Headquarters, Java, February 1942.
- SCOTT, MAJOR JOHN SWIRE. Director of the firm of Butterfield and Swire, Far Eastern Shipowners and Merchants. Member of the Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1934-35. Has travelled widely in the Far East. At present serving in the Scots Guards.
- STEIN, GUENTHER. China correspondent of *The News Chronicle* (London) and *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston). Japan 1934-37; Hongkong 1938-39; Chungking 1939-November 1944. Recently returned from a journey to the Communist areas in Northwest China. Author: "Made in Japan," and "Far East in Ferment."
- WENTWORTH-SHIELDS, COLONEL W. F. Served as General Staff Officer 3 (Intelligence), H.Q. Eastern Command, and General Staff Officer 2, on the Coordination Staff of the Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff. A.Q.M.G. of the Lethbridge Mission to the U.S.A. and the South and Southwest Pacific Commands, India, and the Indo-Burma Fronts. At present serving at the War Office, London. Author: "The Empire on Guard."
- WHYTE, SIR FREDERICK, K.C.S.I. (1927, 1942). Convenor of Discussion Meetings and Chairman of the Far Eastern Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. President, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1920-25. Political Adviser to the National Government of China, 1929-32. Director-General of the English-Speaking Union in London, 1928-39. Head of the American Division of the Ministry of Information, 1939-40.

### *United Kingdom Secretariat*

- MARIE LOUISE TWADDELL, New York Publications Secretary, R.I.I.A., 542 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y.
- MRS. JOHN LOCKE (1942).

## UNITED STATES

- JESSUP, PHILIP C. (1933, 1939, 1942). Professor of International Law, Columbia University. Former Chairman of the Pacific Council, I.P.R. Chief, Division of Personnel and Training OFRRA; Secretary pro-tem of Council of UNRRA, 1943. Legal Adviser to American Ambassador to Cuba, 1930. Author: "The United States and the World Court," 1929; "International Security," 1935; "The Life of Elihu Root," 1938. *Chairman*.
- HART, ADMIRAL T. C. Navy General Board, Navy Department. Former Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, 1939-42. *Vice-Chairman*.
- ALLEN, EDWARD W. Member, Allen, Hilen, Froude & DeGarmo, Attorneys at Law, Seattle. American member and Chairman of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission. Member, Seattle Chamber of Commerce.
- BOLTON, THE HONORABLE FRANCES P. Representative 22nd Ohio District. U. S. Congress. Vice-Chairman, National Republican Program Committee, 1938-40.
- BUNCHE, RALPH (1942). Area Specialist, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State. Served with the U. S. group at Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Substitute Adviser on the United States Delegation to the 26th Session of the International Labour Conference at Philadelphia, April-May 1944.
- CALKINS, ROBERT D. Dean, School of Business, Columbia University. Dean, College of Commerce, University of California, Berkeley, 1937-41. Vice-Chairman,

## *Security in the Pacific*

- San Francisco Regional Labor Board, 1934. Chairman, Pacific Coast Regional Committee of Social Science Research Council, 1939-41. Chairman, Executive Committee, American Council, I.P.R. Consultant, National Resources Planning Board, 1940-41.
- COE, FRANK (1942). Assistant Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration.
- COONS, ARTHUR G. Dean of Faculty and Professor of Economics at Occidental College, Los Angeles. Visiting Professor and Research Fellow at California College in China Foundation, in China, 1933-34. Research Chairman, Southern California Region, American Council, I.P.R., 1938-41.
- DE CAUX, LEN (1942). Publicity Director, Congress of Industrial Organizations; Editor of *The CIO News*. Member, Board of Trustees, American Council.
- EMERSON, RUPERT. Director, Liberated Areas Branch, Foreign Economic Administration. On leave from Harvard—Associate Professor in the Department of Government. One year 1932-33, spent in Southeast Asia. Author: "Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule."
- FAHEY, COLONEL DANIEL C., JR. Member of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff, assigned as working member with Civil Affairs Division.
- FIELD, FREDERICK V. (1929, 1931, 1933, 1936, 1939, 1942). Executive Vice-Chairman, Council for Pan American Democracy. Secretary, American Council, I.P.R., 1935-40. Author: "American Participation in the China Consortiums," Editor: "Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area," 1934. General Editor: "Economic Survey of the Pacific Area," 1942.
- GERBODE, MRS. FRANK A. (1929). Member, Executive Committee, San Francisco Bay Region, American Council, I.P.R.
- GILCHRIST, HUNTINGTON. Executive, American Cyanamid Company. Chief of Department of Administrative Commissions, League of Nations Secretariat, 1920-25; Assistant Director of Mandates Section, League of Nations, 1925-28. Instructor, Anglo-Chinese College, Foochow, 1913-14; Peking University, 1914-15. Secretary of the Second Session of the UNRRA Council, Montreal, 1944.
- JOHNSTONE, WILLIAM C. Director of Washington Study Program, I.P.R. Professor of Political Science and Dean of the School of Government, The George Washington University, Washington, D. C.
- KEESING, FELIX M. (1931). Professor of Anthropology, Stanford University, California. Professor and Chairman, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of Hawaii, 1937-43. Author: "Modern Samoa," 1934; "The Philippines—A Nation in the Making," 1937; "The South Seas in the Modern World," 1941.
- KIRK, GRAYSON. Research Associate, Institute of International Studies, Yale University. Professor of Government at Columbia University. Served with the U. S. group at Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Author: "Philippine Independence," 1936.
- LATTIMORE, OWEN (1933, 1936, 1939, 1942). Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University. Consultant, Office of War Information. Former Political Adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

### Conference Membership

- MACKEY, J. A. Vice-President, National City Bank, New York, in charge of Far Eastern district.
- MCCOY, MAJOR GENERAL FRANK R., U.S.A. retired (1939, 1942). President, Foreign Policy Association. Member of Wood-Forbes special mission to the Philippines, 1921. In charge of American relief activities in Japan following the earthquake of 1923. American member of the League of Nations Commission of Inquiry in Manchuria, 1932.
- MORISON, GEORGE ABBOT. Vice-Chairman, Bucyrus-Erie Company, Milwaukee. Chairman, Milwaukee Office, American Council, I.P.R.
- SALISBURY, LAURENCE. Editor, *Far Eastern Survey*, American Council, I.P.R. Former Foreign Service Officer; twelve years in Japan, five in China and two in Manila, five years in the Department of State.
- STALEY, EUGENE (1939). School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D. C. Consultant, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Formerly on Faculty of University of Chicago, Institute Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales (Geneva), Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Author: "World Economy in Transition," 1939; "World Economic Development: Effects on Established Industrial Countries," 1944.
- THOMPSON, LAURA. Coordinator of Research in Administration, Society for Applied Anthropology. Formerly consultant to the U. S. Naval Government of Guam. Author: "Guam and Its People," "Fijian Frontiers," "Steps Toward Colonial Freedom."
- VAN ZANDT, J. PARKER. Research Associate, The Brookings Institution. Observer at International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago, 1944. Author: "Civil Aviation and Peace," "The Geography of World Air Transport."
- VINCENT, JOHN CARTER. Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs, Department of State.
- WAYMACK, W. W. Editor and Vice-President, *The Des Moines Register and Tribune*. Chairman, Economic Policy Committee, 1938-41.
- DENNETT, RAYMOND. Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y. *Secretary*.
- American Secretariat*
- DOROTHY BORG (1939, 1942). Temporary member, American Council Staff.
- MIRIAM S. FARLEY (1936, 1939, 1942). Editor, American Council Pamphlet Series; Research Associate, American Council, I.P.R.
- MARGARET FISCHL. American Council Staff.
- SHIRLEY JENKINS, Assistant Editor, *Far Eastern Survey*, American Council, I.P.R.
- MRS. WILLIAM C. JOHNSTONE. Temporary member, American Council Staff.
- CAROLYN KIZER (1936, 1942). American Council Staff.
- BRUNO LASKER (1931, 1933, 1936, 1942). Research Associate, American Council, I.P.R.
- ELEANOR LATTIMORE (1936, 1939). Washington Office, American Council, I.P.R.
- CHARLES F. LOOMIS (1925, 1927, 1929, 1931, 1933, 1936, 1939, 1942). Secretary, Hawaii Office, American Council, I.P.R. Chief, Morale Section, Office of the Military Governor, Hawaii.
- J. J. MICKLE. Temporary Member, American Council Staff.
- HARRIET MILLS. American Council Staff.
- HARRIET H. PARKER. Assistant to the Secretary, American Council, I.P.R.

## *Security in the Pacific*

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER (1939) . Far Eastern Research Associate, Foreign Policy Association.

FRANCES SHARPE. American Council Staff.

MARGUERITE A. STEWART. Editor and Secretary of the School Department, American Council, I.P.R.

ROSE YARDUMIAN (1942) . Washington Representative, I.P.R.

### *INTERNATIONAL OFFICERS OF THE I.P.R.*

TARR, EDGAR J. (1929, 1933, 1936, 1939, 1942) . Chairman, Pacific Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. President, Monarch Life Assurance Company; Director, Bank of Canada.

LI, K. C. (1939, 1942) . Chairman, International Finance Committee, I.P.R. President, Wah Chang Trading Corporation, New York.

WHYTE, SIR FREDERICK, K.C.S.I. Chairman, International Programme Committee, I.P.R.

### *OBSERVERS*

#### *International Labour Office*

E. J. RICHES (1942) . Acting Economic Adviser, in charge of the Economic and Statistical Section.

PETRONELLA M. HAGE. Member of the Dependent Territories Service.

#### *League of Nations Secretariat*

A. LOVEDAY (1942) . Director, Economic, Financial and Transit Department.

SHAN-KWEI FONG. Economic, Financial and Transit Department.

#### *Rockefeller Foundation*

ROGER F. EVANS (1942) . Assistant Director for the Social Sciences, Rockefeller Foundation. J. H. & C. K. Eagle Company, Inc., Shanghai, 1921-29.

#### *United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration*

K. Y. CHEN. Assistant Chief of the Far Eastern Division, Bureau of Areas.

ROBERT T. HUANG. Assistant General Counsel, UNRRA. Formerly, Director, Bureau of Trade Marks, Chinese National Government, Chungking; Legal Counsel, Central Bank of China; Legal Adviser to President, Executive Yuan.

SZE-MING SZE. Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Health Division.

### *INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT*

EDWARD C. CARTER (1927, 1929, 1931, 1933, 1936, 1939, 1942) . Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations.

W. L. HOLLAND (1929, 1931, 1933, 1936, 1939, 1942) . International Research Secretary, I.P.R.

HILDA AUSTERN (1936, 1939, 1942) . Assistant Treasurer, I.P.R.

T. A. BISSON (1936, 1939)

Y. Y. Hsu

FRANCES CAPPS

FRED MYERS

RUTH D. CARTER (1936, 1939, 1942)

RUTH PARSONS

P. E. CORBETT (1939)

LAURA LEE ROSENTHAL

BROOKS EMEY (1936, 1939, 1942)

CLARA SPIDELL

OLGA FIELD

ROBERT J. VERNON, JR.

ANDREW J. GRAJDANZEV (1942)

MICHI YASUMURA

## *Conference Membership*

### *CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT*

MRS. JANE ALDEN	MARGUERITE F. HILL
ALVIN BARBER	CLARE HOLT
LT. ROBERT G. BARNES	MAJOR BRUCE HOWE
MRS. ROBERT W. BARNETT (1939)	LT. ANSCO E. JANN
MRS. HORACE BELSHAW	MICHAEL LEE
KNIGHT BIGGERSTAFF	CAPT. R. F. MACEY
LT. RAYMOND E. BURNES	MRS. ABBOTT MOFFAT
MRS. EDWARD C. CARTER	LT. SAMUEL E. PERKINS
(1929, 1936, 1939, 1942)	LT. CMDR. DARIUS V. PHILLIPS
LT. COLONEL J. W. COULTER	SQDN. LDR. FRED W. POLAND (1942)
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## INDEX

- Aggression, *see* Peace maintenance.
- Agriculture, 25, 28, 48, 51, 53, 55, 57, 58-59, 61, 63, 81.
- Air Force, 115-116, 118, 142.
- Aircraft industry (Japanese), 33, 47.
- Alaska, 88.
- American troops, 72-74.
- Americans, 91-92, 93, 118, 124-126, 132.
- Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, 97.
- Anglo-Russian treaty of 1942, 7.
- Annamites, 80-81.
- Anti-Semitism, 78.
- Anzac Agreement, 19, 107, 114, 118.
- Armament control, 32-34, 35-36, 48, 118, 120, 121, 128, 138, 140.
- Armed force, 71-74, 115-119, 142.
- Armistice (Japanese), 27-29.
- Atlantic Charter, 1, 9-10, 11-12, 121, 125.
- Assembly, *see* General Assembly.
- Australia, 12, 19, 27, 36, 52, 55, 71, 75, 95-97, 107, 109, 113; American troops in, 72; Conference membership, 148; troops of, 72.
- Bailey, K. H., 12.
- Bases, 116-117.
- Big Three, 1, 2, 28; *see also* Great Powers and United Kingdom, United States and U.S.S.R.
- Big Four, 2, 28, 145; *see also* Great Powers and China, United Kingdom, United States and U.S.S.R.
- Blockade of Japan, 41.
- Bombay Plan, 60-61.
- Bonin islands, 37.
- Boundaries, *see* Territorial questions.
- Borneo, 83.
- Bretton Woods, 2, 14, 125.
- British, 9-10, 11-12, 132; troops, 72.
- British Empire, 131-132.
- Burma, 5, 37, 52, 56, 61, 69, 86, 123-124.
- Cairo Conference, 5, 21, 36, 37, 89, 125.
- Cambodians, 80-81.
- Canada, 13, 71, 74, 75, 107, 109, 113; Conference membership, 149-150.
- Canberra Agreement, 12, 27, 89, 107, 112, 113, 115.
- Canteens, 72, 74.
- Capital, 59, 60, 63-65, 67, 121, 131.
- Caribbean, 97.
- Cement, 62.
- Chemicals, 33, 47.
- Chiang Mon-Lin, 5-6.
- Chicago Conference, 1.
- China, 2, 5-6, 11, 18-19, 28, 31, 35, 44, 89, 91, 105, 109, 113, 120, 139; aid to, 5, 14-15, 60, 121; American troops in, 72; Conference membership, 150-151; democracy in, 6, 57, 59-60; and Great Britain, 19; industrialization of, 6, 35, 48, 57, 59; and Mongolia, 122-123; and Pacific Islands, 36; political differences in, 122; postwar needs, 48, 52-59, 121; postwar trade, 48; reparations to, 45, 46; role of, 6, 14-15, 21; and United States, 18; *see also* Great Powers.
- China's Destiny*, 59.
- Chinese, 5, 19, 74; army, 5, 15; immigration, 75; labor, 60; nationals, 71, 83, 94.
- Churchill, Winston, 9, 11.
- Civil affairs, 28, 38, 122.
- aircraft, 33.
- conflict, 122.
- rights, 44.
- service, 70, 82, 83.
- Civil Aviation conference, 14, 112.
- Clothing, 53.
- Coal, 54, 62.
- Collective security, 1, 7, 10, 16, 21, 22, 34, 36, 37, 44, 45, 51, 62, 65, 88, 97, 99-126, 130.
- Colonies and Dependencies, 8, 15, 16, 35, 55, 69, 77, 80-98, 109, 114-115, 121, 122, 128, 130-131.
- Communications, 57, 61, 63.
- Communists, 26, 55, 58.
- Corbett, P. E., 99-103.
- Court of Justice, *see* World Court.
- Cripps Mission, 85-86.

## Index

- de Gaulle, General, 6-7, 80.
- Democracy, 82-83, 92-93, 121; in China, 6, 57, 59-60; in Japan, 25-26, 30, 36, 41, 42-44, 47, 51.
- Dependencies, *see* Colonies and Dependencies.
- Development, *see* Reconstruction and Development.
- Disarmament, *see* Armament control.
- Doctors, 53, 62.
- Drugs, *see* Medical supplies.
- Dumbarton Oaks, 1, 6, 7, 10, 12, 35, 51, 68, 94, 97, 100-102, 104-122, 125-126, 130, 135-136; proposals of, 137-145.
- Economic and Social Council, 109, 114, 139, 143-144.
- Economic development, 8, 10-12, 15, 19, 21, 27, 36, 41, 45, 47, 48, 50-51, 61, 62, 65, 68, 93, 114, 121, 128, 130-131, 133; problems, 130-131, 142-143.
- Education, 44, 61, 62, 70, 76-79, 83, 90, 93, 97, 102, 136.
- Emperor, Japanese, 26, 27-28, 30-31, 39-41, 51.
- Employment, 11, 12, 63, 65, 66, 67.
- Europe, postwar, 48.
- Fair Employment Practices Committee, 70, 79.
- Fertilizers, 52.
- Filipinos, 74.
- Fishing, 47.
- Food, 21, 22, 28, 30, 47, 48, 53, 54, 61, 64.
- Foreign exchange, 48, 64.
- Foreign loans, 58, 60, 62-66, 130-131.
- Formosa, 21, 46, 52.
- Four-Power Treaty, 99.
- France, 6-7, 66, 70, 89, 95, 119, 124, 139, 151-152.
- Franco-Russian Treaty, 7.
- Free Thai, 16, 123-124.
- Freedom from fear, 10, 120-121, 134; freedom from want, 10, 12, 120-121, 135; freedom of speech, 104, 130.
- Frontiers, *see* Territorial questions.
- Gandhi, Mahatma, 84-85.
- General Assembly, 107, 138-139, 141, 144.
- Great Britain, *see* United Kingdom.
- Great Powers, 1, 2, 10, 28, 35, 38, 102, 105-108, 112, 120, 123, 136, 145; *see also* China, United Kingdom, United States and U.S.S.R.
- Guam, 88.
- Guarantees, 110-111, 124.
- Guerrillas, 21, 22, 26, 28.
- Hawaii, 74, 88.
- Health, 53, 55, 61, 62, 90, 97, 114.
- Hindus, 85, 90.
- Hong Kong, 36-37, 84.
- Housing, 61, 62.
- Immigration laws, 71, 75-76.
- Imperial institution, 39; *see also* Emperor.
- Import control, 34, 41, 46, 47, 48, 131.
- IPR, Mont Tremblant Conference, *see* Mont Tremblant Conference.
- India, 11, 16-17, 48, 49, 52, 55, 64-65, 67, 69, 121, 123, 130; Conference membership, 152-153; foreign trade, 61, 67; foreign troops in, 73-74; independence of, 84-86, 90-91, 132; postwar needs, 6, 131.
- Indian Army, 84.
- Indo-China, 54, 56, 61, 62, 80-81, 95.
- Indian nationals, 75, 79, 83, 94.
- Industries, 53-54, 55, 58-59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 67, 128, 131; Chinese, 6, 35, 48, 57, 59; Japanese, 21, 22, 32-34, 44, 47, 48.
- Inflation, 55.
- International accountability, 8, 12, 16, 27, 38, 95-98, 117, 122, 130.
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 65, 66.
- International cooperation, 62-63, 65, 67-68, 76, 79, 127, 129, 133-134, 136; *see also* International organization.
- International Labour Organization, 68, 94.
- International Monetary Fund, 65.
- International organization, 35, 38, 50, 68, 91, 92, 95, 99-103, 125, 127, 129; *see also* Dumbarton Oaks.
- International police force, 118; *see also* Armed force.

# Index

- International trusteeship, 36.
- Iron, 62.
- Isolationism, 125-126.
- Japan, 4, 19; army and navy, 24, 28, 32; constitution, 39, 40, 42-43; defeat of, 5-6; democracy in, 25-26, 30, 36, 41, 42-44, 47, 51; foreign trade, 34, 36, 46, 47, 48; and international organization, 35, 50; island bases, 21, 36-37; occupation of, 28-30, 32, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42, 47, 49; postwar, 21-50.
- Japanese, 23-26, 29, 36, 39, 40-41, 42-43, 47; education of, 44; nationals, 74; propaganda, 75.
- Korea, 21, 26, 31, 36, 44, 46, 52, 53, 79, 89; Conference membership, 153.
- Kuriles, 37.
- Labor, 70, 79, 93, 114.
- Languages, Oriental, 78.
- Laos, 81.
- League of Nations, 68, 97, 99-101, 104, 109.
- Lend-Lease Agreements, 1.
- Lime, 62.
- Liuchin, 36.
- Living standards, 11, 47, 49, 60, 61, 62, 63, 121, 128, 131, 133.
- McFadyean, Sir Andrew, 8-11.
- Machine tools, 33.
- McInnis, Edgar, 13.
- Maize, 54.
- Malaya, 71.
- Manchuria, 21, 22, 26, 31, 46, 52.
- Mandate system, 90-91, 97, 117.
- Mandated Pacific islands, 36-37, 89-90, 117; *see also* Colonies and Dependencies.
- Marcus islands, 37.
- Medical supplies, 53, 55.
- Melanesians, 89.
- Merchant shipping (Japanese), 33, 47.
- Micronesians, 89.
- Middle Powers, 107, 109.
- Military force, 19, 100, 106.
- Military Staff Committee, 115, 118-120, 142.
- Moi, 81.
- Money, 64.
- Mongolia, 122-123.
- Mont Tremblant Conference, 8, 10, 91, 111-112.
- Moscow Declaration, 1, 5, 12, 125, 145.
- Moslems, 85, 90, 123.
- Naggiar, Paul Emile, 5-6.
- Negroes in U. S. A., 93.
- Netherlands, The, 7-8, 66, 81-82, 95, 119; Conference membership, 153-154.
- Netherlands Indies, 7-8, 15, 46, 53, 56, 81-82; Conference membership, 153-154.
- New Guinea, 52.
- New Zealand, 12, 19, 27, 36, 52, 95, 96-97, 107, 113; American troops in, 72; Conference membership, 154.
- Nine-Power Treaty, 99.
- Nisei, 5, 74.
- Occupation of Japan, 28-30, 32, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42, 47, 49.
- Oceania, 89-90, 97.
- Okano, Susumu, 26.
- Ore, 62.
- Pacific Islands, 21, 36-37, 89-90.
- Pakistan, 85.
- Pandit, Mrs. V. L., 11.
- Papua, 52.
- Peace maintenance, 10, 17, 34, 35, 36, 49-50, 100, 110, 112, 119-121, 141-143.
- Peace treaty, 38.
- Permanent Court of International Justice, *see* World Court
- Petroleum, 34, 54, 66.
- Philippines, 4, 13-14, 28, 49, 53, 54, 56, 62, 79, 87-88, 91, 117, 133; Conference membership, 154-155; independence of, 13-14; and U. S. A., 14, 117.
- Polynesians, 89.
- Police force, international, 118; Japanese, 32, 39; *see also* Armed force.
- Power control, 34.
- Prisoners, Japanese, 31.
- Private enterprise, 57.
- Propaganda, 75, 76, 110.

## Index

- Public opinion, 93, 104, 118, 121-125, 127.  
Public works, 54, 63.
- Racial relations, 5, 69-79, 82-83, 121, 129, 130, 136.  
Raw materials, 8, 22, 31, 48, 52, 60, 63, 64, 65, 121, 128, 130.  
Reconstruction and Development, 45, 49, 52, 57-68, 79, 83.  
Regional organizations, 68, 89, 92, 95-97, 107, 111-115, 118-119, 127, 132.  
Relief and Rehabilitation, 51-57; *see also* UNRRA.  
Religious tolerance, 70.  
Reparations, 45-46, 48.  
Repatriation, 31-32, 46.  
Rice, 30, 53, 54, 61.  
Rubber, 66, 83.
- Sakhalin, 37.  
Samoa, 88.  
Sanctions, 100, 106, 108, 120, 142.  
Savings, 60, 61, 63, 130.  
Security, *see* Collective security.  
Security Council, 35, 107, 110, 113, 114, 115, 118, 125, 138, 139-140, 141-144.  
Seeds, 52.  
Self-government, 80-97, 109, 121, 122, 123, 128.  
Shipbuilding, 34, 47.  
Shipping, 54.  
Siberia, 23.  
Simla Conference, 123.  
Singapore, 71, 83.  
Sinkiang, 123.  
Skilled workers, *see* Technicians.  
Small Powers, 12, 27, 35, 38, 102, 106-108, 136.  
Social welfare, 89, 49, 143-144; *see also* Food, Health, Housing and Living Standards.  
Societies, patriotic and secret, 29, 39.  
South Seas Regional Commission, 89, 97, 115.  
Sovereignty, 100-101, 135.  
Spheres of influence, 2.  
Stabilization, 63-64, 128.  
Steel, 62.
- Straits Settlement, 83.  
Supply problems, 56-57.
- Tariffs, 66-67.  
Tarr, Edgar J., speech of, 1.  
Technicians, 31-32, 34, 42, 45, 53, 55, 78, 130.  
Teheran Conference, 5, 125.  
Territorial questions, 36-37, 80-81, 87, 110, 122-124.  
Textiles, 46-47, 48, 54, 66.  
Thailand, 16, 71, 80, 87, 123-124; Conference membership, 155.  
Tibet, 122-123.  
Trade, 2, 8, 22, 33, 35, 36, 46-47, 52, 61-68, 81, 89, 100, 121, 128, 131.  
Transport, 28, 52, 53, 54-55, 57, 63.  
Treaties, 111.  
Treaty of Paris (1928), 99.  
Tsushima islands, 7.  
Tydings-McDuffie Law (1934), 13.
- United Kingdom, 1, 2, 8-11, 28, 64, 70, 87, 89, 96, 105, 109, 118-120, 131-133, 139; and China, 19; Conference membership, 155-156; foreign loans, 66; and France, 7; and Pacific War, 9; and United States, 1, 132-133; *see also* Great Powers.  
United Nations, Charter of, 111; Conference, 102; Declaration of Jan. 1, 1944, 94.  
UNRRA, 7, 14, 55-56, 139.  
United States, 1, 2, 17-18, 28, 89, 91, 105, 118-119, 128, 139; aid to Netherlands, 7; and China, 18, 19; Conference membership, 157-160; foreign loans, 48, 65, 66; foreign trade, 65; and France, 7; and Great Britain, 1, 15; immigration laws, 75; and Pacific islands, 36-37, 92, 125; racial relations, 69, 70-71, 75; role of, 10, 16, 65, 99, 101, 120, 121; treatment of Japanese nationals and Nisei, 74; *see also* Great Powers.  
U.S.S.R., 1, 2, 26, 28, 35, 37, 38, 70, 89, 105, 109, 128; and China, 59, 122-123; and France, 7; *see also* Great Powers.  
Utilities, 29, 54, 59, 63.

## *Index*

Vandenburg, Arthur H., 112, 125.  
Veterans, 125.  
Veto power, 105-106.  
Visman, Frans H., 7.  
Visman Commission, 82.  
Volcano islands, 37.  
  
Wage standards, 70.

War criminals, 30.  
Waymack, W. W., 4-5.  
Wilhelmina, Queen, 8, 81.  
World Court, 18, 97-98, 99, 106, 138,  
140-141.  
  
Zafra, Urbano A., 13-14.  
Zaibatsu, 24, 29, 39, 41-42, 51.











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